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  and Political Science 
ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on nuclear deterrence has 
declined. The rise of China has generated a voluminous literature on power 
transition theory and whether China and the United States can avoid the 
“Thucydides Trap.” A lacuna in this literature is the role that nuclear deterrence 
plays in the strategic dynamic between the United States, Japan, and China.   
This dissertation fills this lacuna by analyzing the role that nuclear 
deterrence plays in the military strategies of Japan, China, and the United States. 
How do China and Japan internalize and understand nuclear deterrence theory 
in ways that depart from the Cold War paradigm? What effect do dissimilar 
conceptions of nuclear deterrence theory have on the nuclear and conventional 
force structure and strategies of each country?  
To understand the reasons for variation in nuclear strategy in East Asia, I 
argue that contra systemic theories Japan legitimizes its military capabilities in an 
	 x 
extended nuclear deterrence framework based on ideationally driven 
constitutional theory.  Departing from Japan’s strategic mindset during the Cold 
War, China now occupies the place of the “Other” in Japanese national identity, 
thus in part explaining its shift to a more pro-active military posture. This is to say 
that it is not China’s rise that preoccupies Japan, but China’s rise that influences 
Japanese strategic behavior. Lastly, I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy 
behavior and nuclear strategy are driven not by structural incentives dictated by 
the international system, but by ideational and historical imperatives under the 
rubric of the “China Dream (zhongguo meng)” and “National Rejuvenation (minzu 
fuxing).” 
Using analyses of Japanese and Chinese language sources, e.g., official 
government and defense documents, newspapers, books, and journal articles, 
this dissertation makes two major contributions. First, departing from the 
dominant and acultural structural realist and game theoretic approaches to 
nuclear deterrence theory, it offers an alternative “thin constructivist approach” 
that considers distinct ideational determinants of each country’s approach to 
nuclear deterrence theory and their effect on nuclear strategy. Second, it 
uncovers dissimilar approaches to nuclear escalation that depart from Cold War-
derived models. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
The Paradoxes in Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Realism: 
The Case for a Thin Constructivist Approach 
 
So free action requires not just that reasons cause actions but that 
reasons cause actions because they are the reasons they are. So if there 
is any free action at all, then there has to be mental causation. If there is 
no mental causation, then there cannot be any free action.1 
 
Introduction: Are Extant Theories of Nuclear Deterrence Inadequate? 
Given the centrality of material factors as drivers in international relations 
theory generally, and nuclear deterrence theory specifically, one might be 
inclined to question the salience or appropriateness of ideational, political, and 
other immaterial factors in nuclear strategy. Further, for those that argue that 
immaterial factors are mere epiphenomenal appendages of the material world, 
especially when we consider the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons, 
studies of ideational, political, and immaterial inputs into the dynamics of 
deterrence may seem quaint at best and, at worst, a potentially dangerous 
distraction from the true nature of the nuclear problem. This is to say, to some 
observers, the relationship and relevance of the political to nuclear strategy is not 
self-evident. 
Abstract models of nuclear strategy—designed for deterrence, 
ostensibly—are not intrinsically problematic, as many conceptions of the political 																																																								
1 Anthony Dardis, Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem (New York: Columbia 
Univ. Press, 2008), 5. 
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are undoubtedly abstract. The key issue of contention is whether actors in 
nuclear states understand the dynamics of deterrence and nuclear strategy in a 
more-or-less monolithic, reductive fashion.2 The same may be said of the 
problem of reification. It could be that some or all of those involved in 
conceptualizing and implementing nuclear strategy have recourse to reified 
concepts of nuclear deterrence. What is not abundantly clear, however, is the 
degree of similitude in reified models of nuclear deterrence across political 
systems, defense intellectuals, and the broader overall strategic community in 
each country under consideration, respectively. 
Nuclear deterrence and the subsequent nuclear strategy it entails do not 
exist in a vacuum. Nuclear deterrence is a relationship: one surely cannot deter 
nothing. Yet, this is not an argument about the causes of proliferation. Nor is this 
an argument about the consequences of proliferation qua proliferation. Nuclear 
weapons states have invested political and economic resources into their 
respective nuclear forces for a variety of reasons. The puzzle of nuclear 
proliferation can include the rationale(s) for constituting a nuclear weapons 
program up to and including the point of weaponization and deployment. Nuclear 
strategies and nuclear deterrence relationships occur, on the other hand, ipso 
facto after the weapons have become operational and deployable. 
																																																								
2 See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow’s assessment in how the CIA and DoD 
differed in their conceptions of nuclear deterrence, Richard Ned Lebow, “Misconceptions 
in American Strategic Assessment,” Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 2 (Summer 
1982): 192–94. 
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Asia and Theoretical Pessimism 
Prior to examining the theoretical aspects of nuclear strategy and 
deterrence, I will briefly attempt to outline why the study of nuclear strategy and 
its effect on international relations in Asia is significant by elucidating some 
pessimistic perspectives that can be derived from mainstream international 
relations theory. Perhaps surprisingly, a pessimistic perspective on the future of 
the Asian security dynamic is not a position unique to realists. With respect to 
international relations theory, pessimistic perspectives or conflict-prone future 
typologies can be located within or derived from the tenets of the three dominant 
paradigms of international relations theory: realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism. As we shall see, negative security spirals can have many origins 
or motivations, i.e., tensions arising from classical machtpolitik, incongruity in 
governing institutions and the ideational commitments contained therein, 
animosities whose loci lie in historical memory saturated with antipathy toward 
the Other, or a sense of state identity or personhood imbued with and cultivated 
by doctrines of illiberal nationalism. 
Realism, the tradition of thought in international relations most often 
associated with pessimism, allows little room for trust between states, is 
suspicious of cooperation, and incentivizes the adoption of self-help security 
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policies.3 Realism is not a uniform theory, but pessimistic assumptions can 
emanate from all strands of realist thought.4  
Realist calculations of the security dynamic in Asia naturally stress the 
dangers of the disequilibrium likely to be caused by rising powers, specifically 
China, and potentially India. Realist logic posits that rising powers will assume a 
military power commensurate with its economic power. This will inevitably upset 
the current balance- of- power, and conflict is likely to be the primary variable in 
establishing a new order to accommodate a rising China’s ambitions. Kenneth 
Pyle aptly explains the destabilizing effects of systemic irruption: 
Rising powers may be tempted either by opportunities offered to them 
where obstacles are surmountable to expand their access to new 
territories, new sources of raw materials, and markets or by the lure of 
intangible gains in prestige, leadership, and security. Depending on many 
factors, including the degree of alienation, the nature of domestic politics, 
and the willingness and skill of the other powers to cope with 
dissatisfaction, a rising power may be prepared to see the overthrow of 
the existing system.”5 
 
When assessing the power potential of an aspiring hegemon through a 
realist lens, we can envision a future China with a larger population, a more 
prosperous economy, a modern military equipped with nuclear weapons, 																																																								
3 For the seminal work on classical realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1985). For 
the seminal work on structural or defensive realism, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). For the seminal work on offensive 
realism, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2nd ed. (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2014). 
4 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International 
Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 10. 
5 Kenneth B. Pyle, “International Order and the Rise of Asia: History and Theory,” in 
Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers: China and India, ed. 
Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Seattle, WA and Washington, DC: 
The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 44. 
5 
	
advanced submarine forces with blue-water capabilities, and an incentive to 
upset the regional power equilibrium to better reflect its own interests.6 
Resultantly, there has been a marked negative shift in societal attitude regarding 
China’s military modernization programs accompanied by a deepening distrust 
and wariness of Chinese intentions.7 As a recent Japanese Defense White Paper 
concludes: 
China does not disclose a clear, specific future vision of its military 
modernization. Furthermore, China has been expanding and intensifying 
its activities in its surrounding waters. Lack of transparency in its rational 																																																								
6 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Regional Military Posture,” in Power Shift: China and 
Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2005), 
273–74. The literature on China’s military and economic “rise” is vast. See, for example, 
John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 
2006): 160–62; John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US 
Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 
381–96; Yuan Kang Wang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power 
Politics, Contemporary Asia and the World (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2011); 
“Conflict with China,” Product Page, 2011, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP344.html; Arvind Subramanian, “The 
Inevitable Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2011, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68205/arvind-subramanian/the-inevitable-
superpower; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the 
Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 1–8, 27–35, 153–55; 
Andrew F. Krepinevich, “China’s ‘Finlandization’ Strategy in the Pacific,” Wall Street 
Journal, September 11, 2010, sec. Opinion, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704164904575421753851404076.html; 
Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International 
Order in an Era of US Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 41–72; Roger 
Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their 
Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); James R. Holmes 
and Toshi Yoshihara, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. 
Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010); Robert D. Kaplan, “The 
Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?,” 
Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (June 2010): 22–41; Hideaki Kaneda “The Rise of Chinese ‘Sea 
Power,’” Project Syndicate, accessed April 1, 2012, http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-rise-of-chinese--sea-power. 
7 Mike M. Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New 
Equilibrium?,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2005), 136–37. 
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defense policies, and its military activities are referred to as a matter of 
concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, 
which should require prudent analysis.8 
 
Certain activist security policies over the past 10 to 15 years have certainly not 
done much to assuage Asian nations of Chinese intentions. On the whole, many 
Asian nations, but particularly Japan, have become deeply pessimistic with 
respect to Chinese intentions and relations, and they are keenly apprehensive of 
China’s plans for a “blue-water navy” and its potential threat to vital sea-lanes of 
communication.9  
The core premise of liberalism holds that “the relationship between states 
and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are 
embedded critically shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes 
underlying state preferences.”10 Thus, liberal-pessimist predictions are rooted 
primarily in differences in the internal structures and political dynamics of 																																																								
8 “Defense of Japan 2011: Annual White Paper” (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2011), 
74, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/12Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf. For 
Japan’s expressed concern with Chinese naval operations in and around Japanese 
waters, see ibid., p. 81. 
9 Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?,” 138–
39. 
10 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 516. For the 
seminal works on liberalism, see Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal 
Theory of International Politics”; Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 
American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1151–69; Robert Axelrod 
and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 226–54; Robert O. Keohane, After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1984); Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch,” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, 2nd, enlarged ed., 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1991). Much of the philosophical bases for liberalism can be found in Kant’s formulation 
of the preconditions of “Perpetual Peace.” 
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different regimes. Liberal pessimists contend that the disparate character of 
liberal democratic regimes (e.g., Japan and the United States) and authoritarian 
regimes (e.g., China and North Korea) could lead to mistrust and 
apprehensiveness because of a fundamental epistemic chasm with respect to 
what constitutes regime legitimacy, the necessary degree of government 
transparency, the nature of the social contract between society and the state (i.e., 
the governed and the government, the military and the state, etc.), and 
misconceptions about the ultimate logic and end of authoritarian regimes.11 
Thus, the pessimistic strand emanating from liberalist theory results from 
the lack of robust economic and security institutions in Asia as well as the stark 
contrast in regime types among Asian states. Because the ideal theoretical end-
state of liberalism is economic-, institutional-, or ideational-based peace and 
cooperation, the prospects of actualization of the liberal paradigm seem rather 
																																																								
11 Christopher A. Ford, “Realpolitik with Chinese Characteristics: Chinese Strategic 
Culture and the Modern Communist Party-State,” in Strategic Asia 2016-17: 
Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison 
Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, Strategic Asia (Seattle and Washington, DC: National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 28–60; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Ideas, Perceptions, 
and Power: An Examination of China’s Military Strategy,” in Strategic Asia 2017-18: 
Power, Ideas, and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison 
Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle and Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2017), 18–43; Russell Ong, China’s Strategic Competition with the United 
States, Routledge Security in Asia 9 (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 25–41; 
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” 
International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 29–34; Thomas U. Berger, “Set for Stability? 
Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia,” Review of International Studies 26, 
no. 3 (2000): 416–20; Jinghao Zhou, “American Perspective versus Chinese Expectation 
on China’s Rise,” International Journal of China Studies 2, no. 3 (December 2011): 629–
31; Biwu Zhang, Chinese Perceptions of the U.S.: An Exploration of China’s Foreign 
Policy Motivations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 50–52; Friedberg, A Contest 
for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, 42–45, 159–63. 
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grim. However, one problematic aspect that may constitute a theoretical 
dissonance in liberalist theory involves conflict between democracies. With 
respect to China, Japan, India, and Pakistan, instability could likely manifest 
during an unplanned regime transition in Pakistan or China.12 The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) currently legitimizes its monopoly on political power not 
on adherence to communist principles, but on providing guidance for China’s 
continued economic prosperity, combined with appeals to nationalism to avoid 
social chaos.13 If economic growth in China slows considerably, and there exists 
potential for revolution, either democratically or through military takeover, the 
CCP will have no other recourse than to invoke nationalist rhetoric to maintain its 
																																																								
12 Carl E. Walter and Fraser J.T. Howie, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial 
Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia), 2011), 
49–82; Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2006); Minxin Pei, “Corruption Threatens China’s 
Future,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2007), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_pei_china_corruption_final.pdf; Minxin 
Pei, “Signs of a New Tiananmen in China,” The Diplomat, April 4, 2012, http://the-
diplomat.com/2012/04/04/signs-of-a-new-tiananmen-in-china/; Edward Chancellor, 
“Corruption Threatens China’s Future,” Financial Times, March 21, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/17e67b8a-71c5-11e1-b853-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1tqCdydJ5; Pei, “Corruption Threatens China’s Future”; Susan 
L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its 
Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007); Anthony H. Cordesman and Varun 
Vira, Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability: A National Net Assessment (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011). 
13 Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” 30; Noted 
China scholar and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs in the George W. Bush administration, Thomas J. Christensen, concurs with this 
assessment, stating, “With the death of Marxism-Leninism, CCP legitimacy is 
increasingly reliant on the party’s image as protector and promoter of China’s honor on 
the international stage . . . in fact, other than the raising of living standards, nothing is 
more important to the CCP’s claim to rule than its nationalist credentials.” Thomas J. 
Christensen, “PRC Security Relations with the United States: Why Things Are Going so 
Well,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 8 (Fall 2003): 2. 
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legitimacy and “may also be inclined to resort to assertive external policies as a 
way of rallying the Chinese people and turning their energies and frustrations 
outward, most likely toward Taiwan or Japan or the United States.”14  
Even if one accepts the notion that historical, political, and economic 
forces impel China inexorably toward a more a liberal and democratic 
government, the transition period from authoritarianism to democracy is when 
states are most likely to choose war as a desirable option, as elites use 
nationalist rhetoric and militant foreign policy to harness and substantiate support 
for a fragile transitional regime.15 As Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder state, 
one significant aspect of illiberal democratization is that “countries become more 
aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic 
states.”16 Thus, should the Chinese state enter a transitional phase, even one 
with a democratic polity as the likely outcome, concerns of political and economic 
instability, manipulated nationalism, and threat miscalculation should be 
particularly acute. Executive constraint in the government, then, would 
compromise Japan’s ability to formulate quick and effective responses to aspects 
of Chinese instability or belligerence that may attend regime transition. 
Constructivism, in a significant theoretical departure from both the 
neorealist and neoliberalist behavioralist-rationalist paradigm argues that the 																																																								
14 Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” 30. 
15 Friedberg, 30. 
16 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 
International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 5; See also, Edward D. Mansfield and 
Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” International 
Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 297–337. 
10 
	
“self-help” logic of anarchy, the underlying assumptions of power politics, the 
basis for international state structure, and state identity neither causally nor 
logically result from anarchy, but are socially constructed phenomena resulting 
from processes or the intersubjectivity between nation-states.17 Thus, contra 
realism and liberalism, the international system reflects the socialization process, 
i.e., the “mutually constitutive” interaction between states in the international 
system.18  
As Thomas Berger observes, one common misconception about 
constructivist theory is that it tends to be incorrectly conflated with progressive, 
idealist views of human nature. As Berger correctly points out, culture, 
nationalism, and ideology can all manifest in potent illiberal forms.19 The 
prevalence of historical grievances, ideational animosities, and illiberal 
nationalisms in Asia lead Thomas Berger to argue that the reasons or sources of 
security competition in Asia are not adequately accounted for by the tenets of 
realism or liberalism, but “are the products of deep-rooted historically based 
suspicions and animosities, frustrated nationalism, and distinct conceptions of 																																																								
17 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 391–392, 393, 394, 
395. 
18 Wendt, 399 For some of the seminal works on constructivism in international 
relations theory, see, for example, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999); Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-
Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 
(July 1987): 335–70; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security : Norms 
and Identity in World Politics, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1996). 
19 Thomas U. Berger, “Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist 
Interpretation,” in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 2003), 388. 
11 
	
national identity and their differing understanding of the national mission in 
international affairs.”20 Put succinctly, “The real source of instability lies in the 
beliefs and values held by regional actors.”21 This theoretical approach allows for, 
then, conflict arising from acute ideational differences, as opposed to structurally 
incentivized conflict.  
Nuclear Deterrence and International Relations Theory: Problematic 
Aspects 
The relationship between international relations theory and nuclear 
deterrence theory is somewhat atypical.22 Although international relations 
scholars have produced an enormous amount of literature on nuclear deterrence 
theory, we do not seem to have a typology of what “offensive realist nuclear 
deterrence theory,” “liberal institutionalist nuclear deterrence theory,” etc., might 
look like. Some scholars who are affiliated with one paradigm or another have 
written very sophisticated works on nuclear deterrence theory, but in most cases, 
the relationship between the various “isms” and their writings on nuclear 
deterrence is not entirely clear, and in some cases clearly contradictory. Given 
the unusual difficulties in determining the nature of what constitutes evidence, 
proof, and causality in the study of nuclear deterrence, perhaps it is unsurprising 																																																								
20 Berger, 388. 
21 Berger, “Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia,” 
405 (Abstract); Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 29–33; Thomas U. Berger, War, 
Guilt, and World Politics after World War II (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012). 
22 Daniel H. Deudney, “Hegemony, Nuclear Weapons, and Liberal Hegemony,” in 
Power, Order, and Change in World Politics, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), 196. 
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that theories of nuclear deterrence do not glide smoothly into preexisting 
frameworks. 
The “second nuclear age” is upon us.23 Yet, a primary analytical, 
theoretical, policy-relevant difficulty that arises when the security dilemma and 
hegemonic behavior in Asia is discussed is the latent role of nuclear weapons 
and the relevance of nuclear deterrence theory. As Daniel Deudney presciently 
states, “[T]he extensive literatures on hegemony and on nuclear weapons, both 
of which realists have done so much to contribute to, if not dominate, have 
surprisingly little overlap, almost at times as if they were exploring phenomena 
from different eras rather than one.”24  
I will outline briefly the main tenets of realism and its variants and power 
transition theory as they relate to nuclear deterrence theory, highlighting the 
contradictions contained therein. I will then offer a tentative proposal of what 
theoretical contributions a constructivist theory may offer. If successful, the 
mutually constitutive effects that necessarily constitute deterrence theory can 
																																																								
23 Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power 
Politics (New York: Times Books, 2012); Gregory D. Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the 
Second Nuclear Age, Council Special Report 71 (New York: The Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2014); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999); Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second 
Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
Univ. Press, 2012); Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: 
Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1996); Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence 
and a New Direction (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2001). 
24 Deudney, “Hegemony, Nuclear Weapons, and Liberal Hegemony,” 196. 
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then be situated and cogently articulated within a thin-constructivist international 
relations theory.25  
Offensive Realism 
A prominent theory invoked with respect to the causes of war is offensive 
realism, articulated by the prominent academic John Mearsheimer.26 
Mearsheimer lays out five “bedrock assumptions” of offensive realism: (1) the 
international system is anarchic; (2) great powers inherently possess some 
offensive military capability; (3) states can never be certain about other states’ 
intentions; (4) survival is the primary goal of great powers; and (5) great powers 
are rational actors.27 The theory is positivist, structural, and materialist. Further, 
offensive realism makes its rejection of an ideological component of a state’s rise 
explicit: “Ideology of any sort, of course, falls outside the scope of my realist 
theory of international politics.”28 Yet, in subsequent analysis, Mearsheimer does 
acknowledge the potent role that nationalism and hypernationalism can play in 
interstate rivalry,29 but in his final analysis, Mearsheimer stands firm, stating 
directly, “[T]he main driving force behind Sino-American relations in the decades 
ahead will be realist logic, not ideology.”30  
																																																								
25 David Marsh, “Keeping Ideas in Their Place: In Praise of Thin Constructivism,” 
Australian Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (December 2009): 679–96. 
26 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
27 Mearsheimer, 30–31. 
28 Mearsheimer, 400. 
29 Mearsheimer, 402–3. 
30 Mearsheimer, 403. 
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The systemic nature of offensive realist theory suggests, then, that 
ideology will not play a decisive role in the security competition and nuclear 
strategies of other dyadic or triadic relationships, i.e., Sino-Indian competition, 
Indo-Pakistani competition, and Sino-Japanese-American competition.31 A 
nonideological theory or analysis of the security competition and nuclear dynamic 
in Asia is ultimately unpersuasive, as there the ideological component of national 
strategy and nuclear strategy becomes evident upon examining Chinese, Indian, 
Pakistani, Japanese, and Taiwanese strategic and doctrinal writings on national 
security strategy in general and nuclear strategy specifically. 
Offensive realism argues that the most efficacious means by which a state 
can ensure security is through the pursuit and attainment of regional hegemony, 
while denying hegemonic status to potential rival states.32 With respect to China, 
Mearsheimer states, “Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no.”33 The 
question remains, then, what form might the nonpeaceful rise of China take? As 
a nuclear-armed America (as well India—the nuclear-armed South Asian 
hegemon) is the hegemon that China would seek to displace in East Asia, does 
this entail nuclear war? In previous writings, Mearsheimer seems to subscribe to 
the rather conventional logic of nuclear deterrence, stating: 
The potential consequences of using nuclear weapons are so grave that it 
is very difficult to conceive of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear 
war. . . . In a nuclear world, the danger associated with any war between 
the superpowers is so great that it becomes difficult for them to think in 																																																								
31 Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” 393. 
32 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 42. 
33 Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” 160. 
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terms of achieving political objectives by going to war against each 
other.34  
 
Describing the “virtues of nuclear deterrence,”35 Mearsheimer states, 
“Specifically, the situation created by Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 
bolsters peace by moving power relations among states toward equality. States 
that possess nuclear deterrents can stand up to one another, even if their nuclear 
arsenals vary greatly in size, as long as both sides’ nuclear arsenals are secure 
from attack”36 thus producing “stabilizing effects.”37 This is the rationale for his 
support of the Ukraine maintaining its nuclear deterrent capabilities after the end 
of the Cold War. A Ukrainian nuclear deterrent, argues Mearsheimer, is 
“imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine.”38 Mearsheimer 
states his case thusly:  
In fact, nuclear weapons often diminish international violence [. . .] and are 
a powerful force for peace because they are weapons of mass destruction. 
They create the possibility that in a war both sides will cease to exist as 
functioning societies. This catastrophic threat will foreclose any Russian 
thoughts of aggression against Ukraine, since a defeated Ukraine could 
well use its nuclear weapons against Russia before going under.39 
 
																																																								
34 John J. Mearsheimer, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe,” International 
Security 9, no. 3 (Winter 1984): 21–22 Emphasis in original. 
35 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” 
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 19. 
36 Mearsheimer, 20. 
37 Mearsheimer, 20. 
38 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign 
Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 50. 
39 Mearsheimer, 57. 
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With respect to the rise of China, however, Mearsheimer argues that a potential 
war involving China and the United States is “more likely than it was between the 
superpowers from 1945 to 1990.”40  
The tension between nuclear deterrence theory and offensive realism 
becomes clear once we consider that Mearsheimer seems to posit two 
contradictory forces at work in the international system, operating simultaneously. 
The first is that, according offensive realism, the international system impels 
China to seek hegemony in Asia at the expense of the United States, which will 
likely entail war. The second is that the nuclear forces of both China and the 
United States create a nuclear deterrence dynamic in which the peace through 
Mutually Assured Destruction is likely to obtain. The same logic would hold true 
regardless of the specific state. Offensive realist theory would hold both tenets to 
be operative in South Asia as well, for example. There would seem to be logical 
and theoretical inconsistencies in reconciling the inevitability of systemic war with 
the deterrent power of nuclear weapons.  
Waltzian Structural Realism 
Kenneth Waltz formulated a highly influential neorealist, structural theory 
of international politics.41 A key insight offered by Waltz is that bipolar systems 
are more stable than multipolar systems, and multipolar systems are more war 
																																																								
40 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 395. 
41 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
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prone than bipolar systems.42 From this, we may deduce that a multipolar Asia 
would be more war prone than the bipolarity that obtained during the Cold War. 
However, Waltz was also an influential voice in the nuclear deterrence debate.  
Beginning with an influential essay in 1981, referring to potential nuclear 
weapons states, Waltz argued, “more may be better.”43 This reflects his 
confidence in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence preventing wars among nuclear 
weapons states. Waltz states explicitly, “The probability of major war among 
states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.”44 Waltz’s two primary 
theoretical contributions suffer from an apparent contradiction. Multipolar 
systems—such as present day Asia with multiple nuclear weapons states—
cannot at once be systemically unstable and war prone and at the same time be 
said to be stable due to the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Thus, we can see that 
two of the primary and most influential theories in international relations offer 
seemingly logically contradictory guidance with respect to the security dilemma 
among nuclear weapons states in East and South Asia. 
																																																								
42 Waltz, 161–93; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, 
no. 3 (Summer 1964): 881–909. 
43 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, More May Be Better, Adelphi 
Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Scott D. Sagan 
and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3rd ed. 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2013). 
44 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 627. 
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Thomas Schelling 
Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, described as “the single most influential 
Western strategic theorist of the Cold War,”45 was instrumental in formulating the 
dominant theoretical and strategic foundations for U.S. nuclear deterrence theory, 
nuclear strategy, and nuclear force structure.46 Central to Schelling’s formulation 
of stable nuclear deterrence during the Cold War was “the threat that leaves 
something to chance.”47 Schelling describes this process as a reaction calculus 
with a “loophole”48 that may engender threats that “arise inadvertently”49 which 
																																																								
45 Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice 
From the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 
2008), 31. 
46 Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among 
Major Powers (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2002), 13; Roger B. Myerson, 
“Learning from Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict,” Journal of Economic Literature 47, no. 4 
(December 2009): 1109–25; Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory 
and Practice From the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century, 7, 83–204, 229–32. Payne 
notes, however, “U.S. policy never has been an unalloyed reflection of Kahn’s 
recommended U.S. advantage of Schelling’s definition of a stable balance of terror. 
Generally, U.S. policy has reflected selected elements of both simultaneously. From the 
early 1960s on, however, with some notable exceptions the U.S. acquisition of strategic 
forces, declarations about deterrence and nuclear weapons, and strategic arms control 
goals were guided increasingly and stubbornly by the basic tenets of a stable balance of 
terror” (p. 83). 
47 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1980), 187–203. Schelling states,  
As a rule, one must threaten that he will act, not that he may act, if the threat fails. 
To say that one may act is to say that one may not, and to say this is to confess 
that one has kept the power of decision—that one is not committed. To say only 
that one may carry out the threat, not that one certainly will, is to invite the 
opponent to guess whether one will prefer to punish himself and his opponent or 
to pass up the occasion. Furthermore, if one says that he may—not that he will—
and the opponent fails to heed the threat, and the threatener chooses not to carry 
it out, he only confirms his opponent’s belief that when he has a clear choice to 
act or to abstain he will choose to abstain (consoling himself that he was not 
caught bluffing because he never said that he would act for sure). (p.187, italics 
in original) 
48 Schelling, 188. 
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could result in “unintended behavior”50 by states during crisis situations that leads 
him to conclude that these types of threats are “less likely to be recognized and 
understood.”51 Recognizing the logical problem intrinsic to this dynamic, 
Schelling proposes a novel, highly influential idea in nuclear deterrence theory, 
arguing that the effectiveness or utility of a nuclear threat is not contingent upon 
the enemy state believing that the threatening state would, in fact, carry out its 
threat, but rather that the threatened party believes that “the final decision is not 
altogether under the threatener’s control. . . . The final decision is left to 
‘chance.’ . . . The threat—if we call this contingent behavior a ‘threat’—has some 
interesting features. It may exist whether we realize it or not.”52 
Another theoretical innovation that Schelling introduced that was part of 
the balance of terror model was the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”53 The 
mutual vulnerability of the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” was a critical 
element in deterrence thinking during the Cold War, and it is argued that this was 
one deterrent dynamic that kept the nuclear peace between the United States 																																																																																																																																																																					
49 Schelling, 188. 
50 Schelling, 188. 
51 Schelling, 188. 
52 Schelling, 188-189. Italics in original. 
53 Schelling, 207–29. Schelling states,  
If surprise carries an advantage, it is worth while to avert it by striking first. Fear 
that the other may be about to strike in the mistaken belief that we are about to 
strike gives us a motive for striking, and so justifies the other’s motive. But, if the 
gains from even successful surprise are less than desired than no war at all, 
there is no “fundamental” basis for an attack by either side. Nevertheless, it looks 
as though a modest temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack—might 
become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with 
additional motive for attack being produced by successive cycles of “He thinks 
we think he thinks we think . . . he thinks we think he’ll attack; so he thinks we 
shall; so he will; so we must.” (p. 207) 
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and the Soviet Union. Understanding of the “threat that leaves something to 
chance” and “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack” by the United States and 
Soviet Union led many to logically deduce these tenets would help avoid 
uncertain escalation processes that would, according to Schelling, deter leaders 
not only from nuclear war, but also from inducing political crises that could 
engender an ultimately uncontrollable escalation process that could jeopardize 
the existence of the United States and the Soviet Union.54  
Yet, there are inherent contradictions in Schelling’s novel propositions to 
the balance of terror theory. It accepts the realities of uncertainty and ambiguity 
in decision processes by nuclear weapons states that would preclude initiating an 
escalatory process that could lead to nuclear war, but subsequently—and 
arguably illogically—posits certainty in the face of responding to these 
uncertainties.55 Keith Payne states: 
In sum, the basic balance of terror proposition that uncertainties abound in 
leadership decision-making and behavior is sound. The very existence of 
these uncertainties, however, point not toward a single consistent “rational” 
mode of opponent decision making—i.e., prudence and caution in the face 
of uncertainty and thus the reliable working of deterrence—but toward the 
potential for multiple, unpredictable decisions and behaviors, including 
surprising decisions to provoke and run great risk. The irreducible 
uncertainties in decision-making and leadership behavior do not ensure 
the predictable functioning of deterrence; they preclude it.56 
 
There is an additional point to be made about why the theoretical concepts 
articulated by Schelling are problematic when thinking about deterrence theory 																																																								
54 Schelling, 188, 201–2. 
55 Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice From the 
Cold War to the Twenty-First Century, 256. 
56 Payne, 256. Italics in original. 
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and nuclear strategy in Asia. An often overlooked element of Schelling’s logic is 
that in order for deterrence to “work,” the simple absence of nuclear war is not 
sufficient; nuclear adversaries must be deterred from creating political or military 
crises whereby there exists the possibility for the employment of nuclear 
weapons by the same factors that are expected to induce uncertainty and fear of 
escalation. The historical record of India, Pakistan, China, Japan, and Taiwan 
clearly invalidate the notion that nuclear weapons states should be deterred from 
initiating conflicts that have escalatory potential.  
A final element of Schelling’s contribution to deterrence theory that may be 
not entirely relevant in contemporary Asia relates to offensive capabilities and 
missile defense systems. In a simple formulation, a logical deduction from 
Schelling’s “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” is that damage-limitation and 
missile defense systems are inherently destabilizing and increase the chances of 
deterrence failure. Thus, nuclear force structure should be configured such that 
the offense is superior to any defensive measures that could be put in place that 
might jeopardize an enemy state’s ability to degrade offensive first- and second-
strike nuclear forces through a nuclear first strike. Following from this, Schelling 
generally proscribed extensive missile defense systems and damage-limitation 
technologies during the Cold War.57 Given the particular conditions of the Cold 
																																																								
57 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, Reprint 
(Millwood, NY: Twentieth Century Fund, 1985), xi. Schelling and Halperin state, “We 
suggested that arms control should concentrate on those technologies and deployments 
that increased the likelihood of a war that neither side wanted. From that perspective, 
the ABM Treaty was almost the ideal model of what we had proposed. Imperfect 
22 
	
War deterrence relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, this 
may have indeed been a logical and prudent position. However, in India, 
Pakistan, China, Japan, and Taiwan, we observe some combination of strategic 
interest in, research directed toward, and in some cases deployment of missile 
defense systems and an acceleration of vertical nuclear proliferation.  
Thus, what I aim to show is that the degree of risk acceptance, what 
constitutes an acceptable convectional-to-nuclear threshold (i.e., “firebreak”58), 
and nuclear strategies at play in Asia exist as politico-culturally contingent 
phenomena, resulting from unique epistemic communities to maximize the 
national interest, as conceived by each country.59 
Power Transition Theory 
With respect to power transition theory, three major works that are invoked 
to understand the dynamics of potential power transitions are taken from the 
works of Robert Gilpin,60 Dale Copeland,61 and Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. 
Organski.62 Addressing the role of nuclear weapons in a potential hegemonic war, 
																																																																																																																																																																					
defensive systems inherently increase the risk of war by creating on both sides an 
incentive to strike first. Prohibiting the deployment of ABM on both sides helped to break 
the spiral of expectations that could lead to preemption in a crisis.” 
58 Barry D. Watts, “Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo” 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013). 
59 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 
International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 175. 
60 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1981); Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 591–613. 
61 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2001). 
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Gilpin argues that while the possibility of a hegemonic nuclear war “must remain 
inconclusive”63 the war accompanying a power transition could conceivably 
involve nuclear war.64 Dale Copeland, on the other hand, in his articulation of 
“dynamic differentials theory” states that nuclear weapons states involved in or 
seeking a systemic power transition shift “are unlikely to launch premeditated 
major wars, given the likelihood that their own societies will be destroyed in the 
process.”65 Kugler and Organski argue that the incentives of states in a power 
transition framework trump the dictates of classical nuclear deterrence theory:  
In sharp contrast with classical deterrence, power transition suggests that 
the calculus of war and peace has not changed with the advent of nuclear 
weapons. It is taken for granted that the absolute costs of war have 
obviously multiplied, but the calculations of marginal gains or losses as a 
challenger overtakes a dominant nation still provide the necessary 
conditions for the initiation of war. There is no need to adjust assumptions 
in the nuclear era.66 
 
Thus we have three versions of power transition theory, two that are 
equivocal about the use of nuclear weapons and one asserting that the classical 
tenets of nuclear deterrence are subsumed to the logic of power transitions. 
However, none of these tell us anything specific about which deterrence 
strategies or nuclear strategies might be used by defenders and challengers in 
the event of a military conflict in a systemic transition. 
																																																								
63 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 218. 
64 Gilpin, 218; Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” 611–12. 
65 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 3. 
66 Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and 
Prospective Evaluation,” in Handbook of War Studies (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 
1989), 185. 
24 
	
 
International Relations Theory, Nuclear Strategy, and the Ontological 
Limitations 
The virtual disappearance of philosophical ontology from IR debates—and 
its ready replacement by sets of substantive considerations—carries with 
it a set of costs for IR scholarship.67 
 
Why Is Ontology Important? 
The study of ontology is often seen as irrelevant to problem-driven social 
science research. Yet, fundamentally, “[O]ntological assumptions (whether 
explicit or implicit) affect epistemology and, as a consequence, methodology.”68 
In international relations, ontology and epistemology need not be studied as 
phenomena in and of themselves. Ontology and epistemology do not “exist in a 
vacuum”; they animate our conceptions of how we think about knowledge and 
the constitutive nature of the international system and our place in it.69 Thus, 
foundational issues, e.g., ontological and epistemological positions, are important 
aspects in the study of political science.  
The fundamental issue regarding what constitutes structure in the 
international system is an ontological and epistemological one concerning the 
appropriate relationship between the two aspects. Embedded in this issue is the 
																																																								
67 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: 
Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, The New 
International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 30. 
68 Abhishek Chatterjee, “Ontology, Epistemology, and Multimethod Research in 
Political Science,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20, no. 10 (2011): 23. 
69 Chatterjee, 2. 
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agent-structure problem.70 Alexander Wendt conceptualizes the agent-structure 
problem thusly: 
The agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life 
which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their 
organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or 
transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of 
social relationships, which structure the interactions between these 
purposeful actors. Taken together these truisms suggest that human 
agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically 
interdependent or mutually implicating entities. Thus, the analysis of action 
invokes an at least implicit understanding of particular social relationships 
(or “rules of the game”) in which the action is set—just as the analysis of 
social structures invokes some understanding of the actors whose 
relationships make up the structural context.71 
 
With respect to the agent-structure problem, structural neorealism holds 
that the international structure is composed of three ordering principles: anarchy, 
the undifferentiated function of units (states), and the distribution of material 
capabilities.72 This is an individualist ontological position that argues that 
structure is separate from agency and that structure determines state action.73 
This structure is generated by the coaction of like units within the international 
system and operates independently of state action. It is from this ontological 
position that posits anarchy from which the fundamental “logic” of Waltzian 
neorealism is derived: anarchy induces “self-help” behavior, which according to 
Waltz is accommodated by internal balancing and external balancing. 																																																								
70 David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?,” International 
Organization 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 441–73; Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem 
in International Relations Theory.” 
71 Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 337–38. 
72 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 79–101. 
73 Waltz, 74–77; Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory,” 336. Wendt states, “[N]eorealism embodies an individualist ontology.” 
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Mearsheimer, sharing the same ontological framework as Waltz and other 
structural realists, states unequivocally: 
Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material 
structure of the international system. The distribution of material 
capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world 
politics. . . . Individuals are free to adopt non-realist discourses, but in the 
final analysis, the system forces states to behave according to the dictates 
of realism, or risk destruction.74 
 
This is extremely problematic because structural realism’s ontological 
position simply does not allow an explanation of the properties and causal 
powers of its primary units of analysis, “a weakness which seriously undermines 
their potential explanations of state action.”75 This aspect of structural realist 
theory is particularly puzzling given its proponents’ propensity to write about the 
effect of nuclear weapons and the strategies of nuclear weapons states. What 
this means for structural realist theory is that it is ontologically incapable to 
articulate a social theory of the state because “system structures cannot 
generate agents if they are defined exclusively in terms of those agents in the 
first place.”76 With respect to nuclear strategy, we can say that because structural 
theory “brackets considerations of the agential powers underpinning action”77 that 
it is incapable of providing necessary explanations of state action. Structural 
theories are epistemologically objective but the relationship between the agent 
and structure is not “mutually constitutive.” 																																																								
74 John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 
1994): 91. 
75 Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 337. 
76 Wendt, 343. 
77 Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?,” 444. 
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Ontological and epistemological contradictions inhere not only in structural 
realist theories but also inhere in regime treatments by neoliberal institutionalist 
theories. Given the liberal and neoliberal institutionalist focus on cooperation in 
the international system, accepting the realist ontological structure has led to 
dissonance articulated most thoughtfully by Ruggie and Kratochwil regarding the 
fundamental incongruity in ontological and epistemological positions that 
neoliberal institutionalism brought to their analysis of international regimes. They 
argue that international regimes, through the interaction among states, can 
reduce uncertainty, enhance trust, reduce transaction costs, and so on, 
necessarily entails an interpretivist epistemology. Yet, neoliberal institutionalism’s 
theoretical assumptions still relied on (or yielded to) an individualist ontology that 
takes interests as exogenously given and “identity” as irrelevant.78 
A Constructivist Theoretical Approach 
How does the above relate to nuclear strategy? First, structural realist 
theories not only are logically inconsistent in their treatment of the security 
dilemma and nuclear deterrence theory, but also cannot offer us a thoughtful 
explanation on the nuclear strategies adopted by nuclear weapons states in Asia 
due to their individualist ontology and inadequate treatment of the agent-structure 
problem.  
																																																								
78 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “A State of the Art on an Art of the 
State,” International Organization 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 763–66. 
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The systemic, materialist theories of international relations cannot tell us 
much about the nature of the states that the theories hope to describe.79 As Iain 
Johnston observes, Waltz’s claim that neorealism is a theory of international 
politics and state behavior generally, and not a theory of foreign policy 
specifically, “seems somewhat disingenuous.”80 The criticism is astute. The 
analytical and theoretical severing of the link between a state’s behavior and its 
foreign policy is, I would suggest, a false one.81 Thus, individuals operating in 
conjunction with others that constitute the organs of state are analytically 
salient.82  
A constructivist approach to the agent-structure problem as outlined by 
Wendt is structuration theory. Adopting a scientific realist philosophy of science 
approach, structuration theory is a “relational solution to the agent-structure 
																																																								
79 Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph, “Scientific Realism and International Relations,” 
in Scientific Realism and International Relations, ed. Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 17. 
80 Alastair Johnston I., Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), ix n1. 
81 For a defense of Waltz’s position, see, Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics Is 
Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54–57. 
82 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing 
the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107–46; Andrew 
B. Kennedy, “Dreams Undeferred: Mao, Nehru, and the Strategic Choices of Rising 
Powers” (Dissertation, Harvard University, 2007); Harsh V. Pant, The U.S.-India Nuclear 
Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics (New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011). 
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problem that conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constituted or co-
determined entities.”83  
The advantages to this approach are many. Structure is defined in 
generative terms whereby elements of a social structure cannot be conceived 
independently of their relational position in a given social structure, which sees 
states “as generated or constituted by internal relations of individuation 
(sovereignty). . . . In other words, states are not even conceivable as states apart 
from their position in a global structure of individuated and penetrated political 
authorities.”84 The existence of states and their behavior are constituted by social 
structures. Ontologically, then, structuration theory suggests agents cannot be 
separated from the social structures in which they are embedded because their 
action is possible only because of the existence of structures, and thus causal 
significance cannot inhere in social structures unless it is instantiated by agents. 
“Social action, then, is ‘co-determined’ by the properties of both agents and 
social structures.”85 This provides a framework for explaining the properties of 
both state agents and system structures that the individualist ontology of 
structural realism cannot. 
By utilizing this theoretical framework, I will be able to, in an ontologically 
and epistemologically consistent manner, place each state’s understanding of 
nuclear deterrence theory and its subsequent effect on nuclear strategy in the 
																																																								
83 Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 350. 
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social and strategic context in which each state is embedded. Deterrence and 
nuclear strategy will not be conceived of as separate from the international 
structure in which they exist, but will be examined as part of the social fabric in 
which they are generated and mutually constituted with respect to how each 
nation perceives its unique interests and strategic necessities. Nuclear 
deterrence is ultimately a social and political relationship that necessitates its 
functioning as a mutually constitutive co-determined phenomenon. From this 
political and socialization process, nuclear strategy can be ascertained in ways 
that structural and game-theoretical analyses of deterrence theory and nuclear 
strategy cannot discern. From the selection of case studies in which conflictual 
relations took place, the “nuclear learning” that took place as a result of mutual 
interaction between states and among political elites in each country should yield 
insights into each state’s variant understandings of deterrence theory and its 
resultant variant nuclear force structure. 
Chapter one of this dissertation discusses the paradoxes and antinomies 
between international relations theory and nuclear deterrence theory. Pessimistic 
strands of thought regarding the security dynamic in East Asia from multiple 
theoretical perspectives are enumerated, along with providing a justification for a 
“thin-constructivist” theoretical approach to nuclear strategy.  Chapter two 
explains constitutional proscriptions in Japan with respect to the use of force and 
the power of the Japanese executive. Examination of the political philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Aristotle, and Carl Schmitt to unpack Japan’s 
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constitutional role in foreign policy making. The theoretical problems of extended 
nuclear deterrence and identity theory are explained with respect to the security 
dynamic between Japan and China. Chapter three explains and contextualizes 
the history of Japan’s interest in nuclear weapons acquisition, its potential 
capabilities to develop an indigenous nuclear deterrent, and the role of the 
Japanese constitution in relation to Japan’s nuclear weapons policies and laws.  
Chapter four explains the relationship between Japan’s ability to exercise 
collective self-defense, Japan’s constitution, and the strains in the U.S.-Japan 
alliance that proscriptions on Japan’s use of military force have generated in the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. Chapter five describes China’s nuclear force structure and 
nuclear strategy and the ideational currents that animate its foreign policy, 
especially with respect to Taiwan and Japan. In conclusion, chapter six offers a 
summation of this dissertation’s arguments and findings.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Constitutional Constraint, the Problem of the Exception, and Identity 
Theory: The Current Dilemma for Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence 
 
A state without the means of some change is without the means of its 
conservation. Without such means it might even risque the loss of that 
part of the constitution which it wishes the most religiously to preserve.1 
 
Introduction 
 
Japan’s fundamental problem with respect to foreign policy and bolstering 
extended deterrence is constitutional. The Japanese government faces a 
genuine dilemma with respect to the survival of the national polity because of 
constitutional constraint and the lack of executive prerogative, specifically. 
Further, these constraints manifest themselves in Japan’s current force 
structure—whether conceived independently or within the U.S.–Japan alliance—
which, as currently constituted, is unable to meet the multidimensional threats 
that face Japan’s constitutional order. 
The restrictive nature of the Japanese constitution does not allow Japan to 
play a decisive role within the U.S.–Japan alliance. Even after the Government of 
Japan’s reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow for the circumscribed exercise of 
collective self-defense, the prime minister of Japan still does not have the 
necessary authority or maneuverability to strengthen the fragile state of extended 
deterrence within the U.S.–Japan alliance. 																																																								
1 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, vol. 2 (Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 1999), 108. 
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Thus, Japan faces a genuine dilemma with respect to satisfactorily 
meeting its security needs because of constitutional and executive proscriptions. 
The inability of the Japanese executive to exercise prerogative with respect to 
the use and deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in a potential 
conflict on the Korean Peninsula, with China in the East China Sea, over Taiwan, 
and the in the South China Sea puts severe strains on the U.S.–Japan alliance 
and, resultantly, the security of the Japanese state writ large. 
Contra systemic theories in which interests are taken as exogenous—and 
thus actions taken by states to secure those interests are taken as routine or 
given—Japan evinces a fundamentally and theoretically distinct form of 
deterrence behavior. This theoretical distinction lies within two processes in 
Japanese deterrence thought that are in fundamental tension with one another. 
The first is what I term the “quest for extra-constitutional and extra-legal 
executive prerogative” (an ongoing, incomplete process) that explains Japan’s 
constitutional and statutory hedging with respect to nuclear weapons acquisition 
and the right to exercise collective self-defense in the face of a rising, 
increasingly assertive China.2 The second is accomplishing this task within its 
extant constitutional framework while remaining within the confines of the 
culturally bound and situated ideational norm of Article 9.3 
																																																								
2 Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Why Chinese Assertiveness Is Here to Stay,” 
Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 151–70. 
3 As stated by Karatani,  
It is true that article 9 was forced upon Japan by the American Occupation 
forces. But when the United States later pressed Japan to rearm, the 
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This chapter will proceed in four parts. First, it will discuss the current 
constitutional dilemma in which Japan finds itself should exigent circumstances 
requiring the use of force that fall outside what is allowed by the constitution 
occur. Second, it will discuss the problems intrinsic to extended nuclear 
deterrence theory and how these theoretical problems affect Japanese force 
structure within the U.S.–Japan alliance. Third, it will explore the theoretical and 
constitutional positions concerning extra-legal and extra-constitutional 
prerogative by Immanuel Kant and John Locke, the notion of contingency and 
equity in executive decision-making in relationship to the established legal order 
of Aristotle, and the concept of the friend-enemy distinction, states of exception, 
and commissarial dictatorship in the constitutional theory of Carl Schmitt. These 
constitutional theorists and philosophers illuminate and in some cases offer 
constitutionally based theoretical prescriptions that could, at minimum, attenuate, 
and maximally, obviate the constitutional problem facing Japan. Lastly, drawing 
on recent scholarship of identity theory, this chapter will show why Japan’s self-
identity vis-à-vis China as the “Other” can explain decisions by the Japanese 
government to enact a more robust security policy. 																																																																																																																																																																					
Japanese people repulsed this. By that time article 9 was already developing 
spontaneously of its own accord.  
If there had not been coercive action by the Occupation forces, then 
probably something along the lines of article 9 would not have emerged. But 
the fact that article 9 was subsequently preserved was not the result of 
conscious reflection by the Japanese, but because it was something that had 
taken root internally. This process cannot be understood without spiritual 
analysis [seishin bunseki].  
Karatani Kojin, “9 Jo No Kongen (The Root of Article 9),” Asahi Shimbun, June 14, 
2016; Quoted in Arthur Stockwin and Kweku Ampiah, Rethinking Japan: The Politics 
of Contested Nationalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), 136. 
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To paraphrase constructivist scholar John G. Ruggie, who stated “[I]t was 
the fact of an American hegemony that was decisive after World War II, not 
merely American hegemony,”4 I argue that it is not China seeking potential 
hegemony, but rather China seeking potential hegemony that worries Japan and 
constitutes its most fundamental and acute security threat. This conception 
allows for an ideational-based explanation of Japanese deterrence behavior, as 
opposed to the sterile, systemic explanations for which Japan has remained a 
theoretical outlier. 
 
Extant Constitutional Proscriptions 
The problem of constitutional revision and reinterpretation in Japan has 
been a contentious, politically charged issue since the constitution’s inception. To 
date, the Japanese constitution has never been amended, despite periodic calls 
for its revision. The significance and ramifications of constitutional revision—
particularly that of Article 9—are not confined to a domestic audience; the effects 
of constitutional revision would reverberate most significantly in East Asia, but 
also would affect relations with the United States, South Asia, Australia, and 
Europe. The orthodox view is that revision of Article 9 augurs ill for facilitating 
trust and smooth diplomatic relations with nations with whom Japan has a 
problematic and sanguinary history, and that whatever potential benefits append 																																																								
4 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in 
Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John 
Gerard Ruggie, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
1993), 31. Italics in original. 
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from revision are vitiated and superseded by the deleterious derivative effects 
that could heighten tensions in the realm of international politics. Such is the 
conventional logic. 
The puzzling aspect inherent in the constitutional revision debate is the 
question of what accounts for the relative paucity of discussion regarding the 
adverse effects of constitutional stasis (i.e., there is a disproportionate focus on 
the risks of revision at the expense of analysis of the risks of stasis). With respect 
to constitutional restrictions, Japan cannot be considered a “normal nation.”5 The 
Japanese constitution, in its current liberal legalist form, does not provide an 
adequate basis from which to confront the realities of the grim exigencies of 
international politics. Further, the constitutional paralysis engendered by the 
public fear of executive authority associated with Japan’s past behavior has led 
to a dangerous disconnect with respect to constraints and expectations of 
executive power and prerogative in the realm of national security and attendant 
foreign policy making. 
The inability of the Japanese executive to exercise extra-legal and/or 
extra-constitutional prerogative and declare states of exception is real. Prior to 
the second administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the government of 
Japan had a constitutionally rationalized self-imposed ban on engaging in 																																																								
5 Marc de Wilde, “Locke and the State of Exception: Towards a Modern 
Understanding of Emergency Government,” European Constitutional Law Review 
(EuConst) 6, no. 2 (2010): 249. de Wilde states, “Modern states have almost without 
exception developed constitutional arrangements to protect themselves from threats 
to their continued existence. The most common of these arrangements is the state 
of exception.” 
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collective self-defense, defined as the legitimate use of force employed to protect 
a formal ally, despite the explicit right to do so being enshrined in the UN Charter. 
This position came from a landmark ruling in 1954 decided by the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau (CLB), the bureau directly responsible for the government’s 
interpretation of constitutional issues. 
Additionally, the JDSF—conceived of as an “organization for self-
defense”—could not be deployed abroad for the explicit use of force, nor could it 
be engaged in “activities that are an integral part of any use of force.”6 The above 
was problematic for a number of reasons, the most salient of which involves the 
combined problematique of the exercise of collective self-defense and being an 
“integral part of any use of force.” For example, prior to the 2014 reinterpretation 
of Article 9 allowing limited collective self- defense, if North Korea or China 
launched a ballistic missile toward the United States or at U.S. naval forces in the 
Pacific, Japanese forces would neither be allowed to intercept the missile nor to 
convey any intelligence-related information about the missile launch to the United 
States because it would violate both the proscription against collective self-
defense and the integrated use of force.7 There are three caveats whereby the 
JDSF can conduct operations abroad,8 but none allow for the robust action 
necessitated if confronted with a meaningful conflict, such as an armed conflict in 
																																																								
6 Yuki Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet 
Washington’s Expectation? (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008), 
123. 
7 Tatsumi, 123. 
8 Tatsumi, 124. 
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the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or with North 
Korea. 
Outside of explicit homeland defense, JSDF deployments must obtain 
legal justification on two fronts: (1) legal justification authorizing the specific 
operation; and (2) legal justification delineating specific actions the JSDF are 
allowed to engage in during said operation. Such a legalist approach, argues 
Yuki Tatsumi, “results in not only a complicated, but also a cumbersome legal 
framework that the JSDF must operate within.”9 
Despite attempts to ameliorate these constraints through the passage of 
the “Emergency Legislation” in 2003, the “Public Protection Law” in 2008, and the 
security legislation passed by the second Abe administration, the JSDF still face 
what will likely be insurmountable bureaucratic and constitutional obstacles when 
quick reaction and decision-making is imperative. Despite the loosening of 
restrictions on JSDF deployment, the use of force, and the government’s ability 
to authorize them, reforms have not been distinguished by their “practicality and 
applicability to reality.”10 Realistic legal and (extra-) constitutional frameworks 
must be established that allow for the JSDF to actually accomplish the missions 
that the JSDF will realistically face. This cannot be done, however, without a 
fundamental change in how Japanese decision makers convey their intentions to 
the public, and, most importantly, a comprehensive revision of the principles that 
established the current framework in the first place. 																																																								
9 Tatsumi, 124. 
10 Tatsumi, 146. 
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Much has been made of recent security legislation leading to reforms, 
particularly with respect to the Kantei and Japan’s establishment of a more 
robust National Security Council (hereafter referred to as JNSC).11 Yet, putting in 
place bodies that can better acquire and streamline information changes neither 
the circumstances nor the proscriptions under which the executive can act. This 
is the central problem facing Japan’s protégé status in an extended nuclear 
deterrence framework. 
Japan’s Weak Executive 
 
Operating under a constitution adopted in a radically different strategic 
context in a world where the United States was the sole nuclear power, Japan’s 
executive was designed to be relatively weak.12 According to Article 41 of the 
constitution of Japan, the Diet “shall be the highest organ of state power, and 
shall be the sole law-making organ of the State”13 with sovereignty resting with 
the people through its election of representatives to the Diet.14 
																																																								
11 Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Management Crisis to Crisis 
Management? Japan’s Post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino-Japanese 
(In)stability,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 5 (March 2017): 604–38; Dr. 
Brad Roberts, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile 
Defense Policy, April 2009–March 2013, interview by the author, October 3, 2017. 
12 Shigenori Matsui, The Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis, 
Constitutional Systems of the World (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2011), 98–99, 
104–5; Tomohito Shinoda, “Prime Ministerial Leadership,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Japanese Politics (New York: Routledge, 2011), 48, 51. 
13 The Constitution of Japan, May 3, 1947, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_
e.html. 
14 Alisa Gaunder, Japanese Politics and Government (New York: Routledge, 
2017), 23, 31. 
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The only emergency provision explicitly granted to the executive 
enumerated in the constitution is under Article 54, Section 2, which allows the 
executive to “convoke the House of Councillors in emergency session”15 if the 
House of Representatives is dissolved at the time. In 1999, the Law on 
Emergencies in Areas Surrounding Japan was passed whereby in the event of 
an emergency, the cabinet may act without first obtaining Diet approval, but only 
under the framework of the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in 
Areas Surrounding Japan, which stipulates that 
[T]he Self-Defense Forces may carry out rear area support and rear area 
search and rescue activities in situations in areas surrounding Japan. As 
defined in Article 3 of the law, the term “rear area” refers to the territory of 
Japan, and the high seas and the airspace thereabove where combat 
operations are not being conducted nor deemed to be conducted while 
such Japanese support is being provided. To prevent activities performed 
by Japan from becoming an integral part of the use of force by the United 
States, rear areas are clearly set apart from combat zones or areas in 
which combat is expected to take place.16 
 
However, the cabinet still must go through a complex process of informing the 
Diet of all operational details17 “and if the Diet disapproves such measures after 
																																																								
15 The full text of Article 54, Section 2 reads: “When the House of 
Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors is closed at the same time. 
However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the House of 
Councillors in emergency session. Measures taken at such session as mentioned in 
the proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null 
and void unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten 
(10) days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.” The Constitution of 
Japan. 
16 National Institute for Defense Studies, “East Asian Strategic Review” (Tokyo: 
Japan Ministry of Defense, 2000), 133. 
17 National Institute for Defense Studies, 133. 
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they are taken, the government must promptly call off such operations.”18 Further, 
the constitution gives executive power to the cabinet, not the prime minister. 
Swift decision-making even within the cabinet is hampered by the fact that “[t]he 
Cabinet Law divides the responsibilities of executive power among the cabinet 
ministers, and requires unanimous agreement for cabinet decisions. These legal 
arrangements have strengthened the inter-agency rivalry and limited the 
leadership of the prime minister.”19 
After 9/11, two pieces of emergency legislation were passed: (1) The Act 
Concerning the Peace and Independence of Our Country and Security of the 
Country as well as Citizens in Time of Situation of Armed Attack in June 200320; 
and (2) the Act Concerning the Protection of Citizens in the Situation of Armed 
Attack.21 
																																																								
18 National Institute for Defense Studies, 133; Alexandra Sakaki and Kerstin 
Lukner, “Japan’s Uncertain Security Environment and Changes in Its Legislative-
Executive Relations,” West European Politics 40, no. 1 (2017): 148–49. 
19 Shinoda, “Prime Ministerial Leadership,” 58. 
20 Matsui, The Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis, 99; Tatsumi, 
Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington’s 
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Armed Attack, etc.” (Buryoku Kougeki Jitai nado ni okeru Kokumin no Hogo no 
tameno Sochi ni kansuru houritsu), is better known as the Public Protection Law 
(Kokumin Hogo Ho). Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can 
Tokyo Meet Washington’s Expectation?, 126; “Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution,” 
Law Library of Congress, n.d., https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-
constitution/article9.php#_ftnref214. 
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These two laws were rather limited in scope, however. The first “enables 
the SDF to engage in defense activities to prepare for attack,”22 and the second 
gives the government the power to “order the mandatory evacuation of the 
people who might suffer harm as a result of an attack, to order property owners 
to allow the passage of the SDF and to mandate local governments as well as 
some important private companies [. . .] to cooperate with the government in 
times of attack.”23 
2014 Collective Self-Defense Legislation 
 
The current administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is engaged in a 
“search for executive prerogative.” While considerable obstacles remain, Japan 
has made progress (albeit slowly) in its ability to utilize the JSDF in support of 
possible contingencies that threaten Japan that fall outside the scope of 
individual self-defense, most notably the recent the reinterpretation of Article 9 by 
the current Abe administration’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau24 and Prime Minister 
Abe’s calls to revise the constitution by 2020, a goal which has been part of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) platform since its inception in 1955.25 Despite the 																																																								
22 Matsui, The Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis, 99. 
23 Matsui, 99. 
24 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Cabinet Decision on Development 
of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, July 1, 2014), 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpoho
sei_eng.pdf. 
25 Leo Lewis, “Abe Sets 2020 Target to Revise Japan’s Pacifist Constitution,” 
Financial Times, May 3, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/a4d2aaa0-2fd9-11e7-
9555-23ef563ecf9a; “Abe: New Top Law in 2020: Eyes Provision Regarding SDF in 
Article 9,” Yomiuri Shimbun, n.d., http://the-japan-
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passage of a limited version of collective self-defense, three critical restrictions 
remain: “(1) Japan’s ‘national survival’ (kuni no sonritsu) must be threatened by a 
‘clear danger’ (meihakuna kiken), (2) no alternative means of addressing the 
threat can exist, and (3) whatever force Japan uses must be limited to the 
minimum necessary.”26 Although the Abe administration initially desired collective 
self-defense without limitations, political compromise dictated a watered down 
version applicable to situations where only Japan’s survival is stake. Adam P. Liff 
provides the “Desired vs. Actual Outcomes of Abe’s 2014 
Revision/Reinterpretation Effort”27: 
Desired objectives Actual outcomes 
Fundamental revision of Article 9 along 
the lines of the LDP’s 2012 draft 
proposal for constitution revision 
Article 9 remains untouched 
																																																																																																																																																																					
news.com/news/article/0003676123?m=jnnl; “Abe: New Top Law in 2020: Eyes 
Provision Regarding SDF in Article 9”; Jiji Kyodo, “LDP Unveils Election Pledges, 
Including Constitutional Revision Plan,” The Japan Times, October 2, 2017, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/02/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-
unveils-election-pledges-including-constitutional-revision-plan/#.WgCcR7aZMnM. 
Despite Prime Minister Abe’s public call for revision, it is this writer’s estimation that 
if revision entails abolishing Article 9, obtaining a two-thirds majority in both 
chambers of the Diet may prove possible (although unlikely) and that obtaining a 
simple 50 percent + 1 majority of Japanese public support in a national referendum 
as stipulated by Article 96 of the Constitution is highly unlikely, thus increasing the 
need for extra-constitutional prerogative. 
26 Adam P. Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics 
of Japan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations,” Asia Policy 24 (July 2017): 
161; See also, Cabinet Secretariat (Japan), “「国の存立を全うし、国民を守るため
の切れ目のない安全保障法制の整備について」の一問一答,” Naikakukanpo, n.d., 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/anzenhoshouhousei.html. 
27 Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics of 
Japan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations,” 162. 
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Significant reduction of domestic and 
constitutional constraints on JSDF 
overseas activities to conform more to 
international major-power standards 
consistent with international law 
Constitutional constraints on JSDF 
activities loosened, but the new 
interpretation continues to disallow full 
exercise of CSD and more ambitious 
policies involving the use of force 
when Japan’s survival is not 
threatened (e.g., UN-sanctioned 
collective security operations) 
A permanent shift in the focus of 
security policy debates away from CLB 
and issues of domestic constitutionality 
toward policymakers and the 
democratically elected Diet and issues 
of national interest 
Issues of constitutionality likely to 
remain a major focus of debates 
about JSDF development and 
employment 
Reorientation of the Diet debate to the 
substance of proposed policies and the 
extent to which they serve Japan’s 
national interest, as opposed to abstract 
debates about constitutionality insulated 
from changes in Japan’s strategic 
environment 
Debates over “constitutionalism” likely 
to continue to be a core focus, unless 
Article 9 is formally revised to remove 
Japan-specific prohibitions on armed 
forces and the use of force 
A shift toward a “negative list” approach 
to JSDF employment: i.e., unless an 
action is explicitly prohibited or violates 
international law, the JSDF would be 
allowed to do it 
Minimal change; there continues to be 
a “positive list” approach to most 
debates about JSDF employment: 
i.e., unless an action is explicitly 
allowed, the JSDF cannot do it 
Table 1. Desired vs. Actual Outcomes of Abe’s 2014 
Revision/Reinterpretation Effort. 
Thus, while the 2014 cabinet ruling on exercising collective self-defense is 
important and expansive in the Japanese historical and domestic context, it still 
does not meet the criteria needed to meet contemporary exigencies. Because of 
the constraints placed on the 2014 security legislation (primarily through 
legislative compromise with the New Komeito and a sufficient degree of public 
opposition28), “the JDSF will probably be unable to use force in defense of the 
																																																								
28 Andrew L. Oros, “International and Domestic Challenges to Japan’s Postwar 
Security Identity: ‘Norm Constructivism’ and Japan’s New ‘Proactive Pacifism,’” The 
Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (March 2015): 153. 
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United States or in support of collective security operations unless Japan itself 
faces an existential threat prompted by an armed attack, an important condition 
that should not be overlooked.”29 Additionally, because of extant constraints, 
support will be primarily what it has been thus far in the post-Cold War era: 
logistical rather than kinetic.30 
The capability and speed with which China (and to a lesser extent North 
Korea, which does not possess the full spectrum of Chinese capabilities) can 
activate, target, and launch its Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), Medium 
Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 
future hypersonic missile capabilities against Taiwan or other U.S. assets in the 
Western Pacific continue to become more robust and lethal, resulting in the 
United States’ ability to operate in the Western Pacific being severely 
compromised, perhaps to “prohibitive levels.”31 The timeframe within which 
																																																								
29 Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics of 
Japan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations,” 169. 
30 Liff, 169; see also, Oros, “International and Domestic Challenges to Japan’s 
Postwar Security Identity: ‘Norm Constructivism’ and Japan’s New ‘Proactive 
Pacifism,’” 152–54, 156–57. 
31 Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies 
and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); 
David A. Shlapak et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military 
Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009); Eric 
Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the 
Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2015); David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, “War with 
China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2016); Bernard D. Cole, “Implications of Improvements in PRC Naval Capabilities: 
2000-2010,” in New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 65–71; David A. Shlapak, “The Red Rockets’ 
Glare: Implications of Improvements in PRC Air and Missile Strike Capabilities,” in 
New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
46 
 
potential attacks could occur—from minutes to hours32—as well as the multi-
domain approach of targeting of potential attacks that do not just include 
traditional targets, i.e., space, cyberspace, air, maritime, and land (some or all of 
which might occur outside the scope of Japan’s ambiguously defined security 
interests),33 will not allow Japan the time to go through the aforementioned 
constitutional and bureaucratic procedures if it wishes to counter them 
successfully. The lack of executive prerogative in Japan constitutes a very real 
weak link in the U.S.–Japan alliance’s ability to bolster deterrence, maintain 
stability, and respond to kinetic attacks, or engage in preemption if an impending 
kinetic attack is detected. 
Regarding the more recent legislation on collective self-defense, 
substantial, potentially insurmountable bureaucratic hurdles remain even if 																																																																																																																																																																					
Corporation, 2011), 73–79; Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile 
Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2017); Kris Osborn, “Could Chinese Hypersonic Missiles 
Sink America’s Aircraft Carriers?,” The National Interest, June 30, 2017, 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-chinese-hypersonic-missiles-sink-
americas-aircraft-21385?page=show; Zachary Keck, “China Confirms Hypersonic 
Missile Test,” The Diplomat, January 17, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/china-confirms-hypersonic-missile-test/; Wa Zhou, 
“China Seeks to Calm US Fears Over Missile,” China Daily, January 16, 2014, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/16/content_17238265.htm; Jan van Tol 
et al., “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept” (Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2010), x, 
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/. 
32 “Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial 
Challenges” (Air-Sea Battle Office, United States Department of Defense, May 
2013), 3, 7, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-
May-2013.pdf. As stated by the authors of this report, “This document is an 
unclassified summary of the classified Air-Sea Battle Concept, version 9.0, dated 
May 12 and the Air-Sea Battle Master Implementation Plan (FY13), dated Sep 12.” 
33 “Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial 
Challenges,” 3–4. 
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Japan’s “survival” is threatened. For example, if a Japanese ally (e.g., the United 
States) came under armed attack, it would have to formally request Japan’s 
assistance. The Japanese government would then be required to “compile 
documentation detailing the threat to Japan’s survival, the appropriate JSDF 
response, and how that response is the only means available and addresses the 
threat to the minimum extent necessary,” which is then further subject to Diet 
approval.34 These cumbersome, legalistic, bureaucratic hurdles constitute a 
severe hindrance in decisive alliance coordination and demonstrate the sui 
generis nature of Japan’s constitutional-based extended deterrence behavior. 
 
Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Japan 
The issue of extended nuclear deterrence has bedeviled nuclear 
strategists since the Soviet Union obtained a secure, second-strike capability 
during the Cold War. 
Nuclear deterrence can be divided into various categories. Herman Kahn 
discussed Type I deterrence: “Deterrence Against a Direct Attack”; Type II 
deterrence: “Deterrence of Extreme Provocations by Threat of Strategic Attack” 
against targets other than the United States; and Type III deterrence: 																																																								
34 Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics of 
Japan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations,” 170. On political and societal 
forces that can constrain a more activist nuclear and security policy in general, see 
Yuki Tatsumi and Robert Weiner, “Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and 
Security Policy: New Forces Face Large Obstacles,” Strategic Impact of Shifting 
Nuclear Security Consciousness in Japan, Phase II, Project on Advanced Systems 
and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), February 
2014). 
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“Deterrence of ‘Moderate’ Provocations” or deterring graduated or controlled 
threats that might result in limited military or nonmilitary action.35 Patrick Morgan 
differentiated between “general deterrence” and “immediate deterrence.” Under 
general deterrence, a state “maintains a broad military capability and issues 
broad threats of a punitive response to an attack to keep anyone from seriously 
thinking about attacking.”36 Immediate deterrence is characterized as when a 
state “has a military capability and issues threats to a specific opponent when the 
opponent is already contemplating and preparing an attack.”37 Robert E. Osgood 
and Glenn H. Snyder differentiated between “deterrence by denial” and 
“deterrence by punishment.” Deterrence by denial “results from [the] capacity to 
deny territorial gains to the enemy [and] deter[s] chiefly by their effect on . . . his 
estimate of the probability of gaining his objective.”38 Deterrence by punishment 
is “deterrence by the threat and capacity to inflict nuclear punishment [and] act 
primarily . . . on the aggressor’s estimate of possible costs, and may have little 
effect on his chances for territorial gain.”39 
																																																								
35 For an explication of Kahn’s deterrence typology, see, Herman Kahn, Thinking 
about the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 109–22; 
Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Transaction ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2007), 126–89; Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors 
and Scenarios, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012), 281–
84; Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 
110–17, 122–25. 
36 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations 89 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), 9. 
37 Morgan, 9. 
38 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National 
Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), 14–15. 
39 Snyder, 14–15; Justin V. Anderson, Jeffrey A. Larsen, and Polly M. Holdorf, 
“Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges 
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A further distinction in nuclear deterrence is that between direct (or “Type 
I,” “mutual,” or “central”) deterrence and extended deterrence (or “Type II”). 
Extended deterrence refers to a state’s (a defender’s) attempt to deter an attack 
on an ally or other third party (often termed pawn or protégé) critical to the 
interests of the defending state by the challenger.40 Paul K. Huth distinguishes 
four different types of deterrence relationships: (1) direct-general deterrence; (2) 
direct-immediate deterrence; (3) extended-immediate deterrence; and (4) 
extended-general deterrence.41 Huth defines extended-general deterrence as a 
“political and military competition between a potential attacker and defender in 
which the possibility of an armed conflict over another state is present but the 
potential attacker is neither actively considering the use of force nor engaging in 
a confrontation that threatens war.”42 Extended-immediate deterrence, by 
contrast, is “a policy in which (a) A potential attacker is actively considering the 
use of military force against a protégé of the defender; (b) Policymakers in the 
defender state are aware of this threat; and (c) Recognizing that an attack is 
possible, policymakers of the defender state, either explicitly or by the movement 
																																																																																																																																																																					
for U.S. Policy,” INSS Occasional Paper (USAF Academy, CO: U.S. Air Force 
Institute for National Security Studies, September 2013), 3–4; Robert Jervis, The 
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1989), 8–13. 
40 Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among 
Major Powers (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2002), 52; Frank C. Zagare and 
D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 
72 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 170. 
41 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 
CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1988), 15–18. 
42 Huth, 16. 
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of military forces, threaten the use of retaliatory force in an attempt to prevent the 
use of military force by the potential attacker.”43 
With respect to Japan, its position as a protégé of the U.S. under the 
nuclear umbrella (kaku no kasa) will be of primary importance. In this writer’s 
estimation, because it is unlikely that the U.S. and China would go to war or 
resort to nuclear escalation over matters completely unrelated to the strategic 
position of U.S. allies in East Asia, the problematic aspects of extended 
deterrence, which then theoretically (and paradoxically) become subsumed into a 
direct deterrence relationship, will be the primary focus. 
Within Huth’s typology, Japan is located in both the extended-general and 
extended-immediate deterrence frameworks. Yet there are naturally ambiguities 
and boundary overlaps between when “the possibility of an armed conflict over 
another state is present” and when a “potential attacker is actively considering 
the use of military force against a protégé of the defender.” China’s use of 
“salami-slicing” tactics and gray-zone provocations magnify the complications of 
making this distinction.44 																																																								
43 Huth, 16. 
44 Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the 
Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 77–81, 140–43; Robert 
Haddick, “America Has No Answer to China’s Salami-Slicing,” War on the Rocks, 
February 6, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/america-has-no-answer-to-
chinas-salami-slicing/; Sydney Freedberg Jr., “China’s Fear Of US May Tempt Them 
To Preempt: Sinologists,” October 1, 2013, 
http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/chinas-fear-of-us-may-tempt-them-to-preempt-
sinologists/; Koh Swee Lean Collin, “Is There Any Way to Counter China’s Gray 
Zone Tactics in the South China Sea?,” The National Interest, September 13, 2017, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/there-any-way-counter-chinas-gray-zone-tactics-
the-south-22288?page=show; James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of 
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Japan thus finds itself in a highly tenuous position. It is a nonnuclear 
weapons state with enervating constitutional constraints on its ability to employ 
force. It worries that the United States will accept (or has accepted) mutual 
assured vulnerability vis-à-vis Chinese nuclear forces as an axiomatic principle,45 
thus enhancing the risk of being “decoupled” from the U.S.–Japan alliance in light 
of the increasing modernization and lethality of Chinese nuclear forces.46 																																																																																																																																																																					
Chinese Gray-Zone Strategy,” The National Interest, May 2, 2012, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450. 
45 Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, 
Stanford Security Studies (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2016), 209. Roberts 
states, “China’s experts also ask whether the Obama administration’s commitment 
to strategic stability with China means that the United States accepts mutual 
vulnerability and mutual deterrence as the basis of the strategic relationship, as it 
does with Russia. . . . For the Chinese, this is a key point: If the United States cannot 
answer so simple a question as ‘do you accept mutual vulnerability or not?’ then 
something must be seriously wrong with the relationship. They press repeatedly on 
this.” (p. 153).Clark A. Murdoch et al., “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of 
Extended Deterrence and Assurance: Workshop Proceedings and Key Takeaways” 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2009), 
32–33. 
46 Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, 
Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017 (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2015), 306–17; Timothy R. Heath, Kristen Gunness, and Cortez 
A. Cooper, The PLA and China’s Rejuvenation: National Security and Military 
Strategies, Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2016), 45–49; Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear 
Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2017), 153–63; Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, China’s Evolving 
Approach to “Integrated Strategic Deterrence” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2016), 20–24; Renny Babiarz, “China’s Nuclear Submarine Force,” 
China Brief 17, no. 10 (July 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-nuclear-
submarine-force/; Tong Zhao, “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent,” Carnegie-
Tsinghua Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, 
http://carnegietsinghua.org/2016/06/30/china-s-sea-based-nuclear-deterrent-pub-
63909; Robert Farley, “China’s Underwater Nukes: The Most Dangerous Nuclear 
Threat No One Is Talking About?,” October 13, 2017, 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the- buzz/chinas-undewater-nukes-the-most-
dangerous-nuclear-threat-no-22709?page=show; Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, 
America, and the Future of the Pacific, 16; Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends Its 
Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 
52 
 
Moreover, China’s success in its development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities47 has caused a fundamental shift: the United States can no longer 
																																																																																																																																																																					
2013), 99–116. A full discussion of Chinese nuclear strategy and capabilities will be 
discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
47 Yves-Heng Lim, “Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-
Access Naval Doctrine and Forces,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 
(2017): 146–68; Evan B. Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: 
China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 
4 (Spring 2014): 129–37; Jan van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure 
Operational Concept” (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2010), 
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/; Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle?” (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
February 2010), 13–25, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/02/why-airsea-
battle/; Office of the Secretary Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and 
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017” (Washington, 
DC: United States Department of Defense, 2017), 49–55. Addressing China’s A2/AD 
challenge, Sugio Takahashi states,  
In order for the alliance to remain relevant and continue to play a key role for 
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, defense cooperation within the 
broader framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance needs to adapt to the region’s 
changing strategic reality. Indeed, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) A2/AD 
capabilities may alter the regional military balance in the near term; therefore 
Japan and the United States should update defense cooperation to maintain 
deterrence under the new military situation.  
Sugio Takahashi, “Counter A2/AD in Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Toward 
‘Allied Air-Sea Battle’” (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, March 31, 2012), 1, 
https://project2049.net/documents/counter_a2ad_defense_cooperation_takahashi.p
df. There is debate among scholars surrounding the issue of implementation of an 
A2/AD strategy by China. As Fravel and Twomey note,  
although China is certainly developing military capabilities that would 
complicate U.S. intervention in a major conflict in the region involving China, 
Chinese writings on military strategy and operations rarely if ever mention the 
concept of counter-intervention. Despite the frequent use of the term by 
outside observers—who attribute the concept to Chinese sources—the 
Chinese military does not use the term to describe its own strategy. When it 
does discuss related concepts of “dealing with” or “resisting” a third party’s 
military intervention, it mentions them as a sub-component of one of the core 
campaigns or scenarios that drive Chinese planning, such as an armed 
conflict over Taiwan, not as an overarching strategy. The absence of the term 
and infrequent use of related ideas in authoritative Chinese military writings 
does not appear to reflect a larger denial-and-deception campaign, since this 
literature often involves much more sensitive subjects. 
M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of 
Chinese Counter-Intervention,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 172. 
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assume conventional superiority in the Western Pacific.48 Divergent views on 
what constitutes “strategic stability” between the U.S., China, and Japan,49 
disagreement on the strategic implications of the “entanglement of nuclear 
weapons with nonnuclear weapons,”50 increasing doubts about the United States’ 
ability to maintain its current naval posture,51 increasing Chinese abilities to 																																																																																																																																																																					
However, this writer agrees with Lim’s assessment of this critique by Fravel and 
Twomey. Lim states,  
Recent works have rightly argued that the Chinese authoritative publications 
seldom use the term “anti-access”—or “counter-intervention”—to depict 
China’s doctrine and, from this, have argued that the PLA and the PLAN 
have not developed such a doctrine. I argue that this last step is pushing the 
point too far and mistaking (the absence of) words for (the absence of) deeds. 
This article argues, to the contrary, that China has developed a doctrine that 
in substance—though admittedly not in words—can only be defined as an 
anti-access naval doctrine.  
Lim, “Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-Access Naval 
Doctrine and Forces,” 147. 
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and Japan” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
November 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_321_Stability_WEB.pdf. 
50 James M. Acton et al., “Entanglement: Chinese and Russian Perspectives on 
Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, November 8, 2017), 
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neutralize both U.S. and Japanese bases in Japan,52 the United States’ 
increasing difficulty—if not inability (absent escalation to the nuclear level)—to 
effectively intervene in a Taiwan contingency,53 Taiwan’s relative military decline 
vis-à-vis China with respect to air defenses, (thus increasing the risk of 
unification and the concomitant control of sea-lanes-of-communication crucial to 
Japan’s economy),54 and China’s increasing potential (perhaps already achieved) 
via deployment of the DF-21D and the DF-26 to neutralize U.S. aircraft carriers55 
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all underscore Japan’s precarious strategic position and highlight the fragility of 
cementing effective extended deterrence.56 If the U.S. decisively loses its 
position as the naval hegemon in Pacific, this will have severe if not paradigm-
shifting consequences for both Japan and Asian security as a whole.57 
Extended Deterrence and the Problem of Credibility 
 
Deterrence is by no means a modern phenomenon.58 Yet, nuclear 
deterrence may be veritably said to have originated as a Western phenomenon.59 
The logical problems of the interaction of the different typologies of nuclear 
deterrence—particularly extended deterrence—were recognized early in the Cold 
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War,60 with extended nuclear deterrence being “the central concern of deterrence 
theory during the Cold War”61 because of its “inherently limited credibility.”62 
The logic of the presumed incredibility of extended deterrence is relatively 
simple. It is supposed that if State A (e.g., China) launched a nuclear attack on 
State B (e.g., the United States) that the credibility of State B launching a nuclear 
counterattack on State A is extremely high, thus (in theory) reinforcing mutual or 
direct deterrence. However, if State B has an ally or protégé—state C (e.g., 
Japan)—and State A launches either a conventional or nuclear attack on State C 
(State B’s ally) that the credibility of State B retaliating against State A with a 
nuclear attack is deemed to be low(er) because this would invite a nuclear 
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counterattack by State A on State B’s homeland. It is this logic that leads to the 
tenuousness of extended nuclear deterrence. 
Three prominent deterrence theorists articulated the extended deterrence 
credibility problem. Bernard Brodie wrote: 
We may be quite sure we will hit back if hit directly ourselves, but will we 
do so if any of our chief allies is attacked or threatened with attack? We 
are, to be sure, legally committed to respond with all our power and our 
leaders may presently be convinced that if occasion should arise they 
would honor that commitment. But surely they would on such an occasion 
be much affected by the consideration—assuming no radical change from 
the present situation—that our people are hopelessly exposed to enemy 
counter-attack.63 
 
Schelling expressed similar concerns: 
It hardly seems necessary to tell the Russians that we should fight them if 
they attack us. But we go to great lengths to tell the Russians that they will 
have America to contend with if they or their satellites attack countries 
associated with us. Saying so, unfortunately, does not make it true; and if 
it is true, saying so does not always make it believed. We evidently do not 
want war and would only fight if we had to. The problem is to demonstrate 
that we would have to. . . . [T]he difference between the national 
homeland and everything “abroad” is the difference between threats that 
are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that have to be 
made credible. To project the shadow of one’s military force over other 
countries and territories is an act of diplomacy. To fight abroad is a military 
act, but to persuade enemies or allies that one would fight abroad, under 
circumstances of great cost and risk, requires more than a military 
capability. It requires projecting intentions. It requires having those 
intentions, even deliberately acquiring them, and communicating them 
persuasively to make other countries behave.64 
 
Finally, former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger 
stated in 1979: 
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[I]f my analysis is correct we must face the fact that it is absurd in the 
1980s to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of 
mutual suicide. . . . And therefore I would say—what I might not say in 
office—that our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply 
strategic assurances we cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we 
should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction 
of civilization. Our strategic dilemma is not solved by verbal reassurances; 
it requires redesigning our forces and doctrine.65 
 
However, if State A perceives State B and State C to be as one unit, i.e., 
State A believes that State C’s security interests are equal to that of State A (in 
the minds of the leaders of State A) and that an attack on State C is actually 
coterminous with an attack an State A, then the logic of extended deterrence 
becomes subsumed within the logic of mutual deterrence. Contending 
interpretations of this paradox have been and continue to be at the heart of the 
debate of extended nuclear deterrence. Thus, because the calculus of deterrence 
operates in the challenger’s mind, whether or not extended deterrence can be 
said to “work” or not depends on a fungible admixture of perceived levels of 
credibility, resolve, and capability by the challenger, as well as how the defender 
perceives the challenger’s perceptions of its own credibility, resolve, and 
capability. To further complicate the deterrence calculus, the protégé’s 
perception of both the challenger and defender’s deterrence perceptions then, in 
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turn, in an ongoing process, influence and re-influence the perceptions of both 
the challenger and the defender. As Japanese strategist Yukio Satoh states,  
If the credibility of the US commitment is the question at issue, it is 
Japanese perceptions that matter. The US commitment to provide 
extended deterrence to Japan has been repeatedly affirmed by presidents, 
including President Obama, and other senior officials as well as in agreed 
documents. Nevertheless, Japanese misgivings and doubts about 
American commitment persist.66  	
There is also concern in Japan about the United States’ commitment to 
drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons, which, to some Japanese 
strategists, decreases the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.67 
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As a result, I argue, deterrence stability—especially between the strategic 
triad of the United States, China, and Japan—is more transient and elusive than 
commonly assumed.68 Throughout the Cold War, nuclear strategists in the United 
States grappled with these fundamental problems. One of the most influential—
Thomas Schelling—attempted to solve the problems of credibility, resolve, and 
capabilities using mostly game theoretic models of deterrence behavior. 
Schelling’s thought and force structure prescriptions with respect to offensive 
capabilities and missile defense systems are still highly influential in nuclear 
deterrence theory today.69 Yet, as Glaser and Fetter remind us, “The Cold War’s 
analytic legacy continues to influence current thinking, but it may provide poor 
guidance.”70 
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Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, described as “the single most influential 
Western strategic theorist of the Cold War,”71 was instrumental in formulating the 
dominant theoretical and strategic foundations for U.S. nuclear deterrence theory, 
nuclear strategy, and nuclear force structure.72 Central to Schelling’s formulation 
of stable nuclear deterrence during the Cold War was “the threat that leaves 
something to chance.”73 Schelling describes this process as a reaction calculus 
with a “loophole”74 that may engender threats that “arise inadvertently”75 which 
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could result in “unintended behavior”76 by states during crisis situations. Thus, 
Schelling concludes that these types of threats are “less likely to be recognized 
and understood.”77 Recognizing the logical problem intrinsic to this dynamic, 
Schelling proposes a novel, highly influential idea in nuclear deterrence theory, 
arguing that the effectiveness or utility of a nuclear threat is not contingent upon 
the enemy state believing that the threatening state would, in fact, carry out its 
threat, but rather that the threatened party believes that “the final decision is not 
altogether under the threatener’s control. . . . The final decision is left to 
‘chance.’ . . . The threat—if we call this contingent behavior a ‘threat’—has some 
interesting features. It may exist whether we realize it or not.”78 
Another theoretical innovation that Schelling introduced that was part of 
the balance of terror model was the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”79 The 
mutual vulnerability of the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” was a critical 
element in deterrence thinking during the Cold War, and it is argued that this was 
one deterrent dynamic that kept the nuclear peace between the United States 
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and the Soviet Union. Understanding of the “threat that leaves something to 
chance” and “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack” by the United States and 
Soviet Union led many to logically deduce these tenets would help avoid 
uncertain escalation processes that would, according to Schelling, deter leaders 
not only from nuclear war, but also from inducing political crises that could 
engender an ultimately uncontrollable escalation process that could jeopardize 
the existence of the United States and the Soviet Union.80 
Yet there are inherent contradictions in Schelling’s novel propositions to 
the balance of terror theory. It accepts the realities of uncertainty and ambiguity 
in decision processes by nuclear weapons states that would preclude initiating an 
escalatory process that could lead to nuclear war, but subsequently—and 
arguably illogically—posits certainty in the face of responding to these 
uncertainties.81 Keith Payne states: 
In sum, the basic balance of terror proposition that uncertainties abound in 
leadership decision-making and behavior is sound. The very existence of 
these uncertainties, however, point not toward a single consistent “rational” 
mode of opponent decision making—i.e., prudence and caution in the face 
of uncertainty and thus the reliable working of deterrence—but toward the 
potential for multiple, unpredictable decisions and behaviors, including 
surprising decisions to provoke and run great risk. The irreducible 
uncertainties in decision-making and leadership behavior do not ensure 
the predictable functioning of deterrence; they preclude it.82 
 
There is an additional point to be made why the theoretical concepts 
articulated by Schelling are problematic when thinking about deterrence theory 																																																								
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and nuclear strategy in Asia. An often overlooked element of Schelling’s logic is 
that in order for deterrence to “work,” the simple absence of nuclear war is not 
sufficient; nuclear adversaries must be deterred from creating political or military 
crises whereby there exists the possibility for the employment of nuclear 
weapons by the same factors that are expected to induce uncertainty and fear of 
escalation. The implications of this will be discussed below with respect to the 
stability-instability paradox. 
A final element of Schelling’s contribution to deterrence theory that may be 
not entirely relevant in contemporary Asia relates to offensive capabilities and 
missile defense systems. In a simple formulation, a logical deduction from 
Schelling’s “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” is that damage-limitation and 
missile defense systems are inherently destabilizing and increase the chances of 
deterrence failure. Thus, nuclear force structure should be configured such that 
the offense is superior to any defensive measures that could be put in place that 
might jeopardize an enemy state’s ability to degrade offensive first and second-
strike nuclear forces through a nuclear first strike. 
Following from this, Schelling generally proscribed extensive missile 
defense systems and damage-limitation technologies during the Cold War.83 
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Given the particular conditions of the Cold War deterrence relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, this may have been a logical and 
prudent position.84 However, despite the tenuous nature of extended deterrence, 
in Japan’s case, as a nonnuclear protégé, we have observed continued nuclear 
forbearance, deployment of only limited missile defenses capabilities that could 
not defend against a full-scale Chinese attack, and self-imposed constitutional 
proscriptions on strengthening extended deterrence. 
 
Stability-Instability Paradox 
A final consideration in the extended nuclear deterrence dynamic in which 
Japan finds itself is the stability-instability paradox. The stability-instability 
paradox holds that the strategic balance predicated on nuclear parity makes 
escalation highly unlikely, and thus, paradoxically, incentivizes and allows for 
offensive tactical military operations. 
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Stated simply, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which offensive 
military units can safely operate without (supposed) fear of reprisal.85 
Theoretically, this could apply to both conventional fighting between a nuclear 
challenger and a defender, as well as between a challenger and a nuclear-
protected protégé. The stability-instability paradox is often invoked to explain 
crises in India, but, with few exceptions, there has been a paucity of research on 
this issue with respect to the Sino-Japanese-U.S. security trilemma. For example, 
Robert Ross states explicitly, “China’s understanding of the stability-instability 
paradox is that a mutual second-strike capability at the nuclear level and the risk 
of unintended nuclear war do not deter the conventional use of force.”86 Other 
prominent scholars, such as Brad Roberts, for example, disagree with this 
assessment.87 
The recent historical record of China especially (and North Korea) give 
notional validation to premise that it is not deterred from initiating conflicts that 
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have escalatory potential, that is, inter alia, China’s missile launches over Taiwan 
during 1995 and 1996, the “Impeccable incident” in March 2009,88 the Chinese 
fishing trawler crisis of 2010,89 the establishment of an air-defense identification 
zone (ADIZ) over Japanese territory in the East China Sea in November 2013,90 
China’s militarization of the South China Sea (despite pledging in a press 
conference with former President Obama not to),91 and Japan’s increasing 
frequency of having to scramble to counter Chinese military aircraft intruding into 
Japanese airspace92 point to China’s willingness to push the escalatory envelope, 
testing the boundaries of the U.S. commitment to Japan.93 Of particular concern 
is the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) merging or “commingling” of conventional 																																																								
88 Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National 
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(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 30, 2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43894.pdf. 
91 “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of 
China in Joint Press Conference,” September 25, 2015, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-
president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint. Xi Jinping stated, 
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Chinese strategic thought regarding escalation and the relationship between 
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chapter. 
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forces and doctrine with nuclear forces and doctrine.94 During the Cold War, 
despite the multifaceted and complex nature of conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the stability-instability paradox was not a deterrence 
paradigm within which the two countries operated. This is to say that neither side 
engaged in any large-scale conventional military conflict confident—in 
accordance with the stability-instability paradox—that it would not escalate to the 
nuclear level, despite worries that there could be “inadvertent escalation.”95 
There are multiple causal pathways to war. In much of the IR literature, 
treatments of nuclear deterrence theory and traditional theoretical analyses of 
negative security spirals are often separate and distinct. My aim in this study is to 
identify variation in ideational beliefs that inform dissimilar perceptions of nuclear 
deterrence theory in Japan—particularly with China as the likely adversary—and 
assess how these differences influence nuclear strategy and force structure. 
Thus, part of what I aim to show is that degree of risk acceptance, what 
constitutes an acceptable conventional-to-nuclear threshold, i.e., “firebreak,” and 
what nuclear strategies are at play in East Asia exist as politico-culturally 
contingent phenomena, resulting from unique epistemic communities to 
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maximize the national interest, as conceived by each country.96 This line of 
inquiry runs directly counter to a formal modeling or game theoretical approach. I 
am in disagreement with Zagare and Kilgour’s contention that “[N]ow that the 
Cold War has ended, it should be easier to see that deterrence is a universal 
phenomenon that operates across cultures, across technologies, and across 
millennia.”97 
 
Political Philosophy and Japan’s Constitution: The Search for and 
Justification for Executive Prerogative and States of Exception 
Examination of four political theorists will help elucidate Japan’s current 
constitutional conundrum with respect to executive prerogative, contingency in 
legal and international relations, and states of exception: (1) Immanuel Kant; (2) 
John Locke; (3) Aristotle; and (4) Carl Schmitt. Consideration of political 
philosophy and constitutional theory is justified for three primary reasons: (1) In 
policy terms, Thomas E. Ricks, writer for the popular magazine Foreign Policy, 
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argues that political philosophy is fundamental to our understanding of strategy;98 
(2) theoretically, Benton and Craib remind us that despite the scientific 
pretensions of social science, “Politics will, however, always be close to the 
surface”;99 and (3) philosophical and ethical issues are central to international 
relations theory,100 generally, and nuclear deterrence analysis, specifically.101 
Consider, inter alia, Waltz’s analysis of Spinoza, Kant, and Rousseau in Man, the 
State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis;102 Fukuyama’s analysis of Hobbes, Kant, 
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Marx, and Hegel in The End of History and the Last Man;103 Deudney’s seminal 
analysis of republicanism in international relations theory;104 Morgenthau’s 
Concept of the Political;105 the philosophical underpinnings of the works of 
institutional liberals, such as G. John Ikenberry;106 Lebow’s seminal A Cultural 
Theory of International Relations;107 Wendt’s analysis of Hobbes, Locke, and 
Kant in Social Theory of International Politics;108 Kratochwil’s analysis of Hume, 
Hobbes, Durkheim, Freud, and Pufendorf in Rules, Norms, and Decision: On the 
Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and 
Domestic Affairs;109 and in a non-Western context, the thought of Guanzi, Laozi, 
Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, Xunzi, and Hanfeizi in Ancient Chinese Thought, 
Modern Chinese Power.110 Deepening our understanding of the philosophical 
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frameworks from which political and strategic culture emerge can substantially 
increase our understanding of current nuclear deterrence behavior. 
 
Immanuel Kant: Theory & Practice, i.e., Valid in Thesi, but not in Hypothesi 
First, I will address Immanuel Kant, whose vision of executive prerogative 
most closely mirrors Japan’s extant constitutional philosophy (with respect to 
extra-legal, extra-constitutional executive prerogative). While not formulated 
explicitly, Japan’s current constitutional arrangement as it relates to the executive, 
the Diet, and contingency (the basis from which extra-legal and extra-
constitutional prerogative and the ability to declare states of exception emanate) 
reflects those articulated by Kant. Immanuel Kant recognized the potentially 
confounding nature of contingency almost immediately in On the Common 
Saying. Stating that a “middle term is required between theory and practice,”111 
i.e., judgment or reason, Kant echoes Aristotle in his assessment that judgment 
is required “since rules cannot in turn be provided on every occasion.”112 Yet, 
reflecting accurately Clement Fatovic’s characterization of Kant as one of the 
“best representatives of that rationalistic impulse in politics that strives to 
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eliminate, abridge, or displace contingency,”113 Kant immediately attempts to 
ameliorate this problem by stating that in such cases, instead of invoking 
Aristotelian equity or recourse to executive prerogative, more theory is always 
needed, which is preferable to recourse to judgment.114 Schmitt invokes a similar 
critique about Kant, stating, “Emergency law was no law at all for Kant.”115 
Several contradictions seem to inhere in Kant’s treatment of both 
contingency and executive prerogative. For example, Kant argues against 
allowing for contingency in matters of morality and legal duty: “[A]ll is lost if the 
empirical [hence contingent] conditions governing the execution of the law are 
made into conditions of the law itself.”116 In the same essay, Kant articulates 
circumstances under which a robust executive is needed: 
If the supreme power makes laws which are primarily directed towards 
happiness . . . this cannot be regarded as the end for which a civil 
constitution was established, but only as a means of securing the rightful 
state, especially against external enemies of the people. The head of state 
must be authorized to judge for himself whether such measures are 
necessary for the commonwealth’s prosperity, which is required to 
maintain its strength and stability, both internally and against external 
enemies.117 
 
Yet this arrogation of prerogative is based on the assumption that the head of 
state abides by—and is thus constrained by—the original contract, which, 																																																								
113 Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power, The 
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according to Kant constitutes an “infallible a priori standard”118 and is the 
“ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established.”119 Consequently, 
Kant’s proscription of resistance against the supreme legislative power is 
absolute.120 Japan’s current constitutional arrangements—in this particular 
matter—reflect the above conception articulated by Kant. 
In Mansfield’s analysis of The Metaphysics of Morals, he argues that Kant 
subordinates the executive to the legislative.121 A constitutional executive, as 
opposed to a parliamentary executive, still needs—to a certain degree—the 
support of a “general understanding”122 that yields to executive prerogative and 
executive power in order to prevent the legislature and bureaucracies from 
marginalizing the executive to its syllogistic, or instrumental, form, which results 
in a more equitable distribution of powers among the branches of government.123 
This presupposition of a “general understanding,” however, is not reflected in 
Kant’s discussion of the relationship between external right, freedom, and 
coercive laws: 
And public right is the distinctive quality of the external laws which make 
this constant harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom through 
the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil 
constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive 
laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their 
fellows. Such is the requirement of pure reason, which legislates a priori, 																																																								
118 Kant, 80. Italics in original. 
119 Kant, 79. 
120 Kant, 81. 
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regardless of empirical ends (which can all be summed up under the 
general heading of happiness).124 
 
Kant’s civil state is based on three a priori principles, which, in short, can 
be stated as the freedom, equality, and independence of all members of 
society.125 Arguing against executive prerogative, Kant indicts the paternal 
government, i.e., imperium paternale126—defined as one where the people 
“would be obliged to behave purely passively and to rely upon the judgment of 
the head of state as to how they ought to be happy, and upon his kindness in 
willing their happiness at all”—as “the greatest conceivable despotism.”127 In 
contrast, Kant argues, the legitimate government is not the paternal government, 
but is the patriotic government.128 Accordingly, the citizen, in a properly 
constituted commonwealth governed in accordance with patriotic attitudes 
“regards himself as authorized to protect the rights of the commonwealth by laws 
of the general will, but not to submit it to his personal use at his own absolute 
pleasure.”129 Importantly, Kant states explicitly that this axiom applies to 
everyone in the state “not excepting its head [i.e., head of state],”130 thus 
circumscribing quite explicitly both the political exercise and philosophical 
justification of executive prerogative. 
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The above points to some seemingly conflictual elements in Kant’s 
treatment of the executive. However, the power of the executive within an extant 
constitutional order is distinct from the executive’s ability to act extra-legally or 
extra-constitutionally during states of exception or states of emergency. In 
ascertaining the philosophical priorities of Kant, I argue that the notion of original 
contract—addressed under the rubric of the last component of the civil state, 
independence—is of categorical importance. Kant argues that “all right depends 
on laws . . . and proceeds from the public will [manifested in public laws].”131 
Public laws, then, must require “no less than the will of the entire people.”132 
From this premise, Kant provides his most forceful justification of limiting 
executive prerogative: 
[An] individual will cannot legislate for a commonwealth. For this requires 
freedom, equality and unity of the will of all the members. And the 
prerequisite for unity, since it necessitates a general vote (if freedom and 
equality are both present), is independence. The basic law, which can 
come only from the general, united will of the people, is called the original 
contract.133 
 
Thus, the fundamental axioms of Kantian philosophy do not allow for 
autonomous, extra-constitutional, or extra-legal prerogative of the executive. 
Kant entertains the idea briefly, but reasons that the exercise of such prerogative 
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would cause the fundamental structure upon which the civil constitution rests to 
collapse.134 It is appropriate that a point of distinction be made clear: Kant 
realizes that extra-legal and extra-constitutional executive prerogative is always a 
possibility. Yet, in contradistinction to Locke, the exercise of executive 
prerogative—outside the moral, i.e., virtuous and legitimate, civil constitution—is 
categorically inimical to and axiomatically incompatible with the realization of 
Kantian governance. It is a zero-sum affair; the viability of a Kantian civil 
constitution is inversely correlated, in an absolute sense, with the exercise of 
extra-constitutional executive prerogative. 
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes in a syllogistic model of 
government that “[the government] can be likened to the three propositions in a 
practical operations of reason: the major premise, which contains the law of the 
sovereign will; the minor premise, which contains the command to act in 
accordance with the law (i.e., the principle of subsumption under the general 
will); and the conclusion, which contains the legal decision (the sentence) as to 
the rights and wrongs of each particular case.”135 Kant thus situates the 
executive as “absolutely determined by law.”136 
To summarize, Kant subordinates ends (material) to principles (formal) in 
an effort to effectuate an international, federated republican peace which, he 																																																								
134 Kant, 81. 
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argues, is the only means to secure perpetual peace and freedom through the 
conflation of politics and morality. Given the emphasis Kant places on the 
executive’s negative role in facilitating war—and its concomitant adverse effect 
on Kant’s federative republican project—Kant’s philosophy does not encourage 
activist measures to be taken by the executive whose actions are effectively 
constrained by federative integration. 
Japan does not seem to subscribe to Kant’s federative republican project. 
However, its current constitutional formation with respect to executive prerogative 
in dealing with foreign affairs and contingency is consistent with the Kantian 
formulation. 
Locke and Executive Prerogative 
Is there a philosophical justification for extra-constitutional executive 
prerogative in Japan? More importantly, does there exist within the constitutional-
liberal tradition justification of extra-constitutional executive prerogative that can 
provide the justificatory and ethical framework within which a constitutionally 
liberal regime can have recourse to extra-constitutional prerogative without 
fundamentally and necessarily compromising or betraying the very nature and 
legitimacy of the constitutionally liberal regime? As President Abraham Lincoln 
presciently inquired, “Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the 
liberties of its own people or too weak to maintain its own existence?”137 Insight 
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into this constitutional dilemma can be found in the writings of one of the fathers 
of representative, constitutional government, John Locke.138 
Because the fundamental problem of Japanese foreign policy is 
constitutional, and constitutions are fundamentally documents reflective of 
political philosophy, it is my hope that this constitutes a valuable and substantive 
line of inquiry. Further, one of the most visible characteristics of post-Tokugawa 
Japan has been the study, internalization, and appropriation of Western 
philosophical thought. Constitutional theory was at the heart of the Meiji project, 
and the first generation Meiji leaders accorded the practical ramifications of 
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constitutional and political philosophy a position of utmost importance.139 The 
Meiji leaders’ prescient insight was not just that national power emanated from 
robust political, economic, and social institutions, but that the viability of such 
domestic arrangements must be grounded in a proper and legitimate 
philosophical context. The current leadership of Japan faces a similar challenge; 
the exigencies of international politics have bypassed hitherto legitimate 
constitutional arrangements, just as the exigencies of international politics 
bypassed the sclerotic Tokugawa Shogunate during the Bakumatsu period. 
John Locke is generally associated with advocating a regime type of 
constitutionally limited government. Locke also warns against the dangers of 
government by “extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions”140 which 
render men’s circumstances as being “in a far worse condition than in the state of 
nature.”141  
Yet, one can see in Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Common-
wealth the beginnings of Locke’s qualification of executive constraint. Locke 
justifies the executive privilege of legislative dismissal thusly: The legislature may 																																																								
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be dismissed “for the safety of the people, in a case where the uncertainty and 
variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule [of the 
legislature].”142 The justification of executive power is explicated most fully in 
“Chapter XIV: Of Prerogative.” 
Locke considers the separation of the executive and legislature to be a 
characteristic of “well-framed governments,”143 yet we can reasonably infer from 
his writing that, under normal circumstances, the legislature is that organ which 
disproportionately conduces to the preservation of liberty and property. 
Significantly, “Of Prerogative” gives us insight into Locke’s Machiavellian (and 
Schmittian) sensibilities144 regarding the uncertainties, vicissitudes, and exigent 
circumstances that periodically and unexpectedly confront the constitutional 
order of political societies. What circumstances, according to Locke, justify the 
exercise of executive prerogative at the expense of the legislature? 
Effective handling of exigent circumstances, upon rare occasion, preclude 
legislative primacy, but only when executive prerogative is exercised toward the 
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end of the maintenance of liberty and property for the preservation of liberty and 
the good of society. 
Specifically, Locke argues that executive prerogative must be upheld 
when “the municipal law has given no direction.”145 The precariousness of 
political order ensures the inevitability of exigent circumstances 
[w]hich the law can by no means provide for; and those [exigent 
circumstances] must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has 
the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good 
and advantage shall require: nay, it is fit that the laws themselves should 
in some cases give way to the executive power, or rather to this 
fundamental law of nature and government. . . . This power to act 
according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the 
law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative.146 
 
In contradistinction to general conception, the investigation of Lockean 
executive prerogative above shows that Locke, similarly to Aristotle and Schmitt, 
implicitly grasped the limits of the constitutional liberal order in confronting 
exigent circumstances. This is not to suggest that Locke is an unqualified 
advocate of executive prerogative; rather, the argument is that there is a 
philosophical or prescriptive space in liberal-Lockean philosophy that allows for 
temporary imbalances of power between the executive and the legislative in 
favor of the executive, provided the purpose of exercising executive prerogative 
is, in the final analysis, in the interests of the state and its citizens inasmuch as it 
can facilitate egress from exigent circumstances. In the U.S. context, President 
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Lincoln is considered par excellence in his prudent and temporary use of extra-
constitutional prerogative in order to restore the existing constitution. 
What can one make of this juxtaposition? Does Locke’s justification of the 
dismissal of the constitutional order—founded on agreed-upon laws in the 
interests of the preservation of liberty and property for those in society—in favor 
of the unaccountable and extra-legal expediency of executive prerogative pose a 
fundamental problem, expose a fundamental hypocrisy, or illuminate an 
irreconcilable dissonance in Lockean thought? Would a Lockean turn in 
Japanese constitutional thought inexorably lead to or result in authoritarian 
abuses and imperialist excesses? 
The likely answer is no. Locke’s intention in allowing for executive 
prerogative is neither a detriment to his constitutional liberal philosophy, nor is it 
an oblique endorsement of authoritarian rule. To grasp this seeming contradiction, 
it must be recognized that Locke views such actions not as unconstitutional, but 
as extra-legal or extra-constitutional,147 for the critical reason that the exercise of 
executive prerogative is only justified in exceptional circumstances when the use 
of executive prerogative is a means toward the end of preservation of the just, 
constitutional liberal order, without which the survival of the regime—and 
																																																								
147 On the debate and distinctions between Lockean notions of 
“extraconstitutional” versus “extralegal,” see, for example, Ward, “Locke on 
Executive Power and Liberal Constitutionalism”; Kleinerman, “Can the Prince Really 
Be Tamed? Executive Prerogative, Popular Apathy, and the Constitutional Frame in 
Locke’s Second Treatise”; Corbett, “The Extraconstitutionality of Lockean 
Prerogative”; Casson, “Emergency Judgment: Carl Schmitt, John Locke, and the 
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society—would be genuinely imperiled. Locke recognized that the unpredictability 
of political reality and the occurrence of unforeseen exigencies can manifest 
themselves in ways inimical to the survival of the just order against which only 
executive prerogative can defend. 
The philosophical rationale for Locke’s position can be located within the 
philosophy of Aristotle and his works The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics. 
Aristotle and Equity: Justifying Prerogative Based on Contingency 
Within the Nicomachean Ethics’ discussion of equity one can locate the 
philosophical justification for Lockean executive prerogative and Schmitt’s 
constitutional invocation of the exception. Aristotle argues for a notion of equity 
that supplements the law when confronted with novel situations where 
established law is unable to ensure justice.148 Aristotle states: 
[F]or the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, 
and it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just. 
The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the 
equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, 
but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice. . . . [F]or some 
things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be 
correct.149 
 
Aristotle states explicitly that there will be cases that present themselves 
where adherence to established laws will lead to injustice, as all circumstances 
cannot be foreseen by legislators, jurists, and citizens.150 Aristotle develops his 
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notion of equity to justify legal authorities to countenance, incorporate, and 
implement extra-legal approaches to particularly acute and problematic legal 
dilemmas. Thus, Aristotle, in his explication of equity, rationalizes and legitimizes 
this concept of operating outside constitutional or legal strictures when the end is 
to restore or preserve justice. Justice, in this sense, is that which can be said to 
benefit the whole of society. This anticipates Locke’s argument that the use of 
extra-legal executive prerogative shall be adjudged by the people, who are 
positioned to evaluate whether use of executive prerogative hindered or 
facilitated the actualization of freedom under exigent circumstances.151 
Aristotle	on	Natural	Justice	
The justification of extra-constitutional executive prerogative is, in part, 
contingent upon justice as an end. Therefore, it is instructive to investigate 
Aristotle’s examination of political justice. Political justice is comprised of two 
forms: natural justice (i.e., “that which everywhere has the same force and does 
not exist by people’s thinking this or that”152) and legal justice (i.e., “that which is 
originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent”153). Legal, 
or conventional justice, is that which is positivist, promulgated by a government 
(i.e., written or codified)—and thus legitimate—and meant to provide structure, 
predictability, and impartiality. 
																																																								
151 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 84–85§161. 
152 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 84§7. 
153 Aristotle, 84§7. 
86 
 
Aristotle observes, then, that intrinsic to conventional law, i.e., an 
extension of legal or conventional justice, is variation contingent upon regime and 
location. However, because conventional laws are the product of men, despite 
positive aspects such as impartiality, predictability, and recognizable codification, 
imperfections and prejudices are inevitable features of legal or conventional law. 
Thus, Aristotle argues that defects inherent in legal justice must be 
supplemented by human judgment and reason—which derive from apprehending 
natural justice—to recognize the particularities of the circumstance. 
Therefore, with respect to the relationship between this conception of 
justice and executive prerogative, it can be said that insofar as Lockean 
constitutional arrangements consist of laws with an admixture of legal and natural 
justice, that the inherent defects in conventional laws can be rectified by one (e.g., 
an executive) apprehending natural justice in order to best deal with an exigent 
circumstance. Significantly, when faced with exigent circumstance, Aristotle, 
similarly to Locke, allows space for—and requires—the art of rulership and 
human judgment based on reason. This sentiment is echoed in The Politics, 
where Aristotle discusses the problematic nature of the inability of set laws to 
confront particularistic circumstances. Aristotle states—in a similar vein from 
within the Nicomachean Ethics—that under exigent circumstances not covered 
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by law should result in a decision made “by the most just decision” of the 
regime.154 
Carl Schmitt 
One may question the relevance of the thought of a highly controversial 
constitutional scholar of both Weimer and Nazi Germany.155 Yet, his relevance, 
as I hope to show, is critical to understanding the nature of constitutional 
problems faced in modern-day Japan. This is especially true given the unique 
role the Japanese constitution and legal order play in its formulation of security 
polices, and thus, its role in an extended nuclear deterrence framework within the 
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Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen, “Uses and Abuses of Carl Schmitt,” Telos 122 
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Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921-1936, 
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v–vi, 88-89. This chapter will focus on Schmitt’s incisive legal and constitutional 
thought. No other aspect of his career will be considered here. For an overview of 
Schmitt’s relationship to liberalism, see David Dyzenhaus, “Introduction: Why Carl 
Schmitt,” in Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism (Durham, NC: Duke 
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George Schwab, “Introduction,” in Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept 
of Sovereignty (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2005), xxxvii. 
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U.S.–Japan alliance as Japan faces a continuing deleterious security 
environment. 
There are five primary reasons for why Schmitt’s thought is relevant to the 
modern day, particularly Japan. First, Schmitt faces directly the “fundamental 
problems of political theory—the nature of sovereignty, the legitimacy of the state, 
and the basis of constitutionality and its relation to the rights and obligations of 
the individual, the purpose and limits of political power—[and] mark him as one of 
the most original and powerful”156 legal and political scholars of the modern era. 
Second, Schmitt’s theoretical analyses of “political leadership in mass 
democracies . . . his radical and systemic critique of the ideas and institutions of 
liberal democracy—an attack that has never been answered—distinguish him as 
one of the most important figures in the theory of modern politics.”157 Third, “[t]he 
contemporary world shows many resemblances with the Schmittian political 
cosmos in which the conditions for politics-as-usual rarely obtain. . . . It is in 
many important respects that political world of exceptions, emergencies, and 
crises to which Schmitt, more than any other thinker of our time, devoted his 
considerable energies.”158 Fourth, Schmitt, similarly to international relations 
scholars Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, for example, grappled seriously 
with the notion of whether “liberalism can meet the challenges posed by 																																																								
156 Thomas McCarthy, “Series Editor’s Foreword,” in The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy, Studies in Contemporary German Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1988), viii; Schwab, “Introduction,” 2005, xli; Strong, “Foreword: Dimensions of the 
New Debate Around Carl Schmitt,” xiii. 
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158 McCarthy, viii. 
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international politics.”159 Fifth, Schmitt’s thought continues to occupy studies of 
contemporary constitutional theory as it relates to both domestic and foreign 
policy.160 Douglas Casson frames Schmitt’s relevance in the following terms: 
“The questions Schmitt raised in the chaos of Weimar Germany have reemerged 
with new urgency. The answers he gave have returned to haunt contemporary 
theorists of liberal democracy.”161 
Three insights of Schmitt that apply directly to Japan’s predicament of a 
weak executive and constitutional proscriptions will be considered here: (1) the 
friend-enemy distinction; (2) declaration of the exception; and (3) commissarial 
dictatorship. 
Friend-Enemy	Distinction	
 
While we should be careful in misusing historical analogies,162 there are 
loose parallels that can draw our attention. Schmitt’s focus on the interpretation 
of Article 48 of the Weimar constitution with respect to the use of emergency 
powers by the president can be analyzed in light of the ability of Japan’s 																																																								
159 Strong, “Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate Around Carl Schmitt,” xxiii. 
160 Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power; Eric A. Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, Inc., 2010); Casson, “Emergency Judgment: Carl Schmitt, 
John Locke, and the Paradox of Prerogative”; Clement Fatovic and Benjamin A. 
Kleinerman, eds., Extra-Legal Power and Legitimacy (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2013); David Dyzenhaus, ed., Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism 
(Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1998); Matilda Arvidsson, Leila Brannstrom, and 
Panu Minkkinen, eds., The Contemporary Relevance of Carl Schmitt: Law, Politics, 
Theology (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
161 Casson, “Emergency Judgment: Carl Schmitt, John Locke, and the Paradox 
of Prerogative,” 944. 
162 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and 
the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992). 
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government to interpret its latitude in dealing with emergencies under Article 9.163 
By arguing for a more expansive interpretation of Article 48, Schmitt was 
“committed to preserving and strengthening the Weimer state and mindful of the 
threat from the Nazis and the Communist party [and injected] into legal 
considerations his friend-enemy distinction”164 and rejected the “legalistic view 																																																								
163 Strong, “Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate Around Carl Schmitt,” xv. 
“It is worth remembering that Schmitt was among those who sought to strengthen 
the Weimar regime by trying to persuade Hindenburg to invoke the temporary 
dictatorial powers of article 48 against the extremes on the Right and the Left.” It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into the intricacies of the Weimar state. 
However, in summary, Carl Schmitt was a proponent of the president using a 
more forceful interpretation of article 48 of the Weimar constitution than he did. 
Schmitt’s rationale was that invocation of a “commissarial dictatorship” was 
authorized under article 48 in order to strengthen the constitution and avoid the 
weakening of the Weimar state through accommodation of subversive political 
parties. For more on Schmitt’s position on article 48, see, for example, Schwab, The 
Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt 
between 1921-1936, 80–89; Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 
trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), xxx; Schwab, 
“Introduction,” 2005, xlvi–lii; Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty, 11–12. 
164 Schwab, “Introduction,” 2005, xlvii; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 
trans. George Schwab, expanded ed. (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007). 
On the use of the friend-enemy distinction and the “commissarial dictatorial” powers 
under article 48, George Schwab argues,  
Cognizant that the political left and right utilized bourgeois legality as a 
weapon in the quest for power and fearful of a victory by one of the extremist 
movements with the ideological subversion of the state certain to follow, 
Schmitt saw little hope in the ability of the Weimer state to survive unless its 
leadership was immediately prepared to distinguish friend from enemy and to 
act accordingly. Concretely speaking, he argued in 1932 that only those 
parties not intent on subverting the state be granted the right to compete for 
parliamentary and governmental power. This obviously meant driving the 
extremists on both sides of the political spectrum from the open arena.  
 Heinrich Muth is correct in concluding that someone who advanced 
such a thought with great precision could under no circumstances have been 
in 1932 a member of the Nazi party nor a follower nor one who shared its 
ideas (“Carl Schmitt in der deutschen Innenpolitik des Sommers 1932,” 
Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft [1971], p. 97). This conclusion is particularly 
significant when one considers the erroneous insistence by some that 
Schmitt paved the way for the Fuhrerstaat.  
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[of] enumeratio, ergo limitatio,”165 as well the parliament as “ultimum 
sapientiae.”166 
The friend-enemy distinction, as articulated by Schmitt, is antecedent to 
the similar delineation of various categories of human affairs as defined by 
Morgenthau.167 Schmitt states: 
A definition of the political can be obtained only by discovering and 
defining the specifically political categories. In contrast to the various 
relatively independent endeavors of human thought and action, 
particularly the moral, aesthetic, and economic, the political has its own 
criteria which express themselves in a characteristic way. The political 
must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to which all action with 
a specifically political meaning can be traced. . . . The specific political 
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that 
between friend and enemy. . . . Insofar as it is not derived from other 
criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively 
independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, 
beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. . . . Only the actual 
participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete 
situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. Each participant is in a 
position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s 
way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve 
one’s own form of existence.168 
 
According to Schmitt, political phenomena must be understood in the 
“ever present possibility of the friend-and-enemy grouping, regardless of the 
aspects which this possibility implies for morality, aesthetics, and economics.”169 
In what is an accurate characterization of the tensions that exist between Japan 																																																																																																																																																																					
George Schwab, “Introduction,” in The Concept of the Political (Chicago, IL: Univ. of 
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and China’s political, strategic, and economic relationships, Schmitt writes, “[T]he 
morally good, aesthetically beautiful, and economically profitable need not 
necessarily become the friend in the specifically political sense of the word. 
Thereby the inherently objective nature and autonomy of the political becomes 
evident by virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and comprehend the 
friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses.”170 
From Schmitt’s conception of the friend-enemy distinction, high-levels of 
trade and other forms of communication or integration with China do not weaken 
the basic argument that there is a friend-enemy distinction—in the political and 
strategic realm. Evidence for this is bolstered in Japan’s concern over China’s 
military activities and expansion in numerous Defense White Papers171 and 
public polling in Japan signaling increased mistrust of and disapproval of Chinese 
government actions since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989,172 despite high-levels 
of Sino-Japanese trade and cultural interaction. In this we can see how Schmitt 
differentiates the political from other spheres. It is this insight that led Schmitt to 
question “liberal normativism,” or “the assumption that a state can ultimately rest 																																																								
170 Schmitt, 27. 
171 “Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper)” (Ministry of Defense, 1996-2017), 
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on a set of mutually agreed-to procedures that trump particular claims and 
necessities.”173 
Sovereignty	and	the	Exception	
 
In Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 
Schmitt writes “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”174 The exception 
is defined as that 
which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be 
characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the 
state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to 
conform to a performed law. 
It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of 
sovereignty. . . . The precise details of an emergency cannot be 
anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place in such a case, 
especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and of how it 
is to be eliminated. The precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional 
competence in such a case must necessarily be unlimited. From the 
liberal constitutional point of view, there would be no jurisdictional 
competence at all.175 
 
Schmitt’s view of both sovereignty and the exception in this case is juxtaposed 
against the unpredictability and exigencies of the unknown in international politics 
(themes dealt with by Locke and Aristotle). Anti-Kantian in its outlook,176 he 
argues fundamentally that constitutional rules and—as specifically applicable to 
Japan—severe constitutional restrictions on the freedom of action of the 
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executive and liberal constitutionalism’s insistence on regulating “the exception 
as precisely as possible”177 is inimical to the survival of the national polity.178 
Commissarial	Dictatorship	
Schmitt’s notion of commissarial dictatorship differs from the popular, 
modern usage of the term. Schmitt differentiates between commissarial 
dictatorship and sovereign dictatorship. A sovereign dictatorship corresponds 
more accurately with the modern-day term “dictator.” According to Schmitt, a 
sovereign dictator “does not suspend an existing constitution through a law 
based on the constitution—a constitutional law; rather it seeks to create 
conditions in which . . . [a new constitution] . . . is made possible. Therefore, 
[sovereign] dictatorship does not appeal to an existing constitution, but to one 
that is still to come.”179 This stands in contradistinction to his conception of 
commissarial dictatorship, which is highly similar to, but not identical with, 
Locke’s conception of the use of extra-constitutional prerogative. 
In times of exception or emergency that threaten the existence of the 
constitutional order, a commissarial dictator “suspends the constitution in order to 
protect it—the very same one—in its concrete form. The argument has been 
repeated ever since—first and foremost by Abraham Lincoln: when the body of 
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178 Schmitt, 12. Schmitt further states that because “[a]ll law is situational law” 
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the constitution is under threat, it must be safeguarded through a temporary 
suspension of the constitution. [Commissarial] dictatorship protects a specific 
constitution against an attack that threatens to abolish this constitution. . . . The 
constitution can be suspended without ceasing to be valid, because the 
suspension only represents a concrete exception.”180 
Schmitt draws from classical Roman political theory in his development of 
a theory of commissarial dictatorship “which is bound by allotted time, specified 
task, and the fact that it must restore a previously standing order.”181 The 
distinction between the “commissarial” and “sovereign” types of dictatorship has 
been “completely forgotten” by liberals,182 which in part can lead to distortion in 
discussion of Schmitt’s constitutional theory and “is not in fact the blatant apology 
for executive absolutism that most interpreters have deemed it.”183 
Locke, Aristotle, and Schmitt 
In sum, Schmitt’s analysis pierces through the contradictions that inhere in 
liberal-legalist constitutionalist theory. Recognizing that liberal-legalist attempts to 
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constitutionally rationalize exigencies which are by definition unknowable and 
difficult to anticipate, Schmitt offers theoretical frameworks of the friend-enemy 
distinction, the exception, and a constrained commissarial dictatorship to fill the 
theoretical lacuna left by “naïve legalism” that can, in the end and paradoxically, 
be self-abnegating to those who seek to proscribe the power of the executive for 
the sake of constitutional fidelity. 
Toward what end was the above explication meant to serve? If successful, 
it has aimed to lay the foundation upon which Japan must confront the most 
acute threats to its security: Chinese control over sea lanes of communication 
(SLOC) in the South China Sea; control over Japan’s airspace in the East China 
Sea; the ability of Japan to counter China’s attempts to “decouple” Japan from 
the U.S.–Japan alliance through “salami slicing” tactics; attempts to exert political 
control over the Japanese polity through military means (as China attempted to 
do over Taiwan during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis) or nuclear blackmail; 
expansion into the western Pacific, generally; and countering North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons capability. 
Locke, Aristotle, and Schmitt, on the whole, are fundamentally different 
political and philosophical thinkers. Yet, what these sections have sought to do is 
to adumbrate specific strains in their thought that highlight the difficulties (if not 
impossibilities) that face Japan in its ability to effectively manage deterrence-
related crises within extant constitutional proscriptions. Lockean executive 
prerogative via extra-legal and extra-constitutional (but not illegal and not 
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unconstitutional) measures, the ability to decide on the “exception” with 
temporary commissarial dictator powers in times of extreme emergency that 
threaten the survival of the state (which would occur during a nuclear crisis), and 
recourse to Aristotelian equity (what Locke terms “judgment” and Schmitt 
“competence”) and contingency in the event of such crises are not available to 
the Japanese executive within the confines of Japan’s Kantian legal-liberal 
constitution formulation. Thus, contra systemic theories where interests are taken 
as exogenous—and actions taken by states to secure those interests are taken 
as routine or given—Japan evinces a fundamentally and theoretically distinct 
form of deterrence behavior. 
The post-World War II establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine (which, to be 
sure, has been weakened substantially in the past 15 years) and the concomitant 
culture of anti-militarism have ruled out as viable options robust executive 
authority—particularly extra-legal and extra-constitutional authority) in foreign 
relations. However, Japan does not face a dichotomous choice: remaining within 
a strict self-abnegating constitutional legalism or a descent into unaccountable 
executive abuses. Subsets of Japanese elites from the postwar period up to the 
present have recognized the severe nature that constitutional and cultural 
constraints have put on executive authority in foreign affairs. Yet, Japan’s “quest 
for extra-constitutional and extra-legal executive prerogative” as an ongoing 
process exits in tension with both extant postwar constitutional and cultural 
constraints. 
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The prime minister of Japan lacks the powers that Locke, Aristotle, and 
Schmitt prescribed in recognition of the unanticipated exigencies that necessitate 
extra-legal and extra-constitutional action in defense of the extant constitution. 
Suspension of Article 9 and the laws that circumscribe collective self-defense 
would be necessary in an extreme emergency or in a time of exception, e.g., a 
nuclear crisis,184 or even in a potentially and rapidly escalatory gray-zone 
scenario. However, investiture of these powers in the executive would not 
necessarily fall outside the liberal tradition within which Japan has successfully 
situated itself.185 
 
Executive Prerogative in Light of the 2014 Security Legislation 
In an analysis of pre-Abe security reforms, Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. 
Erickson characterize the Japanese executive’s ability to respond to and manage 
crises as characterized by its decentralization, ad hoc decision making, 
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bureaucratic stovepiping, weak civilian-military integration, and overall “limited 
executive leadership.”186 Even after considerable reforms, such as the 
establishment of the JNSC and the reinterpretation of Article 9 allowing limited 
collective self-defense in 2014, “much decision-making in practice is likely to 
remain ad hoc, subject to heavy political contestation, and dependent in large 
part on personalities [that] may delay—or prevent—effective crisis response, 
especially in cases requiring ‘use of force’ (buryoku koshi) [where] extensive Diet 
debate could still delay practical action.”187 
Japan’s reticence to invest the necessary power in the executive has 
serious implications for its capacity to effectively function both within the U.S.–
Japan alliance and independently, in a “gray zone” situation, for example, and in 
its ability to maximize deterrence, manage potential escalatory situations, and act 
preemptively, if necessary. 
This is particularly true with respect to Japan’s (in)ability to participate in 
the tactical and operational necessities in the AirSea Battle concept188 (renamed 
the “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons [JAM-GC]”) 
and the “Joint Operational Access Concept” designed in response to China’s 
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Under these evolving concepts, “no 
domain can be completely ceded to the adversary. Each domain can be used to 
impact and deny access to the others. . . . U.S. forces must take advantage of 																																																								
186 Liff and Erickson, “From Management Crisis to Crisis Management? Japan’s 
Post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino-Japanese (In)Stability,” 611–16. 
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freedom of action in one domain to create U.S. advantage or challenge an 
adversary in another. This will require tightly coordinated actions across domains 
using integrated forces able to operate in each domain.”189 
It also requires “in-depth” attacks190 on enemy territory to mitigate and 
defeat the A2/AD challenge, stating that the United States must “develop 
networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and 
defeat adversary forces (NIA/D3).”191 This would require attacks deep within 
mainland China, as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which is the new 
designation of the former Second Artillery Force (SAF) given in December 2015 
that fields Chinese nuclear and conventional missiles,192 operates its bases in 
many locations far from the eastern seaboard.193 As envisioned, the United 
States and its allies must have the ability to execute interoperable procedures 
where “[a]uthorities must also be provided at the appropriate C2 [command and 
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control] level in order for joint and coalition forces to gain and maintain decision 
advantage.”194 
The expansive operational demands of JAM-GC and the JOAC lie outside 
the scope of what Japan can legally militarily contribute. The strategic demands 
of countering present security threats have outpaced Japan’s constitutional and 
political evolution. Thus, Japan’s Kantian-legalist position with respect to 
executive prerogative, the inability to act in an extra-constitutional and extra-legal 
manner, and inability to exercise Schmittian sovereignty is a fundamental, 
constitutional theory-based type of extended deterrence behavior. 
Additionally, there are ethical issues at stake. Although Japan is not a 
nuclear power, its position as a nuclear protégé influences U.S. nuclear 
deterrence strategy.195 Effective use of the JSDF is critical in any type of military 
contingency (or an unarmed contingency that has significant escalatory potential). 
Failing to adequately respond to military crises because of constitutional 
constraint potentially puts the lives of both U.S. and Japanese military and 
civilian personnel at risk. Kevin N. Lewis of RAND characterizes the situation 
thusly: “In any ethical treatment of essential aspects of the deterrence problem, 
we must recognize that in some cases a nation’s ability to adhere to any set of 
standards or practices may be limited. In an emergency if decisions are to be 
faithful to any set of basic ethical principles, then we must recognize the 
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importance of infusing certain planning activities (targeting, posture planning, 
etc.) with those principles ahead of time.”196 Lewis links the normative mandate 
of securing the state’s safety with establishing the proper methods by which to 
respond to nuclear escalatory scenarios: “There is a necessary link between the 
ethics and practice of nuclear deterrence. . . . Any national leadership abdicates 
a moral responsibility if it does not have a system of deliberation with appropriate 
structures for nuclear decisions, command relationships, and the like that govern 
nuclear choices.”197 
Despite the establishment between Japan and the United States of the 
Extended Deterrence Dialogue, the Security Consultative Committee, the 
Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the establishment of the JNSC, joint military 
exercises, and the recent security legislation that enables limited collective self-
defense, the “current arrangement [between the United States and Japan with 
respect to nuclear deterrence coordination] is not adequate. It is necessary, but 
no longer sufficient.”198 Under conditions where the United States and Japan 
might have 15 minutes or less to make critical decisions in a nuclear environment, 
Dr. Brad Roberts plaintively summarizes, “It is not a good situation.”199 
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Identity Theory 
Identity has become an increasingly important area of interest for 
international relations scholars.200 Especially in Japan’s case, the study of 
identity is critical because “when identity constructions change they enable and 
constrain behavior in ways that differ from what was previously the case [and 
that] the subject positions that emerge through processes of differentiation [of the 
Other] enable and constrain behavior, and by extension foreign and security 
policy.”201 Andrew L. Oros stipulates that security identity influences foreign 
policy in three ways: (1) it influences public policy rhetoric; (2) it can shape public 
opinion and enable coalition building; and (3) it can become institutionalized into 
the policy-making process.202 
China’s narrative as eternal victim and Japan as eternal victimizer in the 
current era has its contradictions. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of 
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China (PRC) in 1949, the CCP has committed a number of mass atrocities 
against its own people, including, inter alia, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural 
Revolution, and the massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The exact number 
of deaths that the Chinese people (as well as other non-Han Chinese) have 
suffered at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is naturally (and 
purposively) difficult to ascertain. Yet, there are general (if in some cases widely 
divergent) conclusions of the number of deaths inflicted by the CCP. Death 
estimates of the Great Leap Forward range from 23 million to 46 million.203 Death 
estimates of the Cultural Revolution range from 500,000 to 8 million.204 This is in 
addition to the “millions of innocent victims [that have] perished at the hands of 
the security forces” of the CCP which has “wielded their power brutally against 
CCP enemies” in the effort to maintain “the unchallengeable authority of the 																																																								
203 Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating 
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CCP.”205 Overall, it is estimated that the CCP has (excluding deaths from the 
Chinese Civil War and its resistance against Japan during World War II) killed 
approximately 65 million of its own citizens.206 Finally, despite the CCP’s 
adoption of harnessing capitalistic practices to enrich its economy, it also serves 
to strengthen the monopolistic political power of the CCP and does not lead, 
contrary to economic-based (particularly American) theoretical expectations—to 
liberalization or democratization.207 This is to say, the politically Leninist-
authoritarian CCP simply uses the economic gains from a party-directed 
capitalism to perpetuate and strengthen political Leninist authoritarianism. This 
phenomenon has yet to be appreciated by many in both Japan and the West. 
While no state is a utopia, Japan’s domestic postwar trajectory has 
diverged widely from that of the PRC.208 There is no history of systematic murder 
and repression by the Japanese government perpetrated against its own citizens. 
Therefore, it stands to reason that there should be some resistance to the 
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perpetuation of a self-abnegating identity vis-à-vis China given the widely 
divergent ideational nature of the two regimes. While the CCP naturally has a 
vested interest in keeping the severe brutality of Japanese wartime aggression, 
wartime atrocities, and wartime occupation as a rhetorical tool in its effort to 
legitimize CCP rule and to keep Japan as both a historically and potential 
threatening “Other,”209 it does not follow that Japan must internalize this identity-
based narrative as an immoral force in perpetuity, particularly given the 
fundamental ideational change that occurred in Japan after surrender in 1945. 
This has become increasingly true in domestic discourse in Japan on both the 
Left and the Right.210 
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The construction of a “bullying Chinese other”211 “that is something 
fundamentally ‘different’ and antithetical to the Japanese ‘Self’”212 that must be 
stood up to in a “resolute manner (kizen to shita taido)”213 has become a focal 
point of Japanese perceptions of Chinese foreign policy behavior, with China 
believed to harbor a fundamentally anti-Japanese identity.214 From the 
perspective of ideational changes in Japanese identity, China has ceased to be a 
“‘special case’, whose claims to ‘victimhood’ have to be respected first and 
foremost.”215 Resultantly, the “psychological landscape” of many foreign and 
domestic policy experts in Japan sees China as the primary threat to Japan’s 
security.216 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 146–80; Berger, 
Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, 56–81; 
Kazuhiko Togo, “The Assertive Conservative Right in Japan: Their Formation and 
Perspective,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 30, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2010): 
77–89; Yoshihide Soeya, “Regional Perspectives on Japan’s Constitutional Debates” 
(Harvard University, Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, November 3, 2017); 
Titli Basu, “Decoding Japan’s Security Discourse: Diverse Perspectives,” India 
Quarterly 72, no. 1 (2016): 30–49; Suzuki, “The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in 
Japan’s Construction of Identity: Is China a Focal Point of Japanese Nationalism?,” 
99. 
211 Suzuki, “The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan’s Construction of Identity: Is 
China a Focal Point of Japanese Nationalism?” 
212 Suzuki, 107. 
213 Suzuki, 96. 
214 Gustafsson, “Identity as Recognition: Remembering and Forgetting the Post-
War in Sino-Japanese Relations,” 118. 
215 Suzuki, “The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan’s Construction of Identity: Is 
China a Focal Point of Japanese Nationalism?,” 112. 
216 Taku Tamaki, “The Persistence of Reified Asia as Reality in Japanese 
Foreign Policy Narratives,” The Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (March 2015): 35. 
108 
 
Identity Perceptions of the “Other” in Japan and China 
This sentiment is found in recent public polling (not just elites) from both 
Japan and China. According to a joint polling initiative by the Japanese Genron 
NPO and the China International Publishing Group, 91.6% of Japanese hold an 
“Unfavorable/Relatively Unfavorable” view of China, while 76.7% of Chinese hold 
an “Unfavorable/Relatively Unfavorable” view of Japan.217 Among the reasons for 
these views by the Japanese are, inter alia, “Different political system,” 
“Continuing territorial issues over [the] Senkaku Islands,” “Criticism of Japan over 
historical issues,” “Entrenched nationalism of the Chinese,” “Notable 
reinforcement in the army and their non-transparency,” “Repeated anti-Japan 
broadcasts by [the] Chinese media,” “Seemingly hegemonic actions of the 
Chinese,” and “Actions that are against international rules.”218 According to a 
2016 Pew Research Center poll, 86% of Japanese view China as “Unfavorable,” 
with just 11% viewing China as “Favorable.” Among Chinese respondents, 81% 
view Japan as “Unfavorable,” with just 14% viewing Japan as “Favorable.”219 
Among Japanese respondents, 81% of Japanese view China as “Arrogant,” (in 
China, 70%); 76% view China as “Nationalistic” (in China, 41%); and 71% view 
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China as “Violent,” (in China, 74%), with only 12% viewing China as “Honest,” (in 
China, 15%).220 
On the question “Will There Be Military Conflicts between Japan and 
China over Territorial Disputes?” a combined 28.4% of Japanese believed that a 
military conflict “Will happen in a few years” or “Will happen sometime in the 
future,” with 35.5% “Not sure.” In contrast, a combined 62.8% of Chinese 
answered that a military conflict “Will happen in a few years” or “Will happen 
sometime in the future,” with 19.4% “Not sure.”221 When asked about which 
countries constitute military threats, 66.6% of Japanese view China as a military 
threat, while 75.9% of Chinese view Japan as a military threat.222 When asked 
“Can Japan and China Coexist and Co-prosper?” only 6.3% of Japanese replied 
that “Peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity are possible,” with 30.8% of 
Chinese replying the same. In Japan, a combined 76.2% responded that 
“Peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity are ideal, but may not be achieved” and 
“Continued conflicts are expected,” and 17.2% percent were “Not sure.”223 In 
China, a combined 59.4% answered that “Peaceful coexistence and co-
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prosperity are ideal, but may not be achieved” and “Continued conflicts are 
expected,” and 9.3% were “Not sure.”224 
Thus, as explicated above, despite high levels of trade, cultural interaction, 
and a high level of integration in a quasi-capitalistic global framework, Schmitt’s 
“friend-enemy” distinction remains intact among both elites and the general 
public in Japan. It is also commensurate with a “thin-constructivist” theoretical 
approach. As Thomas Berger notes, one common misconception about 
constructivist theory is that it tends to be incorrectly conflated with progressive, 
idealist views of human nature. Berger correctly points out that culture, 
nationalism, and ideology can all manifest in potent illiberal forms.225 
The prevalence of historical grievances, ideational animosities, and 
illiberal nationalisms in Asia lead Berger to argue that the reasons or sources of 
security competition in Asia are not adequately accounted for by the tenets of 
realism or liberalism, but “are the products of deep-rooted historically based 
suspicions and animosities, frustrated nationalism, and distinct conceptions of 
national identity and their differing understanding of the national mission in 
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international affairs.”226 Put succinctly, “The real source of instability lies in the 
beliefs and values held by regional actors.”227 
This theoretical approach allows for, then, conflict arising from acute 
ideational differences, as opposed to structurally incentivized conflict. Hagstrom 
and Gustafsson add, “Identity, then, is fundamentally about agency.”228 It is this 
agency within which Japan’s executive attempts to execute its “search for extra-
constitutional prerogative” to more effectively bolster extended deterrence in an 
increasingly severe nuclear security environment in East Asia. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Extended Deterrence and Japan 
Introduction 
The following is an analysis of the constitutional, cultural, and strategic 
dimensions of Japan’s potential nuclear weapons capability with respect to its 
position as a nuclear protégé of the United States in an extended deterrence 
framework. While this is not an analysis of the prospects of nuclear proliferation 
in Japan in terms of proliferation qua proliferation, appreciation of Japan’s 
inquiries into developing an indigenous nuclear capability are necessary 
inasmuch as it reflects both the degree to which Japan assesses the validity of 
U.S. assurances under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its own abilities to produce 
nuclear weapons, should the need arise. Thus, it is critical to understand how 
Japan perceives itself as a nonnuclear protégé with respect to extended nuclear 
deterrence. 
This chapter will assess the historical setting in which Japan considered 
obtaining an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. Special focus will be placed 
on the constitutional and ideational nature of the nuclear debate in Japan. The 
literature on nuclear proliferation is extensive.1 Additionally, there are many 
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valuable studies focusing on nuclear proliferation and Japan, specifically.2 
However, there are reasons to suspect that the general consensus that Japan 
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should continue its strategy of nuclear latency are changing due to a combination 
key ideational changes in Japanese strategic thought, a perceived deterioration 
of its security environment, and a more assertive ideological campaign 
instantiated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that could prove deleterious 
to Japan’s security. 
In my theory chapter, the certain nuances and complexities of extended 
deterrence will be elucidated in conjunction with three other primary factors, 
which, in synergistic fashion, do much to explain Japan’s perception of itself as a 
nonnuclear protégé in an extended nuclear deterrence framework and its 
concomitant force structure: (1) An adoption of a Schmitt–Lockean executive 
prerogative posture within the Japanese executive, (2) Japan’s drive toward the 
exercise of collective self-defense with respect to its position as a nuclear 
protégé and its recently adaptive force structure, and (3) the construction of a 
“relational identity” vis-à-vis China. 
First this chapter will analyze the history of Japan’s research into the 
strategic efficacy of nuclearization. Second, the legal and constitutional basis for 
nuclear weapons acquisition will be discussed. Third, I will analyze recent 
changes in both political institutions and ideational change in Japan that could 
lead to an easier path to constitutional reinterpretation and nuclear weapons 																																																																																																																																																																					
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acquisition, should Japan decide that its position as a nuclear protégé is 
untenable. 
 
History of Potential Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in Japan 
During World War II, in addition to using poison gas and germ warfare, 
Japan expressed an active interest in obtaining nuclear weapons.3 The Japanese 
government undertook three rudimentary programs in atomic research. The first, 
named “Project NI,” began in April 1940 and was run by the Imperial Japanese 
Army Aviation Technology Research Institute. The second, run by the Imperial 
Japanese Navy through the Committee on Research in the Application of 
Nuclear Physics, began in December 1941. In May 1943, the Navy Fleet 
Command Headquarters established a third project known as “F-Research.”4 
None of the programs were particularly successful and were hampered by lack of 
resources and expertise. Thus, minimal progress was made. Yet, the interest 
was clearly present and despite a lack of resources from a failing economy and 
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failing war effort, “Japanese scientists had determined the amount of uranium 
required for a bomb, calculated the likely yield of a fission device, and 
understood how they might go about triggering a fission reaction.”5 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not eliminate the Japanese government’s 
interest in nuclearization. It is often asserted that since Japan is “the only country 
that has been a victim of atomic bomb” (yui-itsu no hibaku-koku),6 that it logically 
follows that Japan would not seek a nuclear weapons capability. A series of 
official and quasi-official studies have been undertaken since the 1960s to 
determine the technological, strategic, and financial means that Japan would 
have to obtain to develop and deploy nuclear weapons contradict this assertion. 
These studies, in addition to ideational changes and threat perceptions of 
Japan’s external environment, vitiate the above logic. 
Despite the strictures of the Yoshida Doctrine7 and Japan’s postwar 
“Culture of Anti-Militarism,”8 the notion of nuclear weapons acquisition is 
anchored in postwar Japanese history. In 1957, Prime Minister’s Nobusuke 
Kishi’s administration (1957–1960) determined that nuclear weapons were not 																																																								
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unconstitutional (this will be discussed in further detail below). Prime Minister 
Kishi’s successor, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (1960–1964), in response to 
President Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy, considered the development of 
nuclear weapons as a more economic means to ensure Japan’s defense.9 In 
1964, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato addressed the nuclear status of Japan with the 
former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer. In a December 29, 
1964, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Tokyo to the U.S. Department of State, 
Ambassador Reischauer wrote regarding Prime Minister Sato’s position vis-à-vis 
a Japanese nuclear weapons program, “Sato launched into the problem of 
nuclear defense, stating his views coincided with those expressed to him by 
British PM Wilson that if other fellow had nuclears it was only common sense to 
have them one-self. Japanese public he realized was not ready for this but would 
have to be educated to this point.”10 
Other significant comments were attributed to Prime Minister Sato. In a 
declassified memorandum from Robert S. Rochlin to Raymond L. Garthoff on 
December 31, 1964, Rochlin states, “Sato is unlikely to press publicly now for a 
change of policy. He is more likely to launch an indigenous ‘peaceful’ nuclear 
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power reactor program, which would facilitate a military program at a later date, 
after the Japanese public could be conditioned to the idea gradually.”11 
Periodical internal assessments have evaluated the possibility of an 
indigenous Japanese nuclear capability. In 1967, Prime Minister Sato 
commissioned an advisory group (the Cabinet Research Office) to assess the 
possibility and desirability of Japanese possession of an indigenous nuclear 
deterrent.12 The panel recommended against Japan acquiring a nuclear deterrent 
at the time due to its prohibitive costs, public opposition, and the likelihood that it 
would exacerbate regional security dilemmas.13 In 1969, the National Institute for 
Defense Studies, under the then Japan Defense Agency, reached a similar cost-
benefit analysis in favor of nuclear forbearance.14 
In 1970, in response to U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s 
noncommittal response to whether the U.S. would deploy U.S. forces to defend 
Japan under the 1965 U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration due to strategic shifts in U.S. 
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thinking under the Guam Doctrine, Defense Minister (and future prime minister) 
Yasuhiro Nakasone ordered a study on the hypothetical development of nuclear 
weapons in Japan. After the two-year study, the commission concluded that “a 
nuclear weapon program would take five years at maximum and an investment of 
¥200 billion yen . . . [and] . . . the lack of a testing site, effective early warning and 
basing facilities, and technology for delivery systems (or submarines), all created 
significant technical hurdles. The group concluded that the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
was by far the most realistic and effective tool to protect Japan.”15 
In 1995, another internal advisory group within the then Japan Defense 
Agency conducted a study assessing the viability of a Japanese nuclear 
weapons program. 
Entitled “A Report Concerning the Problems of Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction,” this report also concluded that the costs of an independent 
nuclear weapons capability outweigh the benefits, given the current 
circumstances.16 In December 2006, the Sankei Shimbun reported that an 
internal government document, entitled “On the Possibility of Domestic 
Production of Nuclear Weapons,” dated September 2006, revealed that it would 
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take between three to five years at a cost of 2–3 billion U.S. dollars to produce a 
small nuclear warhead.17 
Domestic Statements on Nuclearization in Japan 
Throughout postwar Japanese history, Japanese elites’ public 
declarations regarding the desirability of acquiring a nuclear deterrent, as well as 
less aggressive statements that simply call for a discussion of the nuclear option, 
have been met with hostility, public ridicule, and even forced resignations. More 
recently, however, in response to the interaction between shifts in Japan’s 
internal security psyche and an increasingly hostile and deteriorating external 
security environment, it has become more common for elites to openly discuss 
the nuclear option.18 
For example, in 2006, two Japanese elites including the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party’s (LDP) former Foreign Minister Taro Aso and former LDP 
policy chief Shoichi Nakagawa, called on Japan to discuss the nuclear option on 
separate occasions.19 Nakagawa discussed the idea again in 2009.20 Nuclear 
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weapons advocacy is not confined to those in the LDP: in 2002, Ichiro Ozawa, 
former head of the Liberal Party and former president of the now defunct 
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutō), stated that Japan could use its 
plutonium stockpile to make nuclear weapons. Addressing China’s growing 
military threat, he stated, “It would be easy for us to produce nuclear warheads—
we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several 
such warheads.”21 This may sound exaggerated, but due to Japan’s 
management approach to its nuclear power plants, it is, in fact, feasible. Because 
Japan produces more fissile material than it consumes, plutonium stocks 
continue to accumulate. Frank von Hippel, a theoretical physicist, former 
assistant director for national security in the White House Office of Science and 
Technology, and co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, stated at 
an April 2013 presentation to the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 
(NPEC) that “Japan has enough separated plutonium for 1,000 nuclear weapons 
and [by the] IAEA’s estimates, it could take on the order of weeks to prepare 
everything and insert some of that plutonium into nuclear weapons.”22 
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Yasuo Fukuda, former Chief Cabinet Secretary to former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, also publicly stated the possibility of Japan pursuing an 
independent nuclear force.23 Liubomir K. Topaloff, Professor of Political Science 
at Meiji University states: 
Even high officials are beginning to openly talk about a possible nuclear 
option. Politicians close to Abe—including Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, 
who also serves as finance minister; Yusuke Yokobatake, who heads the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau; Tomomi Inada, who is the defense minister 
and a possible candidate for future prime minister; and even the ever-
skillful diplomat Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida—have made a number of 
claims over the past year or so that acquiring nuclear weapons is not 
actually against the Constitution, and is a possible option for the 
government to pursue.24 
 
The significance of these statements is that none of the above persons 
were subject to actions, such as forced resignations, forced apologies, and 
renunciations that would have been the case prior to the weakening of Japan’s 
nuclear allergy. This represents a fundamental ideational change in both how 
elites in Japan discuss nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence and in the level 
of acceptance of the Japanese public to tolerate discussion of a topic once 
considered fundamentally verboten, despite the fact that the majority still 
disagree with such sentiments. This phenomenon of a fundamental disconnect 
between public opinion and elite assessments of nuclear (and collective self-
defense) matters is an important component of the argument of this dissertation, 
as will be elucidated in the theory chapter. 																																																								
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Statements Made by the United States 
The United States has also been consistently attuned to the prospects of 
Japanese nuclearization. As early May 31, 1957, a declassified SECRET 
memorandum from the Department of State Office of Intelligence Research 
states: 
The defense establishment itself, and its partisans in the Diet and the 
ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, apparently aim ultimately at equipping 
Japan’s forces with nuclear weapons. The Defense Techniques Research 
Institute of the military establishment has engaged a number of qualified 
nuclear scientists, and the planning board of the Agency evidently is 
proceeding under the assumption that nuclear weapons would be a 
standard condition of future warfare. The Chairman of the Liberal 
Democratic Party’s sub-committee on defense problems, former admiral 
Hoshina Zenshiro, has circulated among Diet members a study of nuclear 
warfare which asserts that the effective defense is dependent upon the 
utilization of tactical nuclear weapons by forces in the home islands, and 
indirectly upon the possession by the US of a greater supply than the 
Soviet Union of strategic nuclear weapons. 
This sophisticated group, which seems to think in terms of eventually 
regaining for Japan some of its prewar status as an important military 
power, may see in the development of nuclear weapons the means for 
industrially-advanced Japan to become more powerful in military terms 
than its more populous neighbors [. . .] There are indications that these 
Japanese leaders may believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
Japan would be a particularly efficient means of obtaining for Tokyo a new 
and more powerful voice in Far Eastern affairs [. . .] At the present time 
these views are confined to a small conservative elite. The question of 
whether Japan is likely to embark upon the production of nuclear weapons 
in the next decade would be related to the future balance of domestic 
political power in the nation [. . .] Kishi may have anticipated the adverse 
reaction his remarks received, and may be planning to accustom the 
public to hearing discussion by high officials of the advantages of nuclear 
weapons for Japan, as a preliminary to more serious efforts to condition 
public opinion after the general election [. . .] On the whole, the question of 
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whether or not Japan will attempt seriously to produce its own nuclear 
weapons depends upon the nation’s political and economic future.25 
 
Helmut Sonnenfeldt’s emphasis on domestic and political determinants (not 
external systemic concerns) of Japan’s potential nuclearization is instructive. It 
represents recognition of the strategic political culture and agency with which 
domestic actors are imbued, an agency elided by systemic theoretical 
approaches. 
In an October 1962 declassified SECRET/NOFORN memorandum from 
the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the U.S. Department 
of State, Roger Hilsman, regarding the reaction of the anticipated nuclear test by 
China (which first tested in 1964) wrote: 
In the continued absence of an international agreement on armament 
limitations, Japan may well precede to strengthen its military 
establishment to give it enhanced independence of political choice and a 
greater voice in determining military policies in the Far East. 
Obsolescence alone will demand modernization of its weapons arsenal. 
The development of modern conventionally armed defensive weapons is 
already underway. A transition to dual capability defensive weapons, 
initially acquired from the US but eventually manufactured in Japan is 
possible should the Japanese conclude that an international disarmament 
agreement is hopeless. This view would be reinforced if the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons caused then eventually to be regarded as a normal and 
necessary part of the military equipment of key major powers. Further 
development of security policies beyond a purely defensive phase to 
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include the acquisition of a Japanese deterrent capacity, in the form of an 
offshore based system such as Polaris, is a remote possibility at best.26 
 
On March 27, 1967 (three years after China’s first nuclear test), Deputy Director 
of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, George C. 
Denney Jr., wrote in a declassified SECRET/NOFORN memorandum: 
Apart from the new confidence and the freer hand which Peking might 
expect to gain from an ICBM arsenal, its possession of such weapons 
presumably will lend weight to arguments being made in countries like 
India and Japan in favor of acquiring independent nuclear missile 
capabilities. Chinese possession of ICBMs might also spur appeals for 
strong US (or Soviet) commitments to Asian defenses, for deployments of 
ABM systems to protect the area, and, on the part of some, for 
accommodation with China.27 
 
In response to two articles in the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun 
written by a leading Japanese expert on nuclear defense matters, Kiichi Saeki, a 
declassified SECRET/NOFORN memorandum written on April 14, 1967, by Allan 
Evans, Deputy Director for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research for 
the U.S. Department of State, in the midst of international discussions of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stated: 
This paper recommended that, while Japan should favor an NPT, it should 
also reserve the right to produce nuclear weapons in the future, maintain 
close liaison with the United States on defense planning, and continue 																																																								
26 Roger Hilsman, “Document-07. Roger Hilsman to Acting Secretary, ‘Japan’s 
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research and development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But the 
position paper and Saeki’s articles emphasize that Japanese nuclear 
policy must be flexible enough to protect Japan and yet not contribute to a 
nuclear arms race in Asia [. . .] Saeki advocated that, in the meantime, 
Japan should: 1) gradually strengthen nuclear-defense countermeasures 
and study how Japan should contribute to a power balance against China; 
2) build up Japanese national power (not merely military power) so as to 
deal with Peking on equal terms without provoking it; 3) maintain the US-
Japan Security Treaty and strengthen the US nuclear umbrella through 
closer contacts between Japanese and US leaders, joint US-Japanese 
nuclear force planning, and consideration of a Japanese-US ABM system 
and early detection network; 4) attempt to remove the Japanese taboo 
regarding nuclear devices; 5) avoid developing nuclear weapons 
independently, as this could invite Chinese retaliation; but rather 6) 
develop Japanese technical and industrial capabilities, especially in the 
space and peaceful atomic-energy fields, to maintain Japan’s prestige and 
to keep open the option to develop nuclear weapons should that become 
necessary [. . .] [T]he government and its security advisors are well aware 
of the need for careful defense planning that is subject to continued review, 
close cooperation and coordination with the United States, and a flexible 
attitude towards nuclear defenses. Even if the Japanese sign an NPT, 
future decisions in this field will probably depend largely on how the 
Japanese believe they will be best protected against Chinese Communist 
nuclear capabilities.28 
 
A declassified SECRET memorandum written on June 10, 1968, by Henry 
Owen of the State Department Policy Planning Council (and future member of 
the National Security Council) regarding the potential effects of the NPT wrote to 
the Secretary of State: 
In the Far East at least, the progress of the Chinese nuclear effort will 
stimulate the nuclear programs of India, Japan and Australia; each of 
these nations may be expected to put itself in a position to achieve a 
bomb within months of withdrawal of the NPT [and that] [t]he United 																																																								
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States has limited leverage to halt or slow down future proliferation [. . .] 
There is some evidence that status and prestige are as important in 
fostering proliferation as security motivations. It is therefore not clear that 
the maintenance of existing U.S. guarantees or the extension of new ones 
will reliably proscribe further nuclear spread. The French, after all, decided 
to go nuclear despite the NATO guarantee. There are political and 
international pressures for further proliferation in Asia and the Pacific 
despite U.S. deterrence of China. Indeed, further U.S. arrangements to 
provide for the security of non-nuclear powers could make them seem 
more dependent on the United States. This could have the ultimate impact 
of strengthening their incentives for a national nuclear capability [. . .] 
Where U.S. commitments already exist, as in Australia and Japan, there is 
a measure of uncertainty about how long they will last [. . .] The diffusion 
of nuclear capabilities is not likely to be halted once and for all by the NPT. 
Even under the NPT nations will proceed to develop their reactor 
programs to the point where a military nuclear option could be taken up in 
short order. In some cases, this option will be years; in some cases 
months; in others even weeks.29 
 
A declassified TOP SECRET memorandum written by the National 
Security Council on April 28, 1969, addressed to the Office of the Vice President, 
the Office of the Secretary State, the Office of the Secretary Defense, the Office 
of the Director of Emergency Preparedness, the Under Secretary of State, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence 
entitled “NSSM 5: Japan Policy” stated: 
Okinawa houses the most important US military base system in the 
Western Pacific, capable of performing a wide variety of functions. Its 
value is enhanced by the absence of any legal restriction on American 
free access to or use of the bases; which permits storage of nuclear 
weapons and the launching of military combat operations directly from 
those bases [. . .] The denial of storage rights in Okinawa would reduce 
some aspects of US nuclear capability in the forward area, particularly in 
the initial stages of a large-scale conflict with Communist China [. . .] The 																																																								
29 Henry Owen, “After NPT, What? - Information Memorandum, Secret” (U.S. 
Department of State, Policy Planning Council, June 10, 1968), 3–5, 7, George 
Washington University National Security Archive, 
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nukevault/ebb253/doc27.pdf. 
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degradation in capability resulting from denial of nuclear weapons on 
Okinawa would be significant, particularly our ability to carry out strikes 
against time-sensitive targets. The practical alternatives would result in 
increased response time, are expensive, and less satisfactory 
operationally in that flexibility in the forward area would be reduced. The 
aggregate effect of lost options and degradation in general would diminish 
the credibility of the deterrence provided by forward deployed dual-
capable forces. This could lead to miscalculation by communist Asia, thus 
increasing the risk of future US military involvement. Moreover, denial of 
tactical nuclear options from Okinawa would decrease our ability to 
confine any possible nuclear conflict to a regional level because of the 
likely necessity of having to resort to increased reliance on strategic 
nuclear delivery systems such as the Polaris/Poseidon and US-based 
Minuteman.30 
 
It is important to note that Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” (hikaku 
sangensoku) which consist of Japan “not possessing, not producing and not 
permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan’s Peace 
Constitution”31 were first introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato on February 5, 
1968, and later made into a formal Diet resolution on November 24, 1971.32 
Significantly, the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” are policy, not law. However, 
Prime Minister Sato, evidently understanding that the “Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles” (and, based on what we now know, the “Two- and-a-Half Non-Nuclear 
Principles”33) put Japan’s security in a compromising situation with respect to its 																																																								
30 United States National Security Council, “NSSM 5: Japan Policy TOP 
SECRET” (United States National Security Council, April 28, 1969), 18, 23–24, 
George Washington University National Security Archive, 
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nukevault/ebb291/doc04.pdf. 
31 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” n.d., 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/index.html. 
32 Tatsumi, “Maintaining Japan’s Non-Nuclear Identity: The Role of U.S. Security 
Assurances,” 138. 
33 Martin Fackler, “Japan Says It Allowed U.S. Nuclear Ships to Port,” The New 
York Times, March 9, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/world/asia/10japan.html; “Japan Confirms 
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position as a nuclear protégé. Thus, in March 1968, Prime Minister Sato 
formulated a modified nuclear policy announced to the Diet known as the “Four 
Pillars Nuclear Policy,” (Kaku Yon Seisaku) which held that Japan would “(1) 
adhere to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, (2) pursue global nuclear 
disarmament, (3) limit the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes as defined 
by the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law (Genshi-ryoku Kihon-ho), which limits use 
of nuclear energy to ‘peaceful purposes,’34 and (4) rely upon U.S. extended 
deterrence that is codified by the 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.”35 
Ultimately, Prime Minister Sato earned a Noble Peace Prize for his efforts. 
Yet, based on what we now know publicly, the enterprise was disingenuous. 
Importantly, in 1969, Prime Minister Sato told then-Ambassador to Japan Alexis 
Johnson that the nonnuclear principles were “nonsense.”36 In an effort to further 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Secret Pact on US Nuclear Transit,” BBC News, March 9, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8557346.stm; Anthony Kuhn, “Japan Confirms 
Secret Nuclear Pacts With U.S.,” National Public Radio, March 11, 2010, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124567404; Pyle, Japan 
Rising : The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, 252. 
34 Government of Japan, “原子力基本法 (Atomic Energy Basic Law),” 1955, 
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S30/S30HO186.html. 
35 Furukawa, “Japan’s Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapon: A Historical 
Perspective,” 2–3; Eisaku Sato, “衆議院会議録情報 第０５８回国会 本会議
 第４１号,” June 3, 1968, 
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/058/0001/05806030001041c.html. 
36 “Peace Prize Winner Sato Called Nonnuclear Policy ‘Nonsense,’” The Japan 
Times, June 11, 2000, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2000/06/11/national/peace-prize-winner-sato-
called-nonnuclear-policy-nonsense/#.WcBN2a2ZO8o. 
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ambiguity, in 2012, Japan amended the Atomic Energy Basic Law to include 
“national security” as one its fundamental purposes.37 
Finally, and highly significant, former Prime Minister Nakasone accepted 
former President Reagan’s proposal to allow deployment of U.S. F-16s to 
Misawa Air Base in northern Honshu not only in response to deployment of 
Soviet MiGs in the northeastern Soviet Union “but also with the intent of signaling 
that Japan was prepared to support U.S. horizontal escalation strategies 
because the F-16s were dual-capable and could hypothetically carry nuclear 
weapons against Soviet targets.”38 Michael Green perceptively notes, “The U.S. 
and Japanese press did not pick up on the dual-capable nuclear strategic 
implications of the F-16 deployments, but the Soviets certainly did.”39 In fact, 
General Nikolai Cherubov, referring to the 160-170 U.S. F-16 and F-4 aircraft 
stationed at the base, stated specifically “American nuclear weapons at the U.S. 
military base in Misawa [. . .] threaten Soviet security [and that] the planes can be 
equipped with nuclear weapons capable reaching coastal areas in the Soviet far 
east.”40 
																																																								
37 “Revisions to Japanese Atomic Law Cause Worry Over Possible Weapons 
Aim,” NTI, June 22, 2012, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/revisions-japanese-atomic-
law-spark-concern-about-possible-weapon-development/. 
38 Michael J. Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American 
Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Warren I. Cohen 
Books on American-East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2017), 
406. 
39 Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the 
Asia Pacific Since 1783, 647n95. 
40 “U.S. Nuclear Arms at Japan’s Misawa Base Threatens Soviets,” Kyodo News 
Service, Japan Economic Newswire, August 17, 1987. 
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Thus, as an August 2017 article from the Japan Times states regarding 
the disclosure of violating the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” that was hidden 
from the Japanese public: 
The finding is significant because it shows Japan’s leaders officially 
agreed during the Cold War to violate the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
set out by Prime Minister Eisuke Sato in 1967 while publicly telling the rest 
of Japan that nuclear weapons would not be brought to the prefecture 
[. . .] According to the 1969 memorandum, senior Foreign Ministry official 
Hiroto Tanaka told White House national security adviser Henry Kissinger 
that “The Japanese have no disagreement with the U.S.” on introducing 
nuclear weapons to Okinawa on an emergency basis [. . .] The Japanese 
government had told the public that nuclear weapons would not be 
brought to the war-torn island prefecture.41 
 
A declassified TOP SECRET memorandum written by Acting Secretary of 
State U. Alexis Johnson to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on May 26, 1972, 
echoes similar sentiments: 
The Japanese Government, the opposition parties, and the media all 
believe or suspect that our attack carriers have nuclear weapons on board, 
and we believe even those who support our present arrangements on 
nuclear weapons would make a distinction between periodic port visits 
and a homeporting arrangement, as well as between nuclear weapons 
designed to defend a ship against attack and those used offensively. In 																																																								
41 “Japan Officially Gave U.S. Consent to Bring in Nuclear Weapons Ahead of 
Okinawa Reversion Accord: Document,” The Japan Times Online, August 14, 2017, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/14/national/history/japan-officially-gave-
u-s-consent-bring-nukes-ahead-okinawa-reversion-accord-document/. See also, 
“Presence of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Okinawa,” n.d., 
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb541-Nukes-on-Okinawa-Declassified-2016/; 
“Nuclear Weapons on Okinawa Declassified December 2015, Photos Available 
Since 1990,” National Security Archive, n.d., http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-
book/japan-nuclear-vault/2016-02-19/nuclear-weapons-okinawa-declassified-
december-2015; “The Nuclear Vault: Nuclear Noh Drama - Tokyo, Washington and 
the Case of the Missing Nuclear Agreements,” n.d., 
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb291/; Yuki Tanaka and Robert Wampler, 
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The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 7, no. 45 (November 9, 2009): 1–12, 
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any event, public inquiry would center on whether the carrier had nuclear 
weapons on board and whether the Japanese Government had violated 
its own policy of not permitting the introduction of nuclear into Japan. This 
debate could jeopardize the frequent regular access to Japanese ports of 
our combatant surface ships and nuclear powered submarines.42 
 
A declassified SECRET memorandum written by Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird on June 17, 1972, states: 
Concerning matters of nuclear weapons, I believe that responsible and 
thinking Japanese, both within and outside the government, accept the 
probability that at least some of our ships may carry nuclear weapons, but 
that it is not in their best interest to belabor the issue with the one ally that 
is underwriting their security. Under the Nixon Doctrine, one of our major 
responsibilities is to provide a nuclear shield and credible deterrent 
posture in the Far East. Japan certainly realizes its need for our nuclear 
umbrella, as well as our necessity to provide nuclear equipped and trained 
forces to maintain it [. . .] To deny the nuclear mission to a Japan-based 
carrier would substantially degrade its military utility and create difficult 
operational problems for the remaining nuclear-capable forces in the 
theater. Such degradation would be neither in the US nor the Japanese 
interest. Moreover, from the worldwide US perspective, a precedent set by 
acquiescing in Japanese pressure on this matter could lead to similar 
demands by other countries all around the globe—a development which 
might ultimately threaten the viability of a significant portion of our sea-
borne nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, unless we were prepared to reverse 
our long-standing “neither confirm nor deny” policy, there would be no way 
for us to take advantage of the fact that the homeported carrier in fact 
carried no nuclear weapons. 
On the legal side, the record of our negotiations with the Japanese 
Government on the matter is quite clear. When Ambassador Reischauer 
discussed the subject with Foreign Minister Ohira in April 1963, Ohira 
confirmed the Ambassador’s understanding that the prior consultation 
clause does not apply to the case of nuclear weapons on board vessels in 
Japanese waters or ports. No Japanese Government since then has 
challenged this interpretation [. . .] On balance, I believe that we must be 
forceful in not permitting the U.S.-Japan relationships to evolve to the 
point where U.S. actions are unduly inhibited. U.S. forces in Japan are 																																																								
42 U. Alexis Johnson, “Document 8: Letter, Acting Secretary of State U. Alexis 
Johnson to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, TOP SECRET” (U.S. Department of 
State, May 26, 1972), 2–3, George Washington University National Security Archive, 
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there to give substance to the treaty, and the fundamental facts of Asian 
security must be faced by the Government of Japan.43 
 
What these declassified documents reveal about secret understandings 
between the United States and Japan are critical with respect to the United 
States’ and Japan’s thinking about its role as a nuclear protégé in an extended 
nuclear deterrence framework. In fact, Japan’s national broadcasting corporation, 
NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai) broadcast a documentary specifically addressing the 
issue of secret basing and transport of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory 
entitled “The Truth About the Okinawa Reversion After 25 Years: The Role of 
U.S. Bases as Shown in Classified Documents,”44 exposing the Japanese public 
to the chimerical nature of the three nonnuclear principles. 
In the United States, there have been both mere discussions of and 
outright advocates for Japan acquiring an indigenous nuclear deterrent. On 
March 16, 2003, in an interview with NBC’s Meet the Press, then-Vice President 
Dick Cheney remarked: “The idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea with ballistic 
missiles to deliver those will, I think, probably set off an arms race in that part of 
the world. And others, perhaps Japan, for example, may be forced to consider 
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whether or not they want to readdress the nuclear question.”45 Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Japan Tom Schieffer (2005–2009) stated: “If you had a nuclear 
North Korea, it just introduces a whole different dynamic. . . . [I]t seems to me 
that that increases the pressure on both South Korea and Japan to consider 
going nuclear themselves.”46 U.S. Navy Vice Admiral John M. Bird (Ret.), former 
commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet (July 2008-September 2010) stated in a 
presentation entitled “North Korean Lessons for Japan” that a nuclear-armed 
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Japan could serve as a “balancing force” against North Korean and Chinese 
aggression.47 Current President Donald Trump has echoed similar sentiments.48 
While this writer agrees that the “Culture of Anti-Militarism”49 has 
significant explanatory salience with respect to Japan’s Cold War security 
strategy, and to an extent its post-Cold War security strategy, until, arguably, the 
administration of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, it seems clear that that 
there have always been elites within the Japanese government that never fully 
internalized this mindset. More recently, Japanese elites’ conception of Japan’s 
security role has been even more robust. 
Constitutional Considerations 
In order to make sense of the domestic political environment that currently 
accepts circumscribed discussion of nuclear weapons acquisition, we must 
examine the legal structure in which Japan’s position on Article 9, collective 
defense, and nuclear weapons has evolved. 
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Nuclear Weapons and the Constitution of Japan 
Although the Japanese constitution has never been amended,50 there is a 
history of elastic interpretation, especially with respect to Article 9.51 For example, 
the Japanese constitution does not proscribe maintaining a nuclear deterrent. In 
fact, nuclear weapons have been deemed permissible since 1957 when former 
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (the maternal grandfather of current Prime 
Minister Shinzō Abe) gave testimony before a Diet committee affirming their 
legality provided nuclear weapons were “minimally necessary for self-defense”52 
but that his administration’s policy was to not develop nuclear weapons. This is a 
familiar refrain reiterated by subsequent administrations. 
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Kishi’s statement, “There are many varieties of nuclear arms,”53 was an 
attempt to establish a difference between offensive and defensive nuclear 
weapons. Prominent international relations theorist Robert Jervis would likely 
agree with Prime Minister Kishi’s statement, arguing that countervalue nuclear 
weapons should be viewed as defensive “because the state can credibly threaten 
to retaliate only in response to an attack on itself or its closest allies.”54 It should 
be noted this author disagrees with Jervis’ assessment, as the country on the 
receiving end of a countervalue nuclear strike is unlikely to appreciate this 
distinction. 
The constitutionality of nuclear weapons was again confirmed in 1965 
when the director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), the bureau directly 
responsible for the government’s interpretation of constitutional issues, gave 
testimony to the Diet affirming the legality of maintaining a nuclear deterrent.55 In 
1969, echoing Prime Minister Kishi, the CLB stated, “When it comes to nuclear 
weapons, there are those that can be maintained and those that may not.”56 In 
1970, the Japan Ministry of Defense (then the Japan Defense Agency) codified 
this CLB interpretation into formalized doctrine, provided Japan’s nuclear force 
was to be maintained as a deterrent, and not as an offensive capability. In May 																																																								
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2002, chief cabinet secretary of former Prime Minister Koizumi, Yasuo Fukuda 
confirmed the constitutionality of nuclear weapons,57 followed by Prime Minister 
Shinzō Abe (first term) attesting to their legality in November 2006 in testimony 
given to the Diet.58 
Conspicuously absent from the repeated assertions that possession and 
deployment of nuclear weapons does not contravene constitutional law is the 
voice of the Supreme Court of Japan, which holds ex post facto jurisdiction on 
legislative and constitutional issues (in contrast to the CLB, which has ex ante 
authority over constitutional issues). Thus, as a technical legal matter, the 
Supreme Court of Japan could not even rule on nuclear weapons acquisition until 
after Japan had built or deployed them. Despite the Supreme Court’s explicit 
right of judicial review, it has historically refrained from passing judgments 
deemed “highly political” (統治行為論, or, in U.S. legal terminology, “the political 
question doctrine”). This character and practice of judicial review by the Supreme 
Court of Japan has been described as “the most conservative and cautious in the 
world.”59 The rationale of leaving certain “political matters” to the elected 
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Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan,” Texas Law Review 87, no. 7 (June 
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branches of government (which includes the Cabinet Legislation Bureau) 
originated in the landmark 1959 “Sunakawa Case” which considered the 
constitutionality of U.S. forces stationed in Japan in relation to Article 9 and the 
maintenance of war potential. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled there was no 
violation of Article 9 because the U.S. forces were not under Japanese juridical 
control. As Haley argues, the Supreme Court of Japan’s position held that “In the 
absence of an unmistakable or ‘clear violation,’ the courts were to defer to the 
judgment of the political branches on the issue of constitutionality.”60 The actual 
wording of the Supreme Court’s decision is significant, establishing an enduring 
precedent (referred to as stare decisis in U.S. legal terminology): 
The Security Treaty, therefore, as stated before, is featured with an 
extremely high degree of political consideration, having bearing upon the 
very existence of our country as a sovereign power, and any legal 
determination as to whether the content of the treaty is constitutional or 
not is in many respects inseparably related to the high degree of political 
consideration or discretionary power on the part of the Cabinet which 
concluded the treaty and on the part of the Diet which approved it. 
Consequently, as a rule, there is a certain element of incompatibility in the 
process of judicial determination of its constitutionality by a court of law 
which has as its mission the exercise of the purely judicial function. 
Accordingly, unless the said treaty is obviously unconstitutional and void, it 
falls outside the purview of the power of judicial review granted to the 
court. It is proper to construe that the question of the determination of its 
constitutionality should be left primarily to the Cabinet which has the 
power to conclude treaties and the Diet which has the power to ratify 
them; and ultimately to the political consideration of the people with whom 
rests the sovereign power of the nation.61 
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Its reticence to invoke judicial prerogative over certain matters is reflected 
in its 1973 judgment in a case62 that challenged the constitutionality of the Self-
Defense Forces: 
Whether or not the SDF corresponds to the so-called “war potential” 
prohibited by Article IX or the Constitution is not a matter to be examined 
by the judicial branch. . . . [The judiciary] does not bear responsibility to 
the people . . . [and] these are not matters into which the Court should 
inquire.63 
 
Due to judicial reticence to rule on legislation that it deems “highly political . . . 
(and thus) beyond the authority of the judiciary to investigate,”64 interpretation of 
Article 9 including its derivative issues: collective defense, BMD deployment, 
nuclear weapons, etc.) has been informed by executive action and CLB rulings.65 
To understand the significance of CLB rulings, especially regarding 
permissibility of a Japanese nuclear deterrent, one must first appreciate the 
historical role and legal function of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Founded as 
its current incarnation in 1952 by former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in an ex 
cathedra declaration, it is the descendant of the Legislation Bureau (LB) formally 
established in 1885 as the key legal advisory organ to the Meiji government. In 																																																																																																																																																																					
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1890, the Meiji Constitution allowed the LB to have direct access to the Imperial 
institution. During both prewar and wartime Japan, the Director General of the LB 
was one of the two highest ranking officials in the Cabinet and possessed the 
mandate to approve all acts of every ministry within the government.66 
In its current form, the CLB has two formal tasks: (1) to provide expertise 
to the executive branch on legal matters involving Diet legislation and the 
constitution, and (2) to ensure that all legislation, Cabinet orders, treaties, and 
regulations are both consistent with legal precedent and constitutional. Despite 
the CLB’s formal limitations as a legal advisory body, it exerts a level of influence 
disproportionate to its role as codified by law. 
As Richard Samuels states, the CLB 
derives enormous power from its formal monopoly on the use of the 
government’s “formal seal of approval.” By exhaustively and authoritatively 
reviewing all proposed policies and by issuing “unified government 
interpretations,” the CLB effectively “collateralizes” the authority of 
bureaucrats, lawmakers, and jurists alike. Thus, the CLB’s approval is 
solicited by officials on all matters—from regulations to legislation to 
speeches.67 
 
These “unified government interpretations” serve as de facto laws, and thus 
provide a legal and arguably extra-constitutional institutional barrier to policy 
change. Because the CLB has stepped in to fill the jurisprudential vacuum left by 
the Supreme Court’s reticence to rule on matters deemed “highly political,” the 
																																																								
66 Samuels, “Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: 
Who Elected These Guys Anyway?” 
67 Ibid. See also, “About the Cabinet Legislation Bureau,” Cabinet Legislation 
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CLB “has emerged as a quasi-constitutional court with a de facto monopoly on 
interpreting the constitution.”68 
With the scope of judicial authority in the courts vis-à-vis constitutional 
matters curtailed substantially, final constitutional judgments on “highly political” 
matters, especially those involving foreign policy decisions, are rendered by 
bureaucrats, not by the courts. Because neither the judicial nor the legislative 
branches can contravene CLB rulings on security policy, the “real balance of 
civil-military power” resides in the relationship between the executive branch and 
the CLB.69 Thus, the significance of CLB rulings affirming and upholding the 
legality of Japan maintaining a nuclear deterrent—a position that has remained 
consistent for approximately 50 years—cannot be underestimated. The CLB 
provides Japanese legal system with an authoritative and rationalized legal 
nuclear hedge.70 Japan’s nuclear hedge is a key component of its strategic and 
force structure calculus as a U.S. protégé in an extended deterrence framework. 
Regrettably, many, including those at the highest echelons of the U.S. 
government, misunderstand this complex relationship between the Japanese 
constitution, the CLB, and Japan’s potential nuclear capacity. As then-Vice 
President Joseph Biden misleadingly stated in August 2016, “He [then-candidate 
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Donald Trump] talks cavalierly about encouraging other nations [. . .] to develop 
nuclear weapons,” Mr. Biden said of Mr. Trump. “Does he not understand we 
wrote Japan’s constitution to say they couldn’t be a nuclear power?”71 While he is 
likely correct to assert that that was the attitude immediately after surrender of 
Japan, it can reasonably stated that he suffers a fundamental temporal mismatch 
in his thinking. The ignorance (literally defined) shown toward a formal ally and 
sovereign state displayed by former Vice President Biden is characteristic of the 
general and widespread misunderstanding of the relationship between the 
Supreme Court of Japan, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and Japan’s latent 
nuclear infrastructure.72 
Japan & Technological Ability to Produce Nuclear Weapons 
Japan is among the most industrially and technologically advanced states 
in the world, and is arguably the most advanced when compared to other 
nonnuclear states. Japan’s highly sophisticated civilian nuclear power program73 
ranks third in the world when measured by installed capacity.74 It is the sole 
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nonnuclear weapons state “that possesses full-scale fuel cycle technology.”75 
Thus, most experts agree with the simple observation that Japan has “sufficient 
capabilities to produce nuclear weapons.”76 
Classifying Japan as a “paranuclear state,” the Federation of American 
Scientists concluded: 
Japan would not have material or technological difficulties in making 
nuclear weapons. Japan has the raw materials, technology, and capital for 
developing nuclear weapons. Japan could possibly produce functional 
nuclear weapons in as little as a year’s time. On the strength of its nuclear 
industry, and its stockpile of weapons-useable plutonium, Japan in some 
respects considers itself, and is treated by others as, as a virtual nuclear 
weapons state.77 
 
Ariel E. Levite offered a more ambitious assessment by stating that Japan 
remains “within a few months of acquiring nuclear weapons.”78 Domestic 
assessments have also been quite clear about Japan’s ability to build nuclear 
weapons. Yasuhiko Yoshida, the former Director of Public Information at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and professor of international politics at the 																																																								
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Osaka University of Economics and Law, stated unequivocally, “The country has 
enough plutonium and uranium,” that Japan could “make an atomic weapon in 
six months.”79 Tetsuya Ozeki, the director of the private foreign affairs think-tank 
ATWI Research Institute, contended that Japan could develop a nuclear weapon 
in approximately one week.80 
From a strictly technical perspective, Japan has the rudimentary elements 
in place for nuclear weapons development, including nuclear fuel-cycle programs 
that produce weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide, and the M-V 
rocket that has intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities that can 
operate with solid fuel and place a 1.8-ton payload into orbit.81 Although the M-V 
rocket program was discontinued in 2006 because of budgetary constraints, its 
successor—the Epsilon-1—succeeded in test flights in 2013.82 Additionally, the 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) produced the H-IIB rocket that 
successfully demonstrated controlled exo-atmospheric re-entry capability in 
2011.83 Japan could also adopt a version of the Israeli SSBN (nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarine) nuclear posture due to Japan’s lack of territorial or 
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“strategic depth,”84 or explore “nuclear sharing” agreements with the United 
States.85 The SSBN and nuclear sharing options will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
While technical hurdles still remain, none of these hurdles are 
insurmountable and the requisite technological infrastructure is in place. Japan’s 
expert civilian nuclear engineers could, with some adjustments to and strategic 
redirection of nuclear facilities, produce effective nuclear weapons.86 This has led 
two observers to state that while Japan currently does not possess all of the 
technological prerequisites to nuclear weapons development, they “cannot 
conclude that their proximity to those Japan would need is entirely 
coincidental.”87 Some contend Japan’s advanced rocket program and its ability to 
produce weapons-grade plutonium and uranium have made it a “virtual nuclear 
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power.”88 Despite assurances by the Japanese government that their nuclear 
fuel-cycle program is for civilian purposes only, the fact remains that “production 
of reactor-level nuclear materials and weapons-grade nuclear materials follow 
virtually identical processes,” which allows Japan a latent “breakout” capability.89 
Ogawa and Schiffer argue Japan’s civilian program may actually “undermine the 
nonproliferation system,” which is “already badly compromised and in danger of 
failure.”90 
Since the technological and economic infrastructure already exists, 
economic rationale might give added impetus to exercising the nuclear option. 
Given that Japan’s stagnant economic performance has extended into its third 
decade, future leaders might view nuclear weapons through the lens of economic 
utility. Avery Goldstein asserts that “one of the few clear truths” about strategy in 
the nuclear age is that 
Over time, maintaining nuclear forces sufficient for retaliatory threats as 
part of a deterrent strategy (perhaps a fleet of three or four SSBNs 
together with a small number of quick-reaction aircraft equipped with air-
launched cruise missiles), though far from cheap, is less costly than 
maintaining comparably effective conventional forces to deny a great 
power adversary its military objectives as part of a defensive strategy.91 
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Additionally, with the exception of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (from which 
it is legally authorized to withdraw in accordance with Article 10), Japan is not 
party to any other international agreements that categorically renounce its right to 
develop nuclear weapons.92 
The NPT is often seen as a categorical rejection of nuclearization. This 
view would be mistaken. The failure of the NPT and nonproliferation regime, 
generally, seen as “the lack of real consequences for those countries that have 
defied the international community” by not adhering to their international 
nonproliferation commitments93 is a factor that has contributed to Japan’s nuclear 
hedge. Given genuine security concerns, an emasculated global nonproliferation 
regime, and a historical record virtually devoid of substantive punishment 
(defined by this writer as the dismantling of existing nuclear weapons) for those 
that successfully develop a nuclear weapons capacity, the force of international 
opinion expressing infirm, platitudinal opprobrium will not likely be dissuasive.94 
Article 6 of the NPT states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes 
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
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94 Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, 
and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution, 273. 
 149 
 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.”95 
In what Benjamin Frankel describes as a “cruel irony” of the NPT, vertical 
proliferation (e.g., superpowers attempting to bolster their already sizable nuclear 
forces) actually inhibits horizontal proliferation (e.g., proliferation across states) 
while vertical disarmament encourages horizontal proliferation.96 The logic for 
this lies in the perceived qualitative strength of a superpower’s extended nuclear 
deterrence commitment—the larger the nuclear force, the more viable the 
security guarantee, and vice versa. However, Jeffrey Knopf acknowledges that 
there could be a level of perceived insecurity in a nuclear protégé that “there may 
be no outside security guarantee strong enough to dissuade them from seeking 
their own nuclear deterrent.”97 Thus, according to such reasoning, nonadherence 
to Article 6 of the NPT helps to reduce horizontal proliferation, and a commitment 
by the nuclear states to complete nuclear disarmament would induce horizontal 
proliferation.98 
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Because the NPT is an international treaty, accession is contingent upon 
its ability to serve the interests of the signatory state.99 Accession to the NPT, 
argues Frankel, “[D]oes not connote an existential renunciation of nuclear 
weapons. Rather it indicates an understanding by a member state that under 
present conditions it can do without nuclear weapons. The key to this 
understanding is the availability of superpower security guarantees.”100 Recent 
research by Matthew Kroenig supports, in part, this argument by demonstrating 
that quantitative and qualitative nuclear superiority has an advantageous effect 
on crisis outcomes in disputes between nuclear states.101 Further, Japan has 
refused to sign the recently adopted “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons” adopted by the UN General Assembly on July 7, 2017.102 
I do not argue that Japan is currently in a position to “go nuclear” as 
quickly as some forecast.103 I also recognize there are additional complications 
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involving the strategic deployment of such weapons once they are developed 
(e.g., development of accurate guidance systems, a unified nuclear C4I system, 
a cogently articulated nuclear doctrine, the coupling of nuclear weapons with a 
submarine force with second-strike capabilities, etc.).104 I do contend, however, 
that Japan’s advanced position on the technological nuclear continuum is 
calculated, deliberate, and consistent with a specific constitutionally based 
nuclear deterrence culture that reflects and acknowledges the practical and 
theoretical weaknesses and antinomy of being a protégé in an extended nuclear 
deterrence framework. Finally, none of the aforementioned weapons systems 
have been deemed unconstitutional. 																																																																																																																																																																					
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Elite Relationships 
Elite relationships between the prime minister of Japan and the president 
of the United States can provide either a negative or positive context within which 
Japan determines the viability of its position as a nuclear protégé. Elite 
relationships have historically waxed and waned. For example, the perception of 
“Japan passing” is not a current phenomenon, however and has existed with 
respect to Japan’s standing in American eyes vis-à-vis China. The “Nixon shock” 
in 1972, Bill Clinton’s critical appraisal of the Japanese economy during a 
diplomatic visit to China, joint Sino-American opposition to Japanese economic 
initiatives, such as the Asian Monetary Fund, all serve to reinforce Japan’s fears 
that its position in the hierarchy of international diplomacy is somewhat 
compromised.105 
Although the cordial relationship between former President Bush and 
former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi106 has served to boost security ties, 
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enhance trust, and somewhat mitigate fears of “Japan passing” among the 
Japanese public and elites, relationships in the mold of Reagan-Nakasone (“Ron-
Yasu”) and Bush-Koizumi are atypical.107 It is currently too early to tell how the 
relationship between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Abe will unfold. 
However, to date, the prospect of an acrimonious or ambivalent relationship 
seems small. Prime Minister Abe was the first foreign leader to visit President 
Trump after being elected and with respect to the U.S.–Japan alliance in general, 
President Trump stated in press conference with Prime Minister Abe, “The bond 
between our two nations and the friendship between our two peoples runs very, 
very deep [. . .] This administration is committed to bringing those ties even closer. 
We are committed to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative 
control and to further strengthening our very crucial alliance.”108 
Despite apprehensions from Japan upon the election of the current 
president Donald Trump and potential tensions in U.S.–Japan trade relations, it 
seems clear that President Trump and Prime Minister Abe share not dissimilar 
outlooks on the North Korean nuclear program and Chinese expansionism.109 In 																																																																																																																																																																					
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a recent New York Times op-ed, in response to the nuclear test conducted by 
North Korea, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe stated unequivocally that “Japan has 
responded by reaffirming the ironclad Japan-United States alliance, and Japan 
has coordinated in lock step with the United States and South Korea. I firmly 
support the United States position that all options are on the table.”110 This is 
significant because in the American lexicon, “All options are on the table” 
includes, but is not limited to, a nuclear strike. Thus, despite the public anti-
nuclear stance of Japan, there is implicit recognition of, at least, the idea of using 
nuclear weapons. 
Japanese security strategists certainly view these special relationships as 
positive, yet are too prudent to subject completely Japanese security to the 
vicissitudes of American domestic politics. If relations between the Japanese and 
American government sour considerably in the future, domestic elites could 
conceivably harness this insecurity and mount a campaign to acquire “the 
ultimate hedge against irrelevance and perpetual insecurity—nuclear 
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weapons.”111 Finally, despite public opinion polls consistently demonstrating that 
the Japanese pubic is against acquiring an indigenous nuclear capability,112 
Green and Furukawa perceptively note that it is important to bear in mind that 
“[N]uclear strategy is not determined by public opinion polls.”113 Samuels and 
Schoff reinforce this point, “The return of the LDP in 2012 is a reminder that 
overwhelming majorities can vote against their polled preferences and that even 
democratic governments can act independently of public opinion. The connection 
of public opinion to policymaking is particularly tenuous with respect to national 
security.”114 	
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Japan’s Torturous Path to Exercise the Right to Collective Self-Defense 
and Its Impact on Extended Deterrence 
History of Japan’s Right to Collective Self-Defense 
The issue of Japan exercising the right to collective self-defense 
(shyudantekijieken o koshi suru) has been an important constitutional and 
alliance issue in Japan since the adoption of the constitution. As such, it is a 
critical factor in Japan’s role in an extended deterrence framework, with important 
effects on its force structure, weapons platforms (whether offensive or defensive), 
integration with both U.S. conventional and nuclear forces, and ballistic missile 
defense cooperation in East Asia. Prior to Prime Minister Abe’s Cabinet decision 
to allow Japan to exercise a partially circumscribed (but expansive in the 
Japanese context) right of collective self-defense on July 1, 2014,1 the Japanese 
government subscribed to a very strict interpretation of the constitution with 
respect to collective self-defense. 
Prior to examining Prime Minister Abe’s role in facilitating Japan’s right to 
exercise collective self-defense, incremental changes under the administration of 
former Prime Minister Koizumi will be examined. 
 																																																								
1 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Cabinet Decision on Development of 
Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, July 1, 2014), 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpohos
ei_eng.pdf. 
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Prime Minister Koizumi 
The administration of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (April 2001–
September 2006) contributed to the continued deterioration of the psychological 
palliative that was the Yoshida Doctrine and facilitated a marked symbolic shift in 
Japan’s security consciousness, at least among the elite.2 This manifested itself 
in Japan’s limited cooperation with the United States in ballistic missile defense, 
diplomatic and military cooperation with the United States in the Six-Party Talks, 
the War on Terror generally, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, specifically. 
The Koizumi administration passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 
Law (ATSML)3 in October 2001 in response to the September 11th terrorist 
attacks against the United States, which authorized Japan Self-Defense Force 
(JSDF) units to deploy to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan, but still in noncombat roles and under highly restrictive 
																																																								
2 Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign 
and Defense Affairs (Seattle and London: Univ. of Washington Press, 2007); 
Eugene A. Matthews, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 
(December 2003): 74–90; Michael J. Green, “Japan Is Back: Why Tokyo’s New 
Assertiveness Is Good for Washington,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (April 2007): 142–
47; Christopher W Hughes, “Japan’s Re-Emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power,” 
Adelphi Paper (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004); Kenneth 
B. Pyle, “Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan,” The Journal of Japanese 
Studies 32, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 393–418; Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan: 
The Current Discourse,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 33, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 
125–52. 
3 “The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law” (Government of Japan, October 
2001), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html. 
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rules of engagement. Notably, 48% of the Japanese public opposed this effort, 
while 44% expressed support.4 
In July of 2003, the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian 
and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA) was passed, which authorized JSDF 
deployment to Iraq to provide logistical support for U.S. and other coalition 
forces.5 However, similar to the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, Japanese 
forces were under severe rules of engagement that diminished their tactical and 
strategic contributions substantially. They were not allowed to engage in combat 
or engage in weapons transport and were to focus on “humanitarian and 
reconstruction operations, most notably water purification.”6 Only 33% supported 
SDF deployment to Iraq, while 63% opposed it.7 Another poll registered a more 
balanced public opinion, with 44% in favor and 48% opposed.8 However, it is 
clear that in both cases, only a minority were supportive of deployment under 
even the most restrictive conditions. Ultimately, former Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
contributions to the second Iraq war were merely symbolic. 
																																																								
4 Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to 
Realism?, 117. 
5 “Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi” (Government 
of Japan, December 9, 2003), 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2003/031209housin_e.html; “Basic Plan Regarding 
Response Measures Based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, December 9, 2003), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/law_o.pdf. 
6 Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to 
Realism?, 135. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 137. 
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Further, in a legal sense, these measures were passed as ad hoc laws 
that left the fundamental ambiguity of Japan’s role in collective self-defense 
uncodified and subject to future revision or reversal. While the aforementioned 
developments reflect the shifting elite attitudes toward security norms in Japan 
and show the domestic political evolution of a Japanese government that is 
emerging from its “anti-militarist” shell, they were still, in the strategic and tactical 
sense, too restrictive to provide substantive contributions to military missions. 
Their symbolic nature (and the simple fact that, unlike the First Gulf War, 
legislation was able to be passed) however, is an important aspect of Japan’s 
post-Cold War security evolution.9 Further, under Prime Minister Koizumi, 
institutional changes in the Japanese government gave the executive branch 
more power and influence relative to other bureaucratic organs, making the 
Kantei (broadly defined as the Cabinet Secretariat and the prime minister) the 
“new policy center in defense and foreign affairs.”10 In sum, despite the JSDF 
being a near-non-factor in the tactical and strategic outcome and operations of 
both the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, former Prime Minister Koizumi did succeed 
in allowing an incrementally more proactive shift in Japan’s security posture, 
laying the groundwork for more ambitious reform under Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe. 
 																																																								
9 For a complete analysis of the interaction between domestic processes and 
foreign policy under Prime Minister Koizumi, see, Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: 
Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs. 
10 Ibid., 15. 
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Prime Minister Abe’s First Term (September 2006–September 2007) 
In a policy speech given to the 166th Session of the Japanese Diet in 
January 2007, former Prime Minister Abe addressed the crucial issue that 
confronts Japan implementing a more proactive security strategy. Questioning 
the efficacy of Article 9 and the constitutional proscription of collective defense, 
Prime Minister Abe (first term) stated, 
In addition, we believe that, in order to make greater contributions to the 
peace and stability of the world, we have to reconstruct the legal basis for 
national security to befit the times. We will continue to study, based on 
individual and specific cases, to identify which case constitutes exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense that is prohibited under the 
Constitution.11 
 
At the time, fundamental constitutional ambiguities remained uncodified and 
unresolved, resulting in continued ambiguity of the efficacy and long-term viability 
of the U.S.–Japan alliance and the concomitant nuclear umbrella provided by the 
United States. 
History of Article 9 
To fully appreciate the gravity of this constitutional conundrum, we should 
examine the specific wording of Article 9, which reads: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. 
																																																								
11 “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to the 166th Session of the Diet 
(Provisional Translation),” January 26, 2007, 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2007/01/26speech_e.html. 
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In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, 
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.12 
 
The inclusion of this clause was not without controversy. Unlike the 
American Constitution and the Meiji Constitution that preceded it, for example, 
there is no explicit designation of commander-in-chief. There is no explicit 
mention of to whom authority is delegated to raise a military or declare war, nor 
are there included any provisions articulating the constitutional or legal 
framework through which Japan could or should act if it is attacked by a foreign 
state.13 The original draft of Article 9 was even more stringent. As submitted to 
the Diet on April 17, 1946, it read: 
War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is 
forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations. 
The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the state will 
not be recognized.14 
 
Deeming this wording too restrictive because it indicated that Japan 
should perpetually remain vulnerable and unequivocally unarmed “‘even for 
preserving its own security’ as too sweeping,”15 the Diet’s subcommittee on 
constitutional revision chaired by Ashida Hitoshi (who subsequently served as 																																																								
12 The Constitution of Japan, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.ht
ml. 
13 Shigenori Matsui, The Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis, 
Constitutional Systems of the World (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2011), 235. 
14 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 394; “Main Issues: Topic 2 Renunciation of War,” Birth of 
the Constitution of Japan, National Diet Library, n.d., 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/ronten/02ronten.html. 
15 Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 369. 
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prime minister from March 1948 to October 1948) pushed through adoption 
(cleared by General Headquarters [GHQ]) of the so-called “Ashida 
Amendment”16 that resulted in the extant version of Article 9.17 
The change in wording is significant in that rests on the relationship 
between necessary and sufficient causes of the wording between the first and 
second sections of Article 9. Unlike the original text of Article 9, the first clause of 
section 1 of the extant version is conditional: “Aspiring sincerely to an 
international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes.” The first clause of the second 
paragraph, then, is contingent upon the fulfillment of the conditionality of the first 
clause of the first paragraph: “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” 
This seemingly small semantic difference in wording is not an idle 
distinction. 
The degree of linkage between the two clauses has been an enduring 
source of contention and interpretation. As Dower notes, the relationship 
between the first and second paragraphs of Article 9 “deliberately left vague the 
possibility of modest rearmament ‘for preserving its own security’—and, in so 																																																								
16 Ibid., 394–96; Matsui, The Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis, 236–
37. 
17 On a more detailed analysis of how the “Ashida Amendment” was enacted, 
see, Haley, “Waging War: Japan’s Constitutional Constraints,” 21–23. 
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doing, planted the seed of decades of controversy.”18 This constitutional 
ambiguity in Article 9 opened the door for legal-ideational interpretations of 
Article 9’s scope, which, in turn, influenced the scope for Japan’s role in 
exercising the right to collective self-defense. This, in turn, has a direct bearing 
on the legal, ideational, and material ways in which Japan constitutes its force 
structure as a protégé in an extended nuclear deterrence framework. 
The realities of the Cold War and the Korean War quickly brought the 
idealistic phase of the U.S. occupation to an end and resulted in the “reverse 
course” (逆コース) that focused on diminishing the influence of left-wing and 
communist sympathizers in Japan, supporting limited Japanese rearmament, and 
integrating Japan into the United States’ nascent Cold War strategic framework.19 
Thus began the gradual but consistent push from the United States for Japan to 
engage in a more proactive security policy with strengthened military capabilities, 
less than five years after promulgation of a distinctively pacifist constitution. As 
early as 1951, the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan 
(September 8, 1951) states: 																																																								
18 Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 369; Haley, 
“Waging War: Japan’s Constitutional Constraints,” 18. 
19 Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, 222–
25; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, 33; 
Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 271–73, 526–28; 
James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 550–
55; V. D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia,” International 
Security 34, no. 3 (2010): 181–82; Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation 
(Oxon, U.K.; New York: Routledge; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2009), 23–24; Pyle, Japan Rising : The Resurgence of Japanese Power and 
Purpose, 211; Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the 
Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2008), 53–54. 
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The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is 
presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, 
in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume 
responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, 
always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or 
serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.20 
 
The Constitution of Japan, the United Nations Charter, and Collective Self-
Defense 
The United Nations Charter holds that nations are endowed with an 
intrinsic right to exercise collective self-defense. Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter states: 
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken 
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace or security.21 
 
However, prior to current Prime Minister’s Abe’s administration, Japan had 
chosen not to exercise this right because of a perceived constitutional 
proscription. This position comes from a landmark ruling in 1954 decided by the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), the bureau directly responsible for the 
																																																								
20 “Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan; September 8, 1951,” 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp. Emphasis added. 
21 United National Charter, “Chapter VII: Article 51,” October 24, 1945, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html. 
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government’s interpretation of constitutional issues.22 In 1954, the CLB stipulated 
that all sovereign nations have the right to self-defense (kobetsuteki jieken) and 
that establishment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces does not contravene 
Article 9’s proscription on “war potential” on these grounds. The CLB also ruled 
that Article 9 does not proscribe Japan from defending itself in the event of an 
invasion of Japan. However, Japan must only use “minimum necessary force” 
(jiei no tame no hitsuyô no jitsuryoku) when invaded. But it could not send forces 
abroad (kaigai hahei), nor could Japan participate in any “collective defense 
arrangements” (shudanteki bôei).23 This 1954 ruling was the first “formal 
interpretation” of Article 9 by the CLB and stated: “[War potential (senryoku)] 
refers to a force with the equipment and organization capable of conducting 
modern warfare. . . . Determining what constitutes war potential requires a 
concrete judgment taking into account the temporal and spatial environment of 
the country in question. . . . It is neither unconstitutional to maintain capabilities 
that fall short of war potential nor to utilize these capabilities to defend the nation 
from direct invasion.”24 From this ruling, what constituted “war potential” and 
																																																								
22 Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 
48. 
23 Samuels, “Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: 
Who Elected These Guys Anyway?” 
24 A. Nakamura, Sengo Seiji Ni Yureta Kenpô Kyûjô (Article Nine That Shook 
Postwar Politics) (Tokyo: Chûô Keizaisha, 2001), 99, cited in Samuels, “Politics, 
Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys 
Anyway?” 
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“minimum necessary force” became the benchmark upon which all subsequent 
interpretations were based.25 
However, in May 1981, the CLB again addressed the issue of collective 
self-defense and “issued a formal (albeit tortured) interpretation recognizing that 
Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law but is 
forbidden to exercise it”26 under Article 9: 
It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of 
collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force to stop an 
armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even 
when the state itself is not under direct attack. It is therefore self-evident 
that since it is a sovereign state, Japan has the right of collective self-
defense under international law. The Japanese government nevertheless 
takes the view that the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized 
under Article Nine of the Constitution is confined to the minimum 
necessary level for the defense of the country (wagakuni). The 
government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-
defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under the 
Constitution.27 
 
While this ruling was significant, it was not revolutionary. Yet, it did have 
demonstrable effects. For example, under Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan 
“undertook responsibility for defending American ships in its territorial waters 
against possible Soviet aggression and pushed forward joint planning.”28 The 
importance of Japan assisting the U.S. military in combat operations in East and 
																																																								
25 Samuels, “Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: 
Who Elected These Guys Anyway?” 
26 Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 
48. 
27 National Institute for Defense Studies, “East Asian Strategic Review” (Tokyo: 
Japan Ministry of Defense, 2002), 315. 
28 Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, 
131. 
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South Asia cannot be overstated. Japan’s severe curtailment of this right is 
significant in what it means for U.S. forces in the Pacific. 
Prior to Prime Minister Abe’s reversing the proscription of exercising the 
right to collective self-defense in 2014 (which is still relatively circumscribed, as 
will be discussed in further detail below), Japan was not allowed to defend U.S. 
military forces outside Japan should they come under attack. Nor was it allowed 
to pass intelligence to the U.S. military to warn of an attack if the Japanese 
government could not be sure that the attack (in whatever form) was not directly 
aimed at Japan. For those unfamiliar with the legalities of CLB and constitutional 
decisions related to Japan and Article 9, this should seem, prima facie, a fairly 
straightforward case of alliance malpractice. Yet, the Japanese legal framework 
is clear in its proscription (as of 2008). As such, grounding Japan’s roles and 
functions within the U.S.–Japan alliance in analysis of constitutional and legal 
thought is a necessary condition to fully understand the dilemmas posed by 
assurance and reassurance in an extended nuclear deterrence framework in 
Asia. 
The legal rationale for this proscription is summarized by the first Advisory 
Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security appointed during the first 
term of Prime Minister Abe: 
Regarding “logistics support” for other countries participating in the same 
PKO [Peacekeeping Operations] or similar activities, even though 
activities such as supply, transportation and medical services are not in 
themselves “use of force,” the current constitutional interpretation does not 
allow such support if it is provided in a manner that forms an “integrated 
part” of the use of force by other countries. (This interpretation is known as 
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the concept of “ittaika [一 体 化] with the use of force”). Is it appropriate to 
continue to apply this concept to logistics support activities? 
According to the hitherto held constitutional interpretation, even though 
Japanese logistic support, including supply, transportation and medical 
services, is not in itself “use of force”, such support should be deemed as 
“use of force” prohibited under the Constitution if it is provided in such a 
manner that forms an “integral part” of the use of force by a third country. 
This concept is called “ittaika” with the use of force in the current 
interpretation of the Constitution. . . .29 
. . . Ballistic missile defense is a joint operation by Japan and the 
United States that requires much closer collaboration between the two 
countries, and Japan is heavily dependent on the United States for such 
matters as intelligence and nuclear deterrence. Therefore, it is not 
possible to consider only the missile defense of Japan without taking into 
account such cooperation. 
Moreover, ballistic-missile deterrence will be weakened if Japan takes 
the position that it can shoot down ballistic missiles approaching Japan by 
exercising the right of individual self-defense (kobetsuteki jieken) but not 
the ones directed toward the United States because the latter would 
constitute an exercise of the right of collective self-defense; or, Japan 
cannot take prompt action because it is uncertain which of these the 
actual situation is. 
It is not an option for Japan not to shoot down ballistic missiles that 
might be flying towards the United States when Japan has the ability to do 
so.30 
 
From the U.S. perspective, this level of operational negligence that could 
result in the deaths of U.S. military personnel (and potentially the outcome of a 
war) was seen as particularly problematic.31 The ramifications for this 																																																								
29 Iwama Yoko et al., “Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the 
Legal Basis for Security,” Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for 
Security, Kantei (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet), June 24, 2008, 4, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou/report.pdf. 
30 Ibid., 11. 
31 As Michael Green states, “In the case of Japan, it became apparent in the 
spring 1994 [Korean nuclear] crisis that the Self-Defense Forces had virtually no 
legal or political authority to plan with the United States with respect to interdiction 
operations, minesweeping, rear area logistical support, or missile defense—all the 
basic requirements for the United States to operate from Japan in response to a 
crisis on the peninsula.” Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and 
American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783, 467. 
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constitutional interpretation would manifest itself demonstrably in any crisis 
involving North Korea, China, or Taiwan. The failure to actively assist U.S. forces 
under attack would, as I and many others argue, force a collapse of the U.S.–
Japan alliance, thus rendering Japan less secure, not more (see below). 
The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security was 
tasked by Prime Minister Abe to examine Japan’s potential role in four primary 
scenarios involving hitherto (and as of 2008, constitutionally proscribed) 
collective self-defense measures: “(1) defense of a U.S. naval vessel on the high 
seas; (2) interception of a ballistic missile that might be on its way to the United 
States; (3) use of weapons in international peace operations; and, (4) logistics 
support for the operations of other countries participating in the same peace 
operations, such as U.N. PKOs, to ascertain whether it is possible for Japan to 
ensure its security and make sufficient contribution to international peace and 
security, which in turn is indispensable for Japan’s own security, by maintaining 
the Government’s current constitutional interpretation and the legal system based 
thereon.”32 
The panel concluded that to satisfy the above four conditions that Japan 
would be required to exercise collective self-defense. However, Prime Minister 
Abe was defeated in parliamentary elections in September 2007 (prior to the 
release of the report in June 2008) and succeeded by two relatively ineffectual 
LDP prime ministers. Abe’s successor, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda—a 																																																								
32 Yoko et al., “Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis 
for Security,” 17. 
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member of a more “pro-China” faction of the LDP—chose to not act on the 
panel’s recommendations. After only one year in office Prime Minister Fukuda 
was succeeded by Prime Minister Taro Aso, who also lasted only one year in 
office. Then, in September 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama from the then 
Democratic Party of Japan was elected prime minister. Initially, Prime Minister 
Hatoyama—and the then Democratic Party of Japan as a whole—initially 
entertained a more Asian-centric foreign policy.33 However, there were significant 
changes in Japanese foreign policy and force structure initiated under the 
tutelage of the Democratic Party of Japan (see below). DPJ Prime Minister 
Yoshihiko Noda expressed an interest in pursuing collective self-defense, but he 
lasted barely more than a year in office (September 2011–December 2012) and 
thus could not vigorously pursue the issue.34 With respect to exercising collective 
self-defense, however, the DPJ administrations as a whole did not aggressively 
pursue this issue, even as the United States was pressuring Japan to “reexamine 
its interpretation of the Constitution with regard to the ban on engaging in 
																																																								
33 Michael Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough,” Foreign Affairs 95, 
no. 2 (April 2016): 128; Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, “Electing a 
New Japanese Security Policy?: Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the 
Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy 9 (January 2010): 54–55; Kenneth B. Pyle, 
“Troubled Alliance,” Asia Policy 10 (July 2010): 3–9; Yuki Tatsumi, “A Short-Term 
Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance Putting Its Long-Term Health at Risk,” Asia 
Policy 10 (July 2010): 35–41; Michael J. Green, “Redefining and Reaffirming the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Asia Policy 10 (July 2010): 16–20; Yukio Hatoyama, “A New 
Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 26, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html. 
34 “Noda Seeks Japan’s Right to Exercise CSD,” Asahi Shimbun, July 10, 2012. 
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collective self-defense.”35 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye argued in 2012 
(prior to Prime Minister Abe’s second term) that the JDSF “are poised to play a 
larger role in enhancing Japanese security and reputation if anachronistic 
constraints can be eased.”36 
Regarding the effect of the proscription against collective self-defense and 
its effect on the strategic efficacy of the U.S.–Japan alliance, the report further 
states, “The irony, however, is that under the most severe conditions requiring 
the protection of Japan’s interests, our forces are legally prevented from 
collectively defending Japan. A change in Japan’s prohibition of collective self-
defense would address that irony in full. . . . Prohibition of collective self-defense 
is an impediment to the alliance.”37 Prime Minister Abe seemed to share this 
disposition, as will be seen below. 
 
Prime Minister Abe: Collective Self-Defense, Second Term (September 26, 
2012–Present) 
Upon return to office, PM Abe aggressively picked up where he left off 
with respect to collective self-defense.38 After reconvening the advisory panel of 																																																								
35 Janice Tang, “Schieffer Ends Term in Japan with Call to Reexamine Collective 
Defense,” Kyodo News, January 14, 2009. 
36 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring 
Stability in Asia,” A Report of the CSIS Japan Chair (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, August 2012), 2. Emphasis added. 
37 Ibid., 15. 
38 Significant developments that affect Japan’s defense posture, including, the 
passage of the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, the Mid-Term Defense 
Program (MTDP), and the “Chinese Fishing Trawler Crisis” occurred during DPJ 
administrations. This will be discussed below. 
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collective self-defense in February 2013, his cabinet formally reinterpreted Article 
9 of the constitution to allow a limited (gentei-teki-yonin) form of collective self-
defense on July 1, 2014.39 The cabinet interpretation, formally named “Cabinet 
Decision Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect 
its People,” determined that: 
[E]ven when considering only the quarter-century since the end of the 
Cold War, the shift in the global power balance, rapid progress of 
technological innovation, development and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as international 
terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they 
originate in the world, could have a direct influence on the security of 
Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that can impede the utilization 
of and free access to the sea, outer space and cyberspace have been 
spreading and become more serious. No country can secure its own 
peace only by itself, and the international community also expects Japan 
to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way 
commensurate with its national capability. 
Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival 
as well as securing its people’s lives are the primary responsibility of the 
Government. In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment 
surrounding Japan and to fulfill its responsibility, the Government, first and 
foremost, has to create a stable and predictable international environment 
and prevent the emergence of threats by advancing vibrant diplomacy with 
sufficient institutional capabilities, and has to pursue peaceful settlement 
of disputes by acting in accordance with international law and giving 
emphasis to the rule of law. 
Moreover, it is important to appropriately develop, maintain and 
operate Japan’s defense capability, strengthen mutual cooperation with 
the United States, which is Japan’s ally, and deepen trust and cooperative 
relations with other partners both within and outside the region. In 
particular, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts before they materialize 
and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating the 
effectiveness of the Japan-United States security arrangements and 
enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the 
security of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. On 																																																								
39 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Cabinet Decision on Development 
of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People.” 
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that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of 
its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the 
peace and stability of the international community under the policy of 
“Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international 
cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables 
seamless responses . . . 
Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of 
the current security environment, the Government has reached a 
conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but 
also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close 
relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival 
and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, 
liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate 
means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and 
protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be 
interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-
defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to 
date.40 
 
Consisting of two separate bills (Cabinet Bill No. 72 of 189th Diet Session 
and Cabinet Bill No. 73 of 189th Diet Session, which consisted of a complex 
mixture of the introduction of one new law and amendments to ten existing laws), 
the new CLB interpretation on collective self-defense was submitted to the Lower 
House of the Japanese Diet on May 25, 2015. In a press conference prior to 
submission to Lower House, Prime Minister Abe stated his rationale for the need 
for cooperation with U.S. military forces via exercising the right to collective self-
defense: 
I have thus been making efforts to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, 
which is the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. My recent visit to the 
United States made the ties between Japan and the United States 
stronger than ever. If Japan is attacked, the U.S. Forces will spare no 
effort in defending it. The U.S. Forces are conducting timely and 
appropriate surveillance operations in waters near Japan in order to meet 
their commitments under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Even if those 																																																								
40 Ibid., 1–2, 7–8. Emphasis added. 
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U.S. Forces on duty to protect Japan are attacked, we cannot do anything, 
we will not do anything, unless Japan itself is attacked. That has been 
Japan’s position to date. Does this really make sense? 
It could pose a real danger to us if the U.S. Forces in waters near 
Japan are attacked. This is not someone else’s problem, but a real threat 
to Japan. Our lives and peaceful daily lives are in clear danger. There is 
no other appropriate means available to repel the danger. In addition, the 
use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary. These three 
stringent conditions are stipulated in the legislation bill. Moreover, it goes 
without saying that an approval by the Diet is necessary. The exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense will be permitted under very limited 
circumstances.41 
 
Enough members of the Lower House of the Diet were persuaded by 
Prime Minister’s Abe’s logic to pass the legislation on July 16, despite a majority 
of the public opposing the bills.42 The bill was subsequently debated for 
approximately two months by the Upper House before it passed on September 
19, 2015, and went into effect on March 29, 2016. After passage of the law, in an 
Upper House budgetary committee meeting, Prime Minister Abe stated “The 
quality of Japan-U.S. alliance has reached the point where we can defend each 
other from now on. . . . Our ties have become much stronger.”43 
																																																								
41 Shinzō Abe, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe Following the 
Cabinet Decision on the ‘Legislation for Peace and Security,’” Speeches and 
Statements by the Prime Minister, Kantei (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet), 
May 14, 2015, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201505/0514kaiken.html. 
Emphasis added. 
42 Satoru Mori, “The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction,” 
The Tokyo Foundation, December 2, 2015, 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-legislation-and-public-
reaction. 
43 Ayako Mie, “Security Laws Usher in New Era for Pacifist Japan,” The Japan 
Times, March 29, 2016, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-
contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-
defense/#.Wduz4EyZMcj. 
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Significantly, there are still three limitations or constraints (歯止め
/hadome) or “conditions” set to circumscribe Japan’s ability to exercise collective 
self-defense. An official document released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
summarizes the new criteria for exercising collective self-defense: 
The GOJ had previously considered that the Constitution permits the “use 
of force” only when Japan had an “armed attack.” Given the fundamental 
transformation of the security environment, in certain situation, an armed 
attack against a foreign country could threaten Japan’s survival, 
depending on its purpose, scale and manner. The GOJ has reached a 
conclusion that the “use of force” will be permitted when the following 
“Three New Conditions” are met: 
When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack 
against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs 
and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to 
fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of 
happiness*, 
When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack 
and ensure Japan’s survival and protects its people, 
Use of force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary 
* As a matter of course, use of force must be carried out while 
observing international law. In certain situations this is based on the right 
of collective self- defense under international law.44 
 
Despite these restrictions, Prime Minister Abe included as a legitimate and 
legal exercise of collective self-defense to engage in minesweeping operations in 
the Straits of Hormuz in the event of a hypothetical blockade, despite 
overwhelming public opposition.45 
																																																								
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security: 
Seamless Responses for Peace and Security of Japan and the International 
Community,” Government of Japan, March 2016, 7, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000143304.pdf. Underline in original. 
45 Mori, “The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction,”; Mina 
Pollman, “Could Japan Go Minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz?,” The Diplomat, 
February 18, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/could-japan-go-minesweeping-
in-the-strait-of-hormuz/; Ben Ascione, “Storm Brews Over Japan’s New Security 
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This contingency is included because Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet 
understands the geostrategic vulnerability that Japan faces with respect to sea 
lanes of communication and energy, import, and export security. The Japanese 
public either does not have a full appreciation of the tenuousness of Japan’s 
geostrategic vulnerabilities or believes that maintaining such vulnerability is 
necessary to maintain constitutional law. Either way, we can see the divergences 
of strategic reasoning and understanding among the public and the Abe 
administration. Prime Minister Abe reinforced this point in September 2015, “My 
country cannot be the weak link in the chain [. . .] Now to sum up, Japan should 
not be the weak link in the regional and global security framework where the U.S. 
plays a leading role. Japan is one of the world’s most mature democracies. Thus, 
we must be a net contributor to the provision of the world’s welfare and security. 
And we will. Japan will contribute to the peace and stability of the region and the 
world even more proactively than before.”46 
Yet, even though this is a significant departure from previous strategic 
policy in Japan, it still suffers from significant defects. Under the new legislation, 
the prime minister is still required to seek and maintain Diet approval for any 
actions involving the JSDF. As demonstrated by Japan’s ineffectual 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Laws,” East Asia Forum, August 2, 2015, 
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46 Shinzō Abe, “Remarks by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the Occasion of 
Accepting Hudson Institute’s 2013 Herman Kahn Award,” Prime Minister of Japan 
and His Cabinet, Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister, September 25, 
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parliamentary response both to the First Gulf War and the 1995–1996 Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, it is unlikely that any prime minister will be able to act with the swift 
dispatch needed in today’s security environment, especially in “gray zone” 
situations and other contingencies other than a perceived direct attack on Japan. 
As a result, despite the passage of the so-called War Legislation (senso hoan), 
we can still see the residual effects of Japanese mistrust of executive handling of 
foreign policy, particularly in crisis situations due to Japan’s postwar psyche. 
 
Alliance Strained: The First Gulf War and Its Effect on Japanese Identity, 
Need for Collective Self-Defense, and Protégé Status 
Liberalism, with its contradictions and compromises, existed for Donoso 
Cortes only in that short interim period in which it was possible to answer 
the question “Christ or Barabbas?” with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a 
commission of investigation.47 
 
First Gulf War 
Amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the international landscape was 
fundamentally altered (although some would argue to a lesser degree in Asia 
relative to Europe or “the West”). With respect to the U.S.–Japan alliance, the 
same period ushered in a new era of tensions due to Japan’s lack of substantive 
nonmonetary contributions to the U.S.-led effort in the first Gulf War. Despite 
requests from the United States, Japan provided no military personnel to 
contribute to the war effort, despite approximately 90% of Japan’s oil imports 																																																								
47 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 
trans. George Schwab (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985), 62. 
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coming from the region.48 Japan, did, however, impose economic sanctions on 
Iraq,49 contribute $13 billion to the war effort,50 and after hostilities had ended, 
sent a mine-clearing unit to the Middle East,51 a move criticized as “too little, too 
late.”52 However, none of these efforts were particularly appreciated, and they 
invited much criticism. Japan was criticized for “cowardice” and “free-riding.”53 
Further, in the international realm, it was a rather “easy case” for Japan to fulfill 
normatively. It was led by a multilateral UN coalition in response to an obvious 
case of aggression and was generally considered to meet the criteria of a “Just 
War.”54 Its financial contributions were not acknowledged by Kuwait after 
																																																								
48 Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “INSIGHT—War Trauma Began Japan’s 
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Publishers, 2007), 60. 
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liberation in an article published in the New York Times by the Kuwaiti 
government.55 
Japan’s inability to formulate a coherent policy response with respect to 
troop deployment was due to constitutional restrictions, bureaucratic 
intransigence, and factional infighting56 with the government rendering it “unable 
to agree on what steps to take to provide for many of the elemental needs of 
national security.”57 Japan’s ineffectual response to an international crisis and 
failure to satisfy the “boots on the ground” requirement of its only ally—the United 
States—“demonstrated Japanese paralysis in international military 
contributions”58 because Japan’s constitutional-security framework led the 
government to become “paralyzed, unable to muster a coherent policy.”59 This 
sentiment was enumerated—albeit with more subtlety—by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: 
[D]uring the course of the Gulf Crisis when the immediate situation 
dominated the attention of the international community, there was criticism 
against Japan’s cooperation being “too little, too late” and that it did not 
include cooperation making use of its human resources. 
On the other hand, the Gulf Crisis forced Japan to judge and cope with 
many questions which Japan after World War II had not experienced. It 
would have been unavoidable to a certain extent that the Government 
																																																								
55 Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East 
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57 Pyle, Japan Rising : The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, 7. 
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needed some time for deciding its policies, or that there were limitations to 
its activities.60 
Effects of Inaction During the First Gulf War 
While the first Gulf War did not have a nuclear component, it did relate 
directly to Japan’s ability to deploy its military abroad, thus making it salient to 
Japan’s continued constitutional evolution to exercise collective self-defense, and 
thus strengthen its position as a nuclear protégé, giving extended deterrence 
more credibility. In response to Japan’s relative inaction during the Gulf War, 
reflecting Herman Kahn’s admonition that “unless adequate preparations have 
been made in peacetime (preparations in which the government and people have 
confidence), it would be disastrous for a government that wanted to stand firm to 
extemporize measure to reduce the vulnerability of its population.”61 Go Ito states 
bluntly, “The Gulf War changed Japan’s immobilism.”62 
Again, as stated by Kahn, “About all an unprepared government can do is 
to say over and over, ‘The other side doesn’t really want war.’ Then they can 
hope they are right. However, this same government can scarcely expect to 
make up by sheer determination what it lacks in preparations. How can it 
persuade its opponent of its own willingness to go to war if the situation demands 																																																								
60 “Japan’s Response to the Gulf Crisis.” For a detailed explanation of the 
domestic politics involved as to why the cabinet of Prime Minister Kaifu could not 
marshal an effective response, see, Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei 
Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, 50–62. 
61 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Transaction ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2007), 213. 
62 Go Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in Japan in 
International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State, ed. Thomas U. 
Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2007), 80. 
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it? An unprepared government will have a poor chance of forcing a prepared 
government to back down.”63 Japan’s evolution in security consciousness, as 
shall be shown below, reflects the wisdom in Kahn’s warning. 
A large measure of this change can be attributed to ideational change in 
Japanese strategic thinking. As reported by Reuters, then-JDSF Major Nozomu 
Yoshitomo stated, “‘They asked how Japan could be a true U.S. ally if it hadn’t 
sent troops,’ said Yoshitomi, recalling the shame he felt watching Japanese 
personnel build snowmen as U.S.-led coalition soldiers fought to evict the Iraqi 
army from the Kuwaiti desert [and] that humiliation was a pivotal moment.”64 
The “Gulf Shock” reinforced rifts in the U.S.–Japan alliance. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the 
Japanese stock market followed by Japanese economic stagnation, China’s 
continued adoption of quasi-capitalism, and Japan’s ambiguous role in the U.S. 
response to the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995–1996, many questioned the 
fundamental purpose of the alliance.65 These concerns ultimately led to high-
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level initiatives to justify and reinvigorate the alliance in a post-Cold War world.66 
However, domestically, the Japanese government recognized it could no longer 
afford to strictly adhere to an anachronistic Yoshida Doctrine, and there were 
incremental reforms following the Gulf War that led to a legal basis for a 
minimally more activist security posture. 
For example, in June 1992, the Diet passed the “International 
Peacekeeping Law (Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations)” that allowed the Japanese 
government to send military forces to conflict areas, provided the SDF were kept 
under severely restrictive rules of engagement. For example, special Diet 
approval would be needed if the SDF were to carry even “small arms” and if 
“SDF officers were exposed to dangerous conditions in conflict, they could 
withdraw from the assignment.67 Such restrictive legal measures led to 
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questioning by JDF members whether their deployments could be at all tactically 
effective.68 To further bolster the alliance, the U.S. and Japan published the 
U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security in April 199669 and an updated version 
of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the first since 1978).70 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
China’s Nuclear Force Structure and Nuclear Strategy 
There is no mistaking that China is a nation on a civilizational march, one 
driven by its deep sense of its historical place in the world and the 
entitlements this brings it.1 
 
The history of Chinese dynasties has always been written by their 
successors, and a primary factor in their judgment has been whether 
under the outgoing regime the imperial realm has shrank or expanded. It 
is in this light, ultimately, that Xi Jinping’s China Dream must be seen, 
along with all of the talk about his country’s “sacred” mission to recover 
territory supposedly lost to others throughout history. Xi and his fellow 
leaders appreciate that China’s window of opportunity to transform the 
geopolitics of the world of tian xia, and perhaps of the world itself, has 
never been opened wider, and very possibly will never open this wide 
again.2 
 
[I]f China is the key to Asia, then Japan is the key to China, and the United 
States is the key to Japan.3 
 
Introduction 
China’s nuclear posture is traditionally characterized as one of “minimum 
deterrence,”4 “restrained,”5 “defensive and limited,”6 “limited, but survivable,”7 or 
																																																								
1 Howard W. French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape 
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Studies and Routledge, 2014); John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 
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as is mentioned in Chinese-language documents, “lean and effective” (jinggan 
youxiao)8 and “limited and effective” (youxian youxiao).9  
Yet, China’s nuclear posture is shifting to a more aggressive posture.10 
This is a result of four factors: (1) China’s ideational-based expansion under the 
shield of its nuclear deterrent in order to fulfill the “China Dream” (Zhongguo 
meng) of national rejuvenation (minzu fuxing)11; (2) China’s belief in the stability-																																																																																																																																																																					
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instability paradox12; (3) China’s attempt to decouple the U.S. from its Asian allies 
through a “salami-slicing” strategy and gray-zone provocations designed 
ultimately to substantially erode and drive out the U.S. Navy from East Asia13; 
and (4) China’s adoption of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies to prevent 																																																																																																																																																																					
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[The New Requirements of the ‘Chinese Dream’ towards China’s Diplomacy,” China 
Daily, September 24, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2013mzfxzgm/2013-
09/24/content_16990961.htm; Weiwei Zhang, The China Horizon: Glory and Dream of a 
Civilizational State (Hackensack, NJ: World Century Publishing, 2016); Weiwei Zhang, 
The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State (Hackensack, NJ: World Century 
Publishing, 2012). 
12 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic 
Modernization and U.S.-China Security Relations,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 35, 
no. 4 (August 2012): 447–87; Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, 
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2002): 60; Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and 
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Provocation in Chinese National Security Strategy: A Closer Look at the Impeccable 
Incident,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 219–44. 
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media seek to portray China as reactive. China uses an opportunistically timed 
progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase effective control 
over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict.” Office of the Secretary 
Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2017,” 12; Captain Sukjoon Yoon Republic of Korea Navy 
(Retired), “Implications of Xi Jinping’s ‘True Maritime Power’: Its Context, Significance, 
and Impact on the Region,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 40–63; 
Franz-Stefan Gady, “US Admiral: ‘China Seeks Hegemony in East Asia,’” The Diplomat, 
February 25, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/us-admiral-china-seeks-hegemony-
in-east-asia/. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 23, 
2016, commander Admiral Harry Harris of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) stated, “I 
believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia. Simple as that . . . China is clearly 
militarizing the South China Sea and you’d have to believe in the flat Earth to think 
otherwise.” 
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third-party (particularly U.S. and Japanese) intervention in any potential military 
conflict.14 
China’s nuclear strategy is critical in understanding the security dynamic 
of the East Asia. Historically, nuclear forces in China have played a peripheral 
role in its security strategy. Recently, however, the qualitative15 and quantitative 
increases in Chinese nuclear weapons pose significant new challenges to the 
United States and its allies in the region, as well to other states without formal 
treaty relationships with the United States, such as Russia, India, Pakistan, and 
Southeast Asian states. As China asserts its territorial claims in a more muscular 
																																																								
14 Yves-Heng Lim, “Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-Access 
Naval Doctrine and Forces,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (2017): 146–
68; Evan B. Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and 
the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 
129–37; Jan van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2010, 
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/; Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle?” (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
February 2010), 13–25, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/02/why-airsea-
battle/; David W. Kearn Jr., “Air-Sea Battle and China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial 
Challenge,” Orbis 58, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 132–46; Sugio Takahashi, “Counter A2/AD in 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Toward ‘Allied Air-Sea Battle’” (Arlington, VA: Project 
2049 Institute, March 31, 2012), 
https://project2049.net/documents/counter_a2ad_defense_cooperation_takahashi.pdf; 
“Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges” 
(Air-Sea Battle Office, United States Department of Defense, May 2013), 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf; 
Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia 
(London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014), 45–57; Office 
of the Secretary Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,” 49–55. 
15 Stephen Chen, “China Steps Up Pace in New Nuclear Arms Race with US,” South 
China Morning Post, May 28, 2018, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2147304/china-steps-pace-new-
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fashion, states with current or potential conflictual relations with China must now 
face a more multidimensional military strategy from China.  
Japan, in formulating its constitutional strategy that informs its defense 
posture, must countenance the shift in China’s nuclear strategy. The challenge 
posed by North Korea is not confined to Korean Peninsula: any war on the 
Korean peninsula will likely involve China, and thus security strategists in all 
affected states must take into account the potential for nuclear escalation and the 
role that China’s nuclear forces will play in negotiated (or nonnegotiated) 
settlement regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. China’s emerging blue-
water naval capabilities—which include the deployment of Jin class SSBNs—
substantially affects the naval strategic calculus of Japan, Taiwan, the United 
States, India, Pakistan, and Russia in the Indo-Pacific.16 To understand the role 
																																																								
16 Office of Naval Intelligence, “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 
21st Century” (Suitland, MD, April 9, 2015), 19–20, 
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Strategic Balance,” Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear-strike-capability-
altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738; Renny Babiarz, “China’s Nuclear 
Submarine Force,” China Brief 17, no. 10 (July 2017), 
https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-nuclear-submarine-force/; Yue Qiu, “Expert: 
Nuclear Submarine Can Deter U.S. from Using Nuclear Strike Against China First,” 
China Military Online, January 13, 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-
channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/14/content_6857568.htm. For excellent 
analyses on Chinese naval strategy, in general, see, for example, Andrew S. Erickson, 
“Doctrinal Sea Change, Making Real Waves: Examining the Naval Dimension of 
Strategy,” in China’s Evolving Military Strategy, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, DC: 
The Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 99–132; Captain Sukjoon Yoon Republic of Korea 
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Significance, and Impact on the Region,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 3 (Summer 
2015): 40–63. 
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that China’s nuclear strategy plays in its security strategy, I will first discuss 
China’s broad foreign policy and strategic objectives. 
China’s Foreign Policy and Strategic Objectives 
The goals of China’s foreign policy are multidimensional and intertwined 
with domestic politics and nationalism. Yet, there exist conflictual elements in 
China’s foreign policy goals. The first, most important goal for both domestic and 
foreign policy is maintaining the unchallenged rule of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).17 As Nathan and Scobell note, “The CCP defines national security 
as including regime security and the national interest as including the party’s 
																																																								
17 “Constitution of the Communist Party of China (Revised and Adopted at the 19th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017)” (Communist 
Party of China, October 24, 2017), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_
China.pdf. For example, the Constitution of the Communist Party of China states “The 
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democratic dictatorship, to uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and 
to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought—form the foundation for building 
the country. Throughout the whole course of socialist modernization, the Party must 
adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and oppose bourgeois liberalization.” (p. 4). At the 
19th CPC National Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping states, “The Party exercises overall 
leadership over all areas of endeavor in every part of the country. We must strengthen 
our consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, 
follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment. We must work harder to uphold the 
authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee, and closely follow 
the Central Committee in terms of our thinking, political orientation, and actions.” Xi 
Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress” (National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-
11/04/content_34115212.htm; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, 
America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 159–63; 
Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 2012), 295–99; Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: 
Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004). 
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interests.”18 In order to accomplish this, the CCP must maintain its legitimacy. 
Economic growth, nationalism, and the CCP’s claim that it ended the century of 
humiliation, regained China’s independence, and has safeguarded China’s 
national sovereignty are the primary elements of CCP legitimacy.19  
The PLA is instrumental in both safeguarding foreign policy objectives that 
have already been secured and preparing to fight for and realize foreign policy 
objectives that the CCP has yet to accomplish. The PLA has five primary 
missions: (1) defend CCP rule; (2) engage in territorial defense; (3) reunify 
Taiwan under CCP control; (4) nuclear deterrence; and (5) prepare for and 
execute missions beyond Taiwan.20 According to the most recent Defense White 
Paper, “China’s Military Strategy,” the PLA primary missions include the 
following: 
• To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and 
effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial 
land, air and sea; 																																																								
18 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 2012), 294. 
19 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising 
Power (New York: W.W. Norton, 2015), 140; Wang Zheng, Never Forget National 
Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, Contemporary 
Asia in the World (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012), 128; Jiang Zemin, “Jiang 
Zemin’s Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of 
CPC,” July 1, 2001, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jul/15486.htm. Peter Gries 
states, “Lacking the procedural legitimacy accorded to democratically elected 
governments and facing the collapse of communist ideology, the Chinese Communist 
Party is increasingly dependent on its nationalist credentials to rule. But bottom-up 
popular pressures are increasingly threatening the party’s nationalist legitimacy. And 
those pressures tend to be of the aggressive Maine variety—not the pacifist Munich type. 
Chinese nationalism, therefore, can no longer be described as a purely ‘state’ or ‘official’ 
top-down affair.” Peter Hays Gries, “Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?,” 
Current History 104, no. 683 (September 2005): 256. 
20 Nathan and Scobell, China’s Search for Security, 294–315. 
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• To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland; 
• To safeguard China’s security and interests in new domains; 
• To safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests; 
• To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack; 
• To participate in regional and international security cooperation and 
maintain regional and world peace;   
• To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and 
terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social stability; 
and 
• To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights 
and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national 
economic and social development.21  
 
A moral and philosophical component undergirds the justification and legitimation 
of Chinese foreign policy. Wang Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterates 
this point in an October 2017 speech, “China’s foreign policy and philosophy 
occupy the commanding height of human morality, and shows that Chinese 
Communists are able to and willing to make contributions to solving problems 
facing mankind. And it will be widely welcomed and supported by the 
international community.”22 Deng Yuwen articulated Chinese foreign policy thusly, 
“Chinese diplomacy is likely to be unyielding following 19th party congress, with 
no compromise at all in matters involving its core interests. Given its sizeable 																																																								
21 “China’s Military Strategy (Defense White Paper)” (State Council Information Office, 
People’s Republic of China, May 2015), 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586713.htm. 
22 Wang Yi, “Wang Yi Talks about General Goal of Major Country Diplomacy with 
Chinese Characteristics in New Era: To Promote the Building of a Community with 
Shared Future for Mankind” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
October 19, 2017), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1503758.shtml. 
Emphasis added. See also, Yan Xuetong, “Xunzi’s Interstate Political Philosophy and Its 
Message for Today,” in Ancient Chinese Thought: Modern Chinese Power, ed. Yan 
Xuetong, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 86–87; 
Yan Xuetong, “Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the 
International Normative Order?” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 1 
(February 2018): 1–22. 
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capital and strength, and rising nationalism at home, the Communist Party will no 
longer back down on many issues.”23  
Embedded within these broad goals of Chinese foreign policy are China’s 
desire to obtain both de facto and de jure control of Taiwan, the disputed 
territories in the South China Sea, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East 
China Sea. These goals present the United States, Japan, and Taiwan with 
serious strategic challenges that bear directly on U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence,24 challenges to which the U.S. and its allies have yet to develop a 
coherent counter-strategy.25  
																																																								
23 Deng Yuwen, “In Xi’s New Era, Chinese Diplomacy Will Be a Display of Hard 
Power,” South China Morning Post, October 31, 2017, 
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2117726/xis-new-era-chinese-
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24 Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and 
Reassurance in the Pacific During the Second Nuclear Age,” in Strategic Asia 2013-14: 
Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, Strategic Asia (Seattle, WA and Washington, DC: The 
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Contemporary Asia in the World (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2017); Mira Rapp-
Hooper, “Uncharted Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime Disputes,” The 
Washington Quarterly 38, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 127–46. 
25 Robert Haddick, “America Has No Answer to China’s Salami-Slicing,” War on the 
Rocks, February 6, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/america-has-no-answer-
to-chinas-salami-slicing/; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Russia, China Are Outmaneuvering 
US: Generals Recommend New Authorities, Doctrine,” Breaking Defense, June 15, 2018, 
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/russia-china-are-outmaneuvering-us-generals-
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doctrine/?utm_campaign=Breaking%20Defense%20Air%20&utm_source=hs_email&utm
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prompting-fears; Colonel Robert S. Hume (Retired) et al., “Confronting Conflict in the 
‘Gray Zone,’” Breaking Defense, June 23, 2016, 
https://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/confronting-conflict-in-the-gray-zone/. 
 193 
 
Ideational-Strategic Background 
China and the United States perceive differently what is meant by the term 
status quo (xianzhuang). The U.S. perception is based on maintaining U.S. 
military and economic preeminence in “rules-based liberal international order.”26 
Alternatively, I advance the proposition that China views the status quo as a 
desired state in which China is the natural hegemon in Asia—a position it has 
occupied historically. The weakening of China that began during the Qing Empire 
at the hands of the West and Japan are seen as a historical aberration that 
requires rectification.  
Evidence for the disconnect in U.S. and Chinese perception is seen in 
fundamentally dissimilar conceptions of what constitutions “offensive” or 
“defensive” military postures, what constitutes “aggression” (from the Western 
and/or Japanese perspective) or “defensive” action through expansion in order to 
acquire previously held territory—a matter that is highly contested—that is often 
phrased as being “historically Chinese.” Thus, an invasion of Taiwan; 
establishing an air-defense identification zone over contested territory27 in the 
East China Sea; occupation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; military occupation 
of islands in the South China Sea, e.g., the Spratly Islands, the Scarborough 																																																								
26 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of 
the American World Order, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011); Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, 
and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against 
Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012–2013): 7–51. 
27 It should be noted here that the Government of Japan does not officially recognize 
the “contested” nature of this territorial dispute with China, but only that “different 
positions exist.” 
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Reef, and the Paracel Islands; and occupation of Arachunal Pradesh or Aksai 
Chin (disputed territory with India) are not seen, from China’s perspective, as 
offensive, aggressive, or an effort to change the status quo. Rather, it is seen as 
a defensive action that seeks to maintain the territorial and psychological integrity 
of China against foreign encroachment rooted in a particular historical 
understanding of China’s rightful place in the Asian political-security order.28 
Some may point out that this position does not accord with China’s foreign policy 
behavior since the founding of the PRC. However, both attitudes and capabilities 
can shift. It has been only recently that China has had the economic wherewithal, 
military capabilities, and political influence and confidence to attempt to wed its 
material capabilities to its ideational aspirations.  
Such attitudes are consistent with what Andrew Scobell has labeled 
China’s “cult of defense.” For example, despite China attacking first in the Sino-																																																								
28 Yuri Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring 
States Era (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2009); Yuri Pines, The Everlasting Empire: 
The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 2012); Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire: China’s History and 
Modern Foreign Relations (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2010); Zheng Wang, 
Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign 
Relations, Contemporary Asia in the World (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012); 
Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, 
Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000); Merriden Varrall, 
“Chinese Worldviews and China’s Foreign Policy” (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, November 2015); Christopher A. Ford, “Realpolitik with Chinese 
Characteristics: Chinese Strategic Culture and the Modern Communist Party-State,” in 
Strategic Asia 2016-17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley 
J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, Strategic Asia (Seattle and Washington, 
DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 28–60; Fei-Ling Wang, “From Tianxia to 
Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World Order,” in 
America, China, and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, 
and Global Visions, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Jisi Wang, and Feng Zhu, Asia Today (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 43–68. 
 195 
 
Indian War of 1962,29 the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969, and China’s invasion of 
Vietnam in 1979, they are labeled as “self-defensive counterattacks (ziwei fanji or 
ziwei huanji).” The 2013 Science of Military Strategy labels the wars as Dui Yin 
Ziwei Fanji Zhan (the self-defensive counterattack war against India), Zhenbao 
Dao Ziwei Fanji Zhan (the self-defensive counterattack war over Zhenbao Island 
[against the Soviet Union]), and the Dui Yue Ziwei Huanji Zhan (the self-
defensive counter-attack war against Vietnam).30  
Additionally, even though China was not attacked first in the Korean War, 
it is labeled a “self-defensive counterattack (ziwei fanji).”31 This language is 
consistent with China’s claims in the South China Sea, over Taiwan, the air 
defense identification zone over the East China Sea,32 and the Senkaku Islands. 
When every territory is deemed as being part of China (whether it is or not) or if a 
war occurs when China attacks first, it is consistently framed linguistically and 
discursively in terms of self-defense (and thus devoid of any moral opprobrium). 
																																																								
29 It should be noted here that in this instance that India’s “forward defense” put 
Indian troops north of the McMahan line and Chinese troops. The fundamental point is 
not to state that China did not believe it was acting defensively (or unjustifiably) in all 
situations; rather, the underlying premise is that in both linguistic and psychological 
terms, China evinces a defensive rationale for its military actions. The author would like 
to thank Joseph Fewsmith for this point of clarification. 
30 Shou Xiaosong, Zhanlüe Xue [Science of Military Strategy], 141. 
31 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the 
Long March, Cambridge Modern China Series (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2003), 32. 
32 Air defense identification zone (ADIZ) is a common term in international politics. 
The idea here is not that the evocation of the term by China is unique. The point to be 
made is that the ADIZ established by China covered the sovereign air space of other 
states, thus pointing to the fundamental disconnect: perceptions of what constitute 
offensive vs. defensive. 
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This is the logical conclusion—by China’s criteria—of having internalized an 
expansive view of what should constitute China.  
This Rashomon-like mindset is particularly troubling to states with whom 
China has territorial conflicts and to the United States given that China’s nuclear 
weapons are designed, in part, to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of China 
(quebao guojia de lingtu zhuquan).33 Guaranteeing the territorial sovereignty of 
one’s country with nuclear weapons is a position that all nuclear weapons states 
would share. Yet, in China’s case, there is substantial dissonance in its own 
definition of territorial sovereignty and the definitions that correspond to the 
reality of other states’ definitions.34  
Thus, despite the “defensive” rhetoric of China’s nuclear strategy, it is not 
particularly salient when “defense-in-speech” is coterminous with “offense-in-
action.” It is difficult to conceptualize a circumstance where China is involved in a 
war that is not characterized as “self-defensive”; it is also difficult to conceive of 
China not justifying its use of nuclear weapons (even when used first) as “self-
defensive” or consistent with its no-first-use (NFU) policy. It is not clear that, 
despite China’s rhetoric on nuclear weapons, that, in extremis, the CCP will 
																																																								
33 Shou Xiaosong, Zhanlüe Xue [Science of Military Strategy], 145. 
34 Office of the Secretary Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017” (Washington, DC: United 
States Department of Defense, 2017), 6–16, 41; Central Intelligence Agency, “The World 
Factbook—China: Disputes-International,” May 1, 2018, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 
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abide by the logic of what Philip Bobbitt terms the “deterrence assumption”35 that 
many believe was a defining characteristic of deterrence theory during the Cold 
War.36 For China, “Its nuclear capability . . . is a more important ideational factor 
that embeds China’s nuclear arsenal in the overall political, diplomatic, and 
strategic calculation, rather than matching the opponent’s hardware in a one-to-
one game, as was the case of the former Soviet Union and the United States in 
the 1970s and 1980s.”37 
The discursive element in Chinese military thought is highly important and 
warrants further analysis with respect to how China frames territorial disputes in 
its domestic discourse. China’s claims to most territories under dispute are 
buttressed by a fundamental and identical linguistic justification—“since ancient 
times” [zi gu yi lai]. For example, President Xi Jinping, in a speech given to the 
National University of Singapore, claims the South China islands have been part 
																																																								
35 Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear 
Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 57, 111. Bobbitt defines the “deterrence 
assumption” as “the fact that nuclear weapons render credible the threat to destroy 
another nation such that that nation will be wholly dissuaded from the destroying the 
threatening nations. This assumption was mutually realized upon the acquisition of 
thermonuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union. This assumption has 
been shared by all the strategies, of total or graduated response, contrived by the United 
States in the last thirty years.” 
36 Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice 
From the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 
2008). 
37 Yu Bin, “In Search of Security and Self-Identity: Promise and Paradox of China’s 
Nuclear Weapons,” in America, China, and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, 
Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, 
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of China’s territory “since ancient times (zi gu yi lai).”38 Similar language is used 
to justify Chinese claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. An official 2012 White 
Paper released by China on its position on the Diaoyu Islands states, “Diaoyu 
Dao [Diaoyu Islands] has been an inherent territory of China since ancient times. 
This is the common position of the entire Chinese nation. The Chinese nation 
has the strong resolve to uphold state sovereignty and territorial integrity . . . 
Diaoyu Dao has been an inherent territory of China since ancient times, and 
China has indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao.”39 The same language is 
used with respect to Taiwan. In an official document from China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs titled “What is the Reason for saying ‘Taiwan is an inalienable 
part of China’?” it states, “Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. 
The Chinese people were the earliest developers of Taiwan.”40 The 2001 version 
of the Science of Military Strategy makes similar claims regarding Taiwan stating, 
“Since ancient times, Taiwan has been the sacred land of China. As early as 
historical records can tell, its exploration, development and territorial integrity are 
																																																								
38 Xi Jinping, “President Xi Jinping Delivers Speech at National University of 
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39 “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China” (State Council Information Office, 
People’s Republic of China, September 2012), 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043212.htm. 
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the result of arduous efforts of Chinese people generation after generation, 
embodying the unremitting national spirit of China’s forefathers.”41 
The use of this type of language “since ancient times (zi gu yi lai)” by the 
government of China is important in that it confers an infallible and irreproachable 
legitimacy to China’s claims as well as inculcates into the minds of the Chinese 
people that there are no legitimate alternative positions. As such, commensurate 
with the belief that the unity and territorial integrity of China is the ultimate foreign 
policy and domestic political objective, they are thus causes worth fighting for. In 
a nuclear deterrence framework, if credibility is absolute and China believes itself 
to be on the stronger side in the asymmetry of stakes (because its stakes are 
absolute), it stands to reason that these are causes about which China could 
rationally climb the nuclear escalation ladder. Asymmetry of stakes, in this case, 
refers to the belief by China that the stakes for China are higher than the stakes 
of the United States. In other words, Taiwan and contested territories in the East 
and South China Seas are more critical national security interests to China than 
the United States.42 The military and deterrence implications of this mindset will 
be discussed in further detail below. 																																																								
41 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: 
Military Science Press, 2005), 442. 
42 Godwin and Miller underscore this point:  
These perceived asymmetries of interest contribute to China’s view that U.S. 
policies and strategies are similar to those conducted by imperialist and 
hegemonic powers in the past. This same perspective of asymmetric interests 
applies to China’s maritime territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. 
Whereas Beijing recognizes a U.S. interest in freedom of navigation, any U.S. 
involvement in how these territorial disputes should be settled is unacceptable 
because the disputes do not involve U.S. strategic interests. For Beijing, these 
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No First Use Policy 
Most analysts argue that a distinguishing characteristic of China’s nuclear 
strategy is its strict adherence to an NFU policy, which was articulated on the 
same day as China’s first nuclear test on October 16, 1964.43 For example, 
China’s 2015 Defense White Paper states:  
China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons 
and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in 
nature. China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free 
zones, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. 
China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level 
required for maintaining its national security.44 
 
Most mainstream Chinese officials and military figures echo this view and argue 
the policy is sincere and for China to deviate from it would be destabilizing.45 
However, there is an active debate in China on the wisdom of continuing its NFU 
policy and the ramifications it has for force structure and overall nuclear 
																																																																																																																																																																					
territorial disputes are sovereignty issues extending back to the 19th century 
when Japanese and Western imperialists began their violations of China’s 
sovereignty. In China’s view, they are not a matter where the United States has 
any legitimate interest.  
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and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation,” 
China Strategic Perspectives (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Chinese Military 
Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University 
(NDU), National Defense Univ. Press, April 2013), 3. 
43 Zhongguo Zhanlüe Daodan Budui Baike Quanshu [China Strategic Missile Force 
Encyclopedia] (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House, 2012), 11. 
44 “China’s Military Strategy (Defense White Paper)” (State Council Information Office, 
People’s Republic of China, May 2015), 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586713.htm. 
45 See, for example, Yao Yunzhu, “China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence”; Pan 
Zhenqiang, “China’s Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” China Security 1, 
no. 1 (Autumn 2005): 5–9. 
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strategy.46 For example, PLA Major General (retired) Peng Guangqian and Rong 
Yu argue that a conventional attack designed to degrade China’s nuclear 
deterrent could be construed as nuclear first use, “On the surface, this is merely 
a conventional attack, but in effect, its impact is little different than suffering a 
nuclear strike and incurring similarly heavy losses. In this case, conventional 
attack might also be seen as breaking the nuclear threshold, and the attacked 
party will find it difficult to refrain from a nuclear counterattack.”47  
On the issue of outside interference on Taiwan, PLA General Zhu 
Chenghu stated that China would drop its NFU policy, “If the Americans draw 
their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China’s 
territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.”48 Similarly, in 
1995, PLA General Xiong Guangkai told a U.S. government official that China 
using nuclear weapons was an option in a Taiwan conflict.49 With China’s 
growing territorial claims, it is prudent to consider that China might adopt the 
same policy with respect to its claims in the South China Sea or other territories 
in the East China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, for example. 																																																								
46 Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China Security 1, no. 1 
(Autumn 2005): 12. Shen Dingli states, “Presently, given the advancement of military 
technology, and given the shift of China’s own priority of national interests, China’s NFU 
policy has been under unprecedented pressure which has stirred up a debate on the 
validity of NFU.” 
47 Yu Rong and Peng Guangqian, “Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited,” China Security 5, 
no. 1 (Winter 2009): 85. 
48 Alexandra Harney, Demetri Sevastopulo, and Edward Alden, “Top Chinese 
General Warns US over Attack,” Financial Times, July 14, 2005, 
https://www.ft.com/content/28cfe55a-f4a7-11d9-9dd1-00000e2511c8. 
49 Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues 
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Other Chinese-language sources point to a desire to modify China’s NFU 
policy in order to better protect China’s “core interests” (hexin liyi).50 Shen Dingli 
argues that states with which China has territorial disputes might not violate 
China’s sovereignty if China did not have a NFU policy.51 In a 2015 article in the 
Air and Space Power Journal, Major General (retired) Pan Zhenqiang, despite 
being in favor of upholding China’s NFU policy, states that abandoning the NFU 
policy can be seen in certain Chinese military circles. Their rationale, he states, is 
that China’s NFU policy has already failed to stop U.S. containment of China and 
argue that China should adopt a first-use policy in order to protect Chinese 
sovereignty.52  
Thus, there is reason to suspect that China’s commitment to an NFU 
policy is not absolute.53 Especially as some tie NFU’s conditionality to perceived 
infringements on China’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, China could be in a 																																																								
50 Long Xingchun, “Zhongguo Hezhengce, Bufang Jiang Qingchu [There Is No Harm 
in Speaking Clearly on China’s Nuclear Policy],” Global Times, January 15, 2013, 
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“Zhongguo Hezhengce Yu Hexin Liyi [China’s Nuclear Policy and Core Interests],” 
January 18, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2013-01/18/content_27725872.htm; 
Qiao Liang, “Zhuanjia: Zhongguo Ying Xuexi Eluosi Yong Hewuqi Baozheng Anquan 
Fazhan [Expert: China Should Study Russia, Use Nuclear Weapons to Safeguard 
Security Development],” China Space News, January 17, 2014, 
http://news.cri.cn/gb/42071/2014/01/23/6351s4401636.htm. 
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52 Pan Zhenqiang, “Zhongguo Bu Shouxian Shiyong Hewuqi Mondai Yanjiu 
[Research on the Problem of China’s No-First-Use],” Kongtian Liliang Zazhi, Spring 2015, 
12–24, http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-c/2015/2015-
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position to jettison the policy should they determine the strategic environment is 
conducive to such a measure. Li Nan describes five primary situations under 
which China could launch a nuclear first strike: “(1) China’s conventional forces 
are unable to defend against a “large-scale foreign invasion” (“大规模外敌入侵 / 
daguimo waidi ruqin”); (2) If “the enemy attacks our nuclear bases with 
conventional arms, posing enormous threat to our strategic nuclear forces”; (3) 
[The]  PLA’s operational objectives face an “enormous threat” (“巨大威胁 / juda 
weixie”) by a “large-scale foreign military intervention” (“大规模军事干预 / 
daguimo junshi ganyu”) in a “war of safeguarding national unity”—referring to a 
Taiwan conflict scenario; (4) Escalation indicating an opponent’s “intention” to 
cross the nuclear threshold; and (5) Attacks with conventional arms against 
nuclear bases and targets of life-and-death value like the Three-Gorges Dam 
causing destruction comparable to or larger than a nuclear attack.”54  
Many observers suspect that adoption of an NFU policy is simply moral 
posturing or a “diplomatic asset,”55 specifically because actions taken or not 
taken in the future are unverifiable, and in some cases claims of no-first-use have 
been proven in hindsight to be false. For example, Brezhnev was a supporter of 
NFU, but according to files uncovered in East Germany after the Cold War, the 
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“Soviets had first-use operational plans calling for the use of nuclear and 
chemical on the very first day of a conflict with NATO forces.”56  
To states that have territorial disputes with China and the United States, 
this is a fundamental problem with respect to China’s more aggressive and 
expansive territorial claims. As China continues to redefine its sovereignty in 
more expansive terms, then its nuclear strategy can change in order to safeguard 
what China sees as its “national unity,” “territorial integrity,” or “core national 
interests.”57 Most nuclear deterrence theorists argue that the defender of the 
status quo holds the advantage in escalation scenarios and competitions in 
risk.58 However, in the case of Sino–U.S. strategic competition, both sides see 
themselves as upholding two different versions of the status quo: the U.S. as 
upholding the present status quo and China as upholding a constructed 
historical-but-yet-to-be-obtained status quo. Given that China has suffered no 
serious penalties for many of its more provocative acts, such as establishment of 
an air-defense identification zone over Japanese territory, its expansion into and 
militarization of islands in the South China Sea, and its continued arms buildup 
over Taiwan, China likely sees itself as having the advantage in the “competition 
of nerves” that ultimately determines nuclear deterrence outcomes. As will be 																																																								
56 Delpech, 51. 
57 For example, China officially proclaimed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to be a “core 
national interest” in April 2013. Yoon Republic of Korea Navy (Retired), “Implications of 
Xi Jinping’s ‘True Maritime Power’: Its Context, Significance, and Impact on the Region,” 
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58 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect 
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discussed below, the combination of ideational-based expansion59 along with a 
commensurate increase in the nuclear capabilities it takes to protect it can have 
a substantial effect on overall nuclear strategy, doctrine, and force posture. 
China’s Current Nuclear Force Structure 
According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,” China’s nuclear 
arsenal consists of only land-based platforms and sea-based platforms, but is 
working on completing the “triad” with a potential strategic stealth bomber and 
nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle capability.60 China’s nuclear-capable 
land-based platforms consist of approximately 75–100 ICBMs, which include the 
silo-based DF-5A; the DF-5B (MIRV-equipped); the solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-
31 and DF-31A; the DF-4; and the solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-21 MRBM; the 
DF-26; and the MIRV-capable DF-41.61 
China’s sea-based platforms include four Jin-class SSBNs, each equipped 
with 12 JL-2 SLBMs, which constitute China’s “first viable sea-based nuclear 
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deterrent”62 and is capable of hitting targets in the continental United States.63 
The DF-5, the DF-31, and the DF-41 are capable of hitting targets in the 
continental United States. China is expected to begin work on its next-generation 
SSBN (Type 096 SSBN) in the early 2020s and is expected to more be equipped 
with a more advanced and lethal SLBM, the JL-3.64  
The U.S. government’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017” states 
unequivocally “The (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) PLAAF does not 
currently have a nuclear mission.”65 Yet, as Hans M. Kristensen observes, 
“[B]ombers delivered nuclear gravity bombs in at least 12 of China’s nuclear test 
explosions between 1965 and 1979, so China probably has some dormant air-
delivered nuclear capability.”66 Further, recent reports indicate that China’s 
nuclear-capable strategic bomber—the H-6K (a modified version of the older H-
6)—is being deployed, specifically to China’s military installations in the South 
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China Sea.67 In response to these reports, China’s foreign ministry 
spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated, “China’s peaceful construction in the 
Spratly archipelago, including the deployment of necessary national defence 
facilities, is aimed at protecting China’s sovereignty and security. . . . Those who 
don’t intend to violate [this sovereignty] have no reason to worry.”68 This 
response underscores of the fundamental antinomy of foreign policy perceptions 
between China and many of its neighboring countries. First principles are widely 
divergent. China’s expansion and militarization of the South China Sea (and the 
East China Sea) are seen as “protecting China’s sovereignty” and thus defensive.  
Despite China’s expansive territorial claims and its current military attempt 
to solidify them, this perspective is fundamentally not understood or recognized. 
Xi Jinping reinforced this point in his speech to the 19th CPC National Congress, 
“China pursues a national defense policy that is in nature defensive. China’s 
development does not pose a threat to any other country. No matter what stage 
of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage in 
expansion.”69  																																																								
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China also envisions a more robust role for nuclear missions for the 
PLAAF.70 While the official name of the next generation nuclear-capable aircraft 
has not been officially released, it is commonly referred to as the “H-20,” which is 
part of a larger “20 series” concept of more advance nuclear-capable aircraft.71 
Significantly, the new series of long-range bombers with have both nuclear and 
conventional capabilities and will become “an indispensable part in a major 
country’s strategic strike system . . . [and also of great significance] . . . for 
countering nuclear blackmail from superpowers, solving surrounding maritime 
disputes that impede China’s rise.”72 China’s actions show that its historically 
derived, ideationally driven offensive expansion and “reclaiming” of “historical” 
Chinese territory in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan are 
justified as defensive, which has meaningful implications in analyzing its 
understanding of nuclear deterrence. From China’s perspective, its nuclear 
forces—at least in peacetime—play the role as articulated in the “deterrence 
assumption.” However, a non-Chinese perspective can reasonably view such 
actions as using its own nuclear forces as instruments of nuclear blackmail—																																																																																																																																																																					
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 209 
 
precisely (and ironically) one of the primary missions of China’s nuclear forces 
according to its nuclear doctrine. 
China’s nuclear capabilities continue to increase not only in quality but 
also in quantity. According to a recent RAND study, in 1996, China possessed 
only 19 strategic weapons that could target U.S. nuclear assets. By 2003, this 
number more than doubled and in 2010 China possessed around 68 nuclear 
weapons capable of targeting nuclear assets in the United States. By 2017, it is 
estimated that China possessed between 106 and 160 nuclear warheads 
capable of targeting nuclear assets in the United States.73  
The increased ability to strike U.S. targets is critical in exploiting and 
complicating U.S. extended deterrence efforts, as the possibility of the United 
States having to choose between suffering a nuclear attack on its homeland in 
order to live up to treaty obligations becomes more acute. The effects of 
continued enhancement also influence nuclear command-and-control decisions. 
According to the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, as China’s nuclear and 
strategic early warning capabilities increase, China may want to shift to a launch-
under-attack (LuA) or launch-on-warning (LoW) nuclear posture.74 This change in 
doctrine is likely to occur especially as Chinese SSBN capabilities increase. If 
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U.S. or Japanese ASW forces target Chinese SSBNs, Chinese SSBNs would be 
forced to launch first or else the SSBNs would be sunk, thus losing the (People’s 
Liberation Army Navy) PLAN’s entire nuclear deterrent capability. It is 
conceivable that China would, in keeping with its NFU policy, tolerate the sinking 
of its SSBN fleet first, and then conduct a nuclear counterattack with its nuclear 
ICBMs or strategic nuclear bombers. However, this is unlikely. 
For the United States and Japan, a potential problematic aspect with 
respect to China’s nuclear deterrence posture is Chinese thinking and practice 
on “commingling” or “entanglement” of conventional and nuclear forces and 
nuclear and nonnuclear technologies.75 Differing perceptions of the use, 
deployment, and justifications for various technologies exist between the United 
States, China, and Japan.76 First, both of China’s DF-21 and DF-26 missiles 
have nuclear and conventional variants with the “same missile body.”77 Thus, in 
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the event of an attempt by the United States to neutralize the DF-21 or the DF-26, 
this would increase the likelihood of misperception as to whether the United 
States was carrying out a conventional counterforce strike to degrade China’s 
conventional capabilities or conventional counterforce strike to degrade China’s 
nuclear capabilities.  
Second, China has “co-located” many of its conventional and nuclear-
capable missiles, with some ballistic and nuclear missiles sharing the same 
command-and-control system, which carries a similar problem. David C. Logan 
states that conventional and nuclear missiles in China are “operationally and 
geographically entangled, which poses a threat of inadvertent escalation and 
instability during a crisis.”78 If the U.S. detects activity from missile units where 
nuclear and nonnuclear missiles are co-located, it could not be sure which type 
of attack might be forthcoming. From China’s perspective, if it recognizes that the 
United States might be preparing an attack on missile sites where nuclear and 
conventional missiles were co-located, it could not be sure whether the United 
States was attempting to degrade its conventional capabilities or was escalating 
to degrade its nuclear capabilities. In either case, each possibility could call for 
China dropping its NFU policy.79  
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Third, China and the United States have divergent perspectives on the 
implications, severity, and potential for escalation that Chinese anti-satellite 
weapons (ASAT) attacks carry. According to Micah Zenko, “People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) Air Force publications argue that shooting down U.S. early warning 
satellites would be a de-escalatory and stabilizing action in a naval encounter 
with the United States.”80 However, the U.S. space-based satellites are a critical 
component of its nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 
infrastructure.81 Thus, the United States would likely view such an attack as 
escalatory, or one designed to degrade its own nuclear deterrent. Tong Zhao and 
Li Bin, argue, however, that from the Chinese perspective, a Chinese attack 
against early warning satellites in the event of a crisis over Taiwan, for example, 
“would clearly constitute a tactical military operation with the limited objective of 
undermining U.S. theater missile defense capabilities in the region.”82 This has 
implications for Chinese nuclear strategy. If the United States views attacks 
against its early warning satellites as having the effect of blinding its nuclear 
infrastructure, the United States could adopt a stridently more aggressively 
posture or preempt Chinese attempts to neutralize its own space-based nuclear 
infrastructure with either nuclear or high-precision conventional forces. This, in 																																																								
80 Micah Zenko, “Dangerous Space Incidents: Contingency Planning Memorandum 
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turn, in accordance with Chinese doctrinal writings, would cause China to place 
its own nuclear forces on alert.83 As Jeffrey Lewis notes: 
Chinese leaders may believe they are sending a signal of resolve; a US 
president might conclude that these are preparations for an attack. . . . A 
major rationale for conventional prompt global strike in the US includes 
targets in central China such as anti-satellite locations. Yet the 
development of such systems only increases China’s incentive to target 
space assets, while further blurring the line between nuclear and 
conventional forces. The nuclear forces of both sides are becoming 
increasingly entangled with one another as conventional forces become 
more capable. The result is less clarity and time in a conventional crisis 
that takes on a nuclear character.84 
 
Thus, China would have incentive to structure its nuclear forces in order to avoid 
such an attack by the United States by adopting an agile nuclear posture, 
including an ability to preempt preemption.85 
Conceptualizing ASAT attacks as having such a limited objective as 
described by Tong Zhao and Li Bin is difficult to accept, strategically, given the 
degree to which the United States relies on its space-based satellite 
infrastructure for both conventional and nuclear missions that are vulnerable to 
Chinese attack, including early warning and detection (Defense Support Program 
[DSP/GEO], Space-Based Infrared System-High [SBIRS-H/GEO/HEO], Space-
Based Infrared System-Low [SBIRS-L/LEO]); intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (Electro-Optical Imaging Satellites [LEO], Infrared Imaging 
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Satellites [LEO], Synthetic Aperture Radar Imaging Satellites [LEO], Signals 
Intelligence Satellites [GEO]); meteorology (Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program [DMSP/LEO], Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 
[GOES/GEO]); navigation and guidance (NAVSTAR Global Positioning System 
[GPS/MEO]); and remote sensing (LANDSAT/LEO).86 Chinese strategists, 
evidently, “neglect the possibility that the United States might interpret such 
strikes as preparations for the first-use of nuclear weapons designed to scare 
rather than disarm [and fail to consider] this gap in understandings could lead to 
miscalculations and unexpected escalation.”87  
These divergent conceptions lead to further problems. For example, in 
interviews with Chinese experts, Tong Zhao and Li Bin note that in the event of a 
crisis in which U.S. intelligence saw China preparing its ASAT capabilities and 
the United States launched a preemptive strike on China’s ASAT assets and 
facilities, many Chinese experts argued that the United States would be 
responsible for escalation because of the United States’ launch-under-attack 
nuclear posture, not on China for preparing to attack the U.S. NC3 
infrastructure.88  
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There are similar misperceptions with respect to missile defense 
employment,89 particularly with respect to recent plans for Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) deployment to South Korea.90 From the U.S. (and South 
Korean) perspective, THAAD provides for an added layer of defense in 
conjunction with the already-deployed PAC-2 missile defense system from North 
Korean missile threats. However, China believes that the THAAD deployment is 
ultimately aimed at China91 and is part of a more concerted effort, in conjunction 
with national missile defenses (NMD) and other joint-theater missile defense 
(TMD) systems with Japan, to “ring China with missile defenses in an effort to 
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undermine China’s nuclear deterrent”92 as part of a strategy to obtain “absolute 
military advantage.”93 Of particular concern to China is THAAD’s X-band 
AN/TPY-2 radar’s ability to differentiate between decoys and real warheads from 
Chinese nuclear missiles and its potential capability to detect and track the 
launch of China’s JL-2 SLBMs from its Jin-class SSBNs, thus posing a 
substantial security threat to China.94 These divergent perceptions could lead to 
potential escalation. Two retired military officers, Major General Yin Zhuo and 
Rear Admiral Yang Yi, have stated that in the event of a conflict between the 
United States and China, that China should make preparations to strike THAAD 
batteries in South Korea.95 Major General Yin (retired) stated that China should 
consider striking THAAD batteries as the very first move of any conflict with the 
United States.96 
Additionally, as the United States continues to make strides in its 
conventional unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) technology, Chinese writings 
evince concern that U.S. UUVs could potentially attack both China’s SSBNs and 
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SSNs.97 The above instances of “commingling” conventional with nuclear forces, 
whether in their physical deployment posture or in their war-fighting strategy, all 
increase the risk of “entanglement” and escalation. Importantly, China and the 
United States provide widely divergent perspectives, rationales, and justifications 
for how each views the actions and motivations of the other, thus reinforcing my 
argument that deterrence behavior and its impact on nuclear and conventional 
force structure is based on dissimilar belief systems with respect to how nuclear 
deterrence “should work.” Chinese strategists view certain forms of attack and 
counterattack as lying outside of the nuclear deterrence paradigm, many of which 
are deemed to be within the U.S. nuclear deterrence paradigm. For example, 
analysts believe that China views nuclear weapons “as essentially unusable, 
suitable only for [political] coercion . . . but [do] not offer decisive military 
capabilities.”98 However, the logic of such an assertion is problematic. If nuclear 
weapons are deemed to be unusable, then there should be no coercive value in 
threats of nuclear use. Thus, contrary to China’s declared policy, China’s nuclear 
force structure that is designed for using nuclear weapons first while maintaining 
that first-use falls within the no-first-use policy remains distinctive. It is consistent 
with China’s victim-narrative upon which—in part—the CCP derives its legitimacy.  
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The Stability-Instability Paradox 
The recent historical record of China especially (and North Korea) gives 
notional validation to the premise that China is not deterred from initiating 
conflicts that have escalatory potential, i.e., inter alia, China’s missile launches 
over Taiwan during 1995 and 1996, the Chinese fishing trawler crisis of 2010,99 
the establishment of an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) over Japanese 
territory in the East China Sea in November 2013,100 China’s militarization of the 
South China Sea (despite pledging in a press conference with former President 
Obama not to), including most recently landing H-6K nuclear-strike capable 
bomber aircraft that are capable of carrying supersonic cruise missiles,101 and 
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Japan’s increasing frequency of having to scramble to counter Chinese military 
aircraft intruding into Japanese airspace102 point to China’s willingness to push 
the escalatory envelope, testing the boundaries of the U.S. commitment to 
Japan.103 Additionally, China has embarked on a rather unorthodox strategy of 
using the China Coast Guard (CCG) and its Maritime Militia to harass vessels in 
disputed maritime domains that China claims as its own and, over time, to 
change the reality of who actually controls these waters in order to safeguard 
“China’s maritime rights and interests.”104 
The Chinese Coast Guard is regarded as China’s “primary instrument of 
rights protection in peacetime”105 has four primary functions: (1) establish its 
presence in disputed waters to bolster a claim of ownership, (2) track, monitor, 
and obstruct foreign naval vessels operating in China’s exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ), (3) safeguard the security of official and private vessels operating in 
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disputed waters, and (4)  prohibit use of Chinese-claimed waters by foreign 
vessels.106 According to a recent CNA report, “Official and quasi-official Chinese 
texts identify “administrative control” (guankong) as the desired end state of 
China’s rights protection activities. By this, they mean imposing the Chinese legal 
order over disputed waters.107 
China also uses its Maritime Militia for similar reasons.108 One motivation 
is that supposedly “civilian vessels” cannot be treated as military naval vessels 
under international law. Importantly, China’s Maritime Militia has been involved in 
the following incidents: the 2009 Impeccable incident, the 2011 harassment of 
Vietnam’s survey vessels (Viking II and Binh Minh), the 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
standoff (Tanmen Militia present), and the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig 
standoff.109  
These strategies point to China’s belief in the stability-instability paradox 
insofar as they embark on such an aggressive strategy without appreciation of 
the escalation risks involved. The stability-instability paradox has not manifested 
in conventional war between the United States and China. Yet, there have been 																																																								
106 McDevitt, USN (retired), 54–55. 
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actions that could have led to escalation. Further, there are serious 
disagreements between China, the United States, Japan, and Taiwan where an 
incident could escalate to conventional war. China’s military plans for Taiwan and 
its military actions around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are two salient examples. 
Two reasons for this strategy could be (1) they believe fundamentally, in 
accordance with the stability-instability paradox, that because China possesses a 
secure, second-strike capability, that escalation to the nuclear level is simply not 
a possibility; or (2) they believe firmly that the asymmetry of stakes so strongly 
favors China relative to the United States that China believes the United States 
will not respond aggressively to such provocations. 
Taiwan 
Taiwan is an issue in the Chinese security calculus that has importance 
with respect to both ideational and geostrategic factors.110 Most observers argue 
																																																								
110 Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan: Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial 
Integrity, Studies in Asian Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007), 153-164. 
Alan M. Wachman terms this “the great confluence.” For general literature on the China-
Taiwan issue, see, for example, Wachman, Why Taiwan: Geostrategic Rationales for 
China’s Territorial Integrity; Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military 
Strategy, 442–45; David A. Shlapak et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and 
Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009); Scott L. 
Kastner, “Is The Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed 
Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter 2016): 54–
92; Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner, “Bridge Over Troubled Water? Envisioning 
a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement,” International Security 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 87–
114; Nancy B. Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with 
China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009); Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan as a Factor 
in China’s Question for National Identity,” Journal of Contemporary China 15, no. 49 
(2006): 671–86; Michael McDevitt, “Taiwan: The Tail That Wags Dogs,” in Japan-Taiwan 
Interaction: Implications for the United States, ed. Michael McDevitt et al., vol. 1, NBR 
Analysis 16 (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 14–37; Michael D 
Swaine, Andrew N. D Yang, and Evan S Medeiros, Assessing the Threat: The Chinese 
 222 
 
that although multiple factors111 dictate the CCP’s imperative to “liberate” Taiwan, 
that from the CCP’s perspective, ideational reasons are preponderant. For 
example, Godwin and Miller state, “Beijing’s opposition to the permanent 
separation of Taiwan from China is based on both nationalist and security 
grounds, with nationalism being the strongest driver. Beijing’s willingness to risk 
major war to prevent such a separation has been made eminently clear since the 
PRC was founded in 1949.”112 Similarly Suisheng Zhao argues, “Taking action to 
reunify with Taiwan plays a special role in maintaining the legitimacy of the 
communist regime because it involves territorial integrity and national unity and 
hence bears a symbolic value to Chinese nationalism.”113 With respect to the role 
that Taiwan plays in Chinese military strategy, “China’s goal of preventing 
Taiwan’s permanent formal separation from the mainland, and ultimately 
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reunifying China and Taiwan will probably have a greater impact on Beijing’s time 
frame for defense modernization than any other national security goal.”114 
There are voices in China, however, that focus on the strategic rationale 
for unifying Taiwan with China. The following statement by PLA naval strategist 
Jiang Zhijun underscores Taiwan’s strategic significance: 
Once the Taiwan issue is resolved, all of China’s strategic maritime safety 
concerns would automatically dissipate. Taiwan is China’s ideal seaward 
exit way bequeathed to us by our ancestors. As long as Taiwan is in 
China’s hand, then the Pacific would be China’s open field to the east. 
Taiwan itself is a key link in the “first island chain.” After Taiwan is 
reunified with China, this “first island chain” blockade [by the US] will be 
broken, enabling Chinese troops to expand their defense lines out of the 
East into the Pacific in order to better protect the safety of China’s coast 
and mainland. By that time, the Taiwan Strait would have become a safe 
and convenient route of communication for transporting troops and 
supplies between north and south.115 
 
From China’s perspective, prohibiting Taiwanese independence is an issue of 
singular importance. As stated above, while Taiwan does have strategic 
significance, it cannot be construed only as a mere territorial dispute; it is an 
ideational matter upon which the survival of the CCP regime rests.116 This is not 
to say that Taiwan’s strategic salience is not recognized by the CCP. Rather, it is 
argued here that even if Taiwan had little or no strategic salience, reincorporating 																																																								
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Taiwan in China would still be an ideational imperative. Xi Jinping, in his address 
to the 19th CPC National Congress stated China’s current position: 
We stand firm in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and will never allow the historical tragedy of national division to repeat 
itself. Any separatist activity is certain to meet with the resolute opposition 
of the Chinese people. We have the resolve, the confidence, and the 
ability to defeat separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” in any form. 
We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any 
time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from 
China!117 
 
It is widely believed in China that the CCP would suffer a total collapse if it 
allowed Taiwanese independence.118 To prevent such a possibility, the CCP 
enacted the “Anti-Secession Law” on March 14, 2005, whereby the Chinese state 
is authorized and required to “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary 
measures” to prevent the independence of Taiwan in the event Taiwanese 
“secessionist forces” attempt to move toward de jure independence.119 
Reinforcing this point, (People’s Liberation Army) PLA’s General Zhu Chenghu 
warned that the Chinese would retaliate with nuclear weapons against the United 
States (and presumably other countries as well) should it interfere in any conflict 
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between mainland China and Taiwan, stating, “If the Americans draw their 
missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China’s 
territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.” 120 Baohui Zhang, 
while not endorsing the use of nuclear weapons, offers a similar analysis: 
China’s emerging nuclear capabilities offer a tempting option for the 
Chinese military. China may believe that the threat of first use of nuclear 
weapons could generate a powerful deterrence effect, since the United 
States does not have the same credibility in fighting a nuclear war for the 
sake of Taiwan. This is due to the perceived vast asymmetry of interests 
between China and the U.S. in the Taiwan issue. This point is also 
emphasized by American analysts. As a recent Rand study suggests, 
“Beijing would have much more at stake than Washington in the event of a 
showdown over the status of Taiwan.” Although Taiwan’s security is an 
important U.S. concern, “For Beijing, however, Taiwan ranks as the most 
important security issue. . . . In a conflict over Taiwan, Beijing calculates 
that China’s vital national interests, and perhaps, even regime survival, 
would be on the line.”121 
 
The key point to take away from Zhang’s analysis is that nuclear use could 
be determined by a perceived asymmetry of stakes. While China’s stakes in a 
Taiwan conflict are correctly deemed absolute, one could also make the case 
that the United States’ stakes in a conflict are not only critical because failure to 
respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would certainly have repercussions to 
its alliance structure in Asia but also arguably world-wide. Further, the 
ramifications of unification would have a deleterious effect on Japan. The United 
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States’ ability to project power in the region would be substantially reduced and 
would mark a paradigmatic shift in world power.  
Lowering of the Nuclear Threshold 
Most authoritative sources on Chinese nuclear strategy maintain that a 
regional war will be a “local war under nuclear deterrent conditions” (heweishe 
tiaojian xia de jubu zhongzheng).122 According to the Science of Second Artillery 
Campaigns (designated “classified” [jimi] in China), there are potential 
circumstances that China could face that would constitute the lowering of the 
nuclear threshold, including abrogating its no-first-use policy. Four conditions are 
outlined: (1) An enemy state is threatening to execute military strikes against 
China’s nuclear weapons infrastructure with conventional weapons; (2) An 
enemy state is threatening to execute military strikes against major strategic 
targets; (3) An enemy state is threatening to execute military strikes against 
Beijing, other major cities, or against other targets of economic and political 
importance; and (4) China finds itself losing a conventional conflict in which the 
regime faces serious disaster.123  
The China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia outlines four possible 
ways which a crisis or conventional war could lead to nuclear escalation: (1) in 
the event of a serious international crisis involving two nuclear states, one side 
could determine that carrying a nuclear first-strike is to its advantage; (2) “[a] 																																																								
122 Zhongguo Zhanlüe Daodan Budui Baike Quanshu [China Strategic Missile Force 
Encyclopedia] (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House, 2012), 41. 
123 Yu, Di Er Paobing Zhanyi Xue [Science of Second Artillery Campaigns], 294-295. 
Italics added. 
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hegemonic state that possesses nuclear weapons” finds itself losing a 
conventional war and decides that the use of nuclear weapons will rectify the 
imbalance in the war; (3) nuclear escalation could occur due to errors of 
judgment by political leaders; and (4) there can be “accidental nuclear war” in the 
event of an accidental launch or a failure of command-and-control systems.124 
According to Conditions 1 through 4 of the Science of Second Artillery 
Campaigns and Condition 1 of the China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, 
the United States has been caveated out of China’s NFU policy.  
Caitlin Talmadge distinguishes between two camps with respect to the 
likelihood of nuclear escalation in the event of a Sino–U.S. conflict: escalation 
optimists and escalations pessimists,125 but ultimately concludes that “Chinese 
nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional war with the United States is a 
significant risk. . . . Reasonable Chinese fears that the Unites States might be 
attempting conventional counterforce, or considering or preparing for nuclear 
counterforce, could lead China to engage in limited nuclear escalation to gain 
military advantage or coercive leverage—despite China’s no-first-use-policy.”126  
In a 2016 unpublished manuscript, Wu Riqiang of Renmin University 
delineates three causes of possible nuclear escalation between China and the 
United States: (1) the vulnerability of Chinese nuclear forces, (2) the commingling 																																																								
124 Zhongguo Zhanlüe Daodan Budui Baike Quanshu [China Strategic Missile Force 
Encyclopedia] (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House, 2012), 3. 
125 Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese 
Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 
41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 53–57. 
126 Talmadge, 90. 
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of China’s conventional and nuclear weapons, and (3) the fog of war.127 Wu 
Riqiang’s analysis is important in that it asserts that Chinese nuclear forces do 
not necessarily possess a “secure second-strike capability” and might be 
vulnerable to a disarming campaign by U.S. forces.128 This dichotomy—whether 
China does or does not possess a secure second-strike capability—in both 
Chinese and American thought is critical. Some U.S. academics believe the 
United States achieved the ability to successfully disarm China (and Russia) in a 
successful nuclear counterforce first-strike.129 Most other observers believe that 
China does possess the means to retaliate against a U.S. first strike.130 This 
dichotomy also exists in the convention realm. 
Many Chinese strategists operate under the assumption that China will be 
in a position of conventional inferiority in any conflict with the United States.131 
Alternatively, many U.S. analyses of potential war with China argue that as a 
																																																								
127 Wu Riqiang, “Sino-U.S. Inadvertent Escalation” (Beijing, 2016), 5–6. 
128 Riqiang, 13; Wu Riqiang, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (May 2013): 579–614. 
129 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of 
U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7–44; Keir A. Lieber and 
Daryl G. Press, “U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,” China 
Security, Winter 2007, 66–89. 
130 Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of 
Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure”; Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring 
Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability”; Yao 
Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence”; Yao Yunzhu, 
“China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence”; Shou Xiaosong, Zhanlüe Xue [Science of 
Military Strategy]; Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers 
and Issues for the United States. 
131 Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing 
the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2015); Baohui, “The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China’s No-First-Use 
Policy,” 167–68; Shou Xiaosong, Zhanlüe Xue [Science of Military Strategy]. 
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result of China’s advanced A2/AD strategies, the United States is now at a 
conventional disadvantage in the Western Pacific, or at minimum that Chinese 
advances at the conventional level have advanced to a level where determining 
who is at an advantage has become ambiguous at best.132  
Several weapons deployed by the Chinese make this calculation 
increasingly difficult. These are the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and 
the DF-26 IRBM, respectively. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the 
DF-21D “gives the PLA the capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in 
the western Pacific Ocean.”133 The DF-26 “is capable conducting conventional 
and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets and conventional strikes 
																																																								
132 See “The Receding Frontier of U.S. Dominance,” Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-
China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-
2017, 321–42; Shlapak et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military 
Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute; Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: 
Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher 
Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Implications 
for the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 1 (February 2009): 67–114; 
Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Conventional Missile Capabilities of 
China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,” Asian 
Security 8, no. 2 (July 2012): 115–37; Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals 
Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” The National Interest, September 3, 2015, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/showtime-china-reveals-two-carrier-killer-missiles-
13769?page=show; Toshi Yoshihara, “Japanese Bases and Chinese Missiles,” in 
Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Carnes 
Lord and Andrew S. Erickson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 37–66; 
Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, 
Trajectories, and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 
2013). 
133 Office of the Secretary Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and 
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017,” 31. 
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against naval targets in the western Pacific Ocean”134 and is also capable of 
hitting Guam.135  
Further, because the DF-26 can have either nuclear or conventional 
warheads, this will complicate the United States’ ability to discriminate in a war 
situation and the  United States would have every reason to assume the worst, 
i.e., that an incoming DF-26 or a barrage of incoming DF-26s were carrying 
nuclear warheads. Even if they were not yet launched, if U.S. reconnaissance 
picked up movement of the DF-26, it would have strong incentive to strike first, 
which, according to many authoritative PLA writings, would obviate its NFU policy. 
It is not currently known what defenses carrier strike groups (CSG) have against 
the DF-21D and the DF-26. If U.S. defensive capabilities are inferior to the 
offensive capabilities of the DF-21D and DF-26, and the United States wants to 
gain the initiative or advantage in a conflict, it is likely that vertical escalation will 
ensue via the implementation of Air-Sea Battle (JAM-GC).  
Conclusion 
Conflictual elements inhere in Chinese domestic policy objectives, foreign 
policy objectives, and nuclear strategy. While maintaining its desire for peaceful 
foreign relations, its foreign policy objectives and actions are often inimical to 
peace. China’s militarization of the South China Sea, its aggressive posture 
																																																								
134 Office of the Secretary Defense, 31. 
135 Andrew S. Erickson, “Academy of Military Science Researchers: ‘Why We Had to 
Develop the Dongfeng-26 Ballistic Missile,’” December 5, 2015, 
http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/12/academy-of-military-science-researchers-why-
we-had-to-develop-the-dongfeng-26-ballistic-missile-bilingual-text-analysis-links/. 
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toward Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and its declaration of the ADIZ 
over Japanese and Korean territorial waters are domestic and ideational 
imperatives yet are not commensurate with its public rhetoric of peaceful foreign 
relations. This is because China views its claims over disputed territories as 
absolute and maintains the belief that other states simply should accept the 
legitimacy of China’s claims due to China’s mission of “national rejuvenation 
(minzu fuxing)” and its historical role as the hegemon of Asia.  
The security dynamic in the Western Pacific vitiates Robert Jervis’ security 
dilemma model136: 
China and the 
United States 
Offense has the 
advantage 
Defense has the 
advantage 
Offensive  posture 
not distinguishable 
from defensive one 
Doubly dangerous Security dilemma, 
but security 
requirements may 
be compatible. 
Offensive  posture 
distinguishable from 
defensive one 
No security 
dilemma, but 
aggression 
possible. 
Status-quo states 
can follow different 
policy than 
aggressors. 
Warning given. 
Doubly stable. 
Table 2. Jervis Security Dilemma Model. 
In the Sino-U.S.-Japanese (and Taiwanese) context, it is neither clear 
whether the offense or defense has the advantage (but will depend on the beliefs 
of each state and there is no guarantee that these beliefs will be uniform within 
																																																								
136 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 
(January 1978): 211. 
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each state), nor is it clear, from the perspectives of each state, which is acting 
offensively or defensively. Thus, a fourth column might be added labeled 
“Offensive/Defensive Advantage Indistinguishable.” Additionally, more matrixes 
would have to be added to take into consideration both Japan’s and Taiwan’s 
assessments. This would give us an exponentially greater and more complicated 
set of options than Jervis’ simple two by two table with only two states in a 
security dilemma. China, the United States, and Japan will all believe they are 
acting defensively, and each will believe it has adopted a defensive posture (with 
the opposing state holding the opposite perception). Due to China’s policy of 
“active defense (jiji fangyu)”137 and divergent understandings of the status quo, a 
rather novel security quadrilemma has formed in the Western Pacific. The world 
has not yet seen a rising, revisionist power138 with nuclear weapons believing—
for ideational reasons—it is acting defensively in its expansion, coupled with a 
																																																								
137 “Zhongguo de Junshi Zhanlue: San, Jiji Fangyu Zhanlue Fangzhen [China’s 
Military Strategy: Three, Strategic Guidelines of Active Defense]” (Chinese Ministry of 
National Defense, May 26, 2015), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-
05/26/c_1115408217_2.htm. Regarding China’s policy of “active defense (jiji fangyu),” a 
former military attaché in Beijing and former director of the Strategic Studies Institute of 
the U.S. Army War College stated, “It’s (the policy of ‘active defense’) a fairly prickly and 
aggressive military doctrine inside a defensive structure. . . . A lot of what they do is very 
heavily built on preemption.” Similarly, Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (retired), stated, 
“They (China) don’t have to wait and take the first shot . . . China claims ‘if you act 
diplomatically to challenge our sovereignty . . . we have the right to preemptively attack 
as part of our active defense strategy.’” Sydney Freedberg Jr., “China’s Dangerous 
Weakness, Part 1: Beijing’s Aggressive ‘Self-Defense,’” Breaking Defense, September 
26, 2013, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/chinas-dangerous-weakness-part-1-
beijings-aggressive-idea-of-self-defense/. 
138 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the 
American Military’s Competitive Edge” (United States Department of Defense, January 
19, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
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status quo power also armed with nuclear weapons with either formal or informal 
treaty obligations with the states whom the nuclear-armed revisionist power is 
attempting to challenge under an extended nuclear deterrence framework. 
The traditional narrative is that China views nuclear weapons as 
fundamentally defensive (ziwei fangyu de heweishe [defensive nuclear 
deterrence]) that only serve two purposes, (1) to deter an enemy state’s nuclear 
use and threats of nuclear use and (2) to retaliate against a nuclear first strike 
(ziwei hefanji),139 and that “In general, the drivers of China’s future nuclear 
strategy have two main attributes: they are principally linked to advances in U.S. 
military capabilities . . . and to U.S. strategic defenses and conventional strike 
capabilities in addition to the United States’ nuclear forces.”140 However, if we 
take into consideration that China is deliberately pursuing a more aggressive 
nuclear posture to include “nuclear war-fighting”141 and that its approach to 
“integrated strategic deterrence”142 is one that deliberately conflates nuclear, 
conventional, space, and cyber warfare (as opposed to an astrategic 
bureaucratic conflation of mission sets), then another, plausible narrative 																																																								
139 Yuan, “Chinese Perceptions of the Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Prospects and 
Potential Problems in Disarmament,” 18. 
140 Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of 
Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” 83. 
141 James Samuel Johnson, “Chinese Evolving Approaches to Nuclear ‘War-
Fighting’: An Emerging Intense US-China Security Dilemma and Threats to Crisis 
Stability in the Asia Pacific,” Asian Security, March 2015, 1–18; Johnson, “China’s 
Evolving Approach to Nuclear War-Fighting”; Michael Tkacik, “Chinese Nuclear 
Weapons Enhancements--Implications for Chinese Employment Policy,” Defence 
Studies 14, no. 2 (2014): 161–91. 
142 Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, China’s Evolving Approach to “Integrated 
Strategic Deterrence” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016). 
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emerges. This narrative is focused on the ideational-based expansion of China 
under the guidance of the CCP that returns China to its “rightful” place of 
hegemony in East Asia under the mantra of the “China Dream [Zhongguo 
meng],”143 and its preparations to reduce the hegemonic presence of the United 
States in East Asia and concomitantly reduce the power of U.S. allies in the 
region through a policy of alliance decoupling, salami-slicing, adoption of a 
specific counter-U.S. and counter-Japan A2/AD strategy, its internalization of the 
stability-instability paradox, and incrementally and in long-term fashion engaging 
in a fait accompli foreign policy effectively testing the (non-)resolve of the United 
States and its allies. The above, coupled with China’s quantitative and qualitative 
enhancements of its nuclear forces and its unique politico-strategic 
implementation of “nuclear deterrence with Chinese characteristics” are the 
driving forces behind China’s foreign policy today. 
 
																																																								
143 Li Wenhai, “Shixian Zhonghua Minzu Weida Fuxing de Genben Baozheng 
[Implementing the Fundamental Guarantee of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
People],” People’s Daily, 2001, 
http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/paper85/4118/482479.html; Jin Minqing, “Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Shi Zhonghua Minzu Weida Fuxing de Zhongliudizhu [The Communist 
Party of China Is the Cornerstone of the Rejuvenation of the Chinese People],” 
Guangming Daily, July 6, 2016, http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2016-
07/06/nw.D110000gmrb_20160706_1-06.htm. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation sought to elucidate the understudied ideational aspects 
of nuclear deterrence theory using Japan and China as case studies. Using a 
thin constructivist approach, key ideational aspects of Japan’s role as a protégé 
in an extended nuclear deterrence framework—particularly constitutional theory 
and identity theory—were explicated to explain Japan’s exceptional strategic 
behavior for which structural realism and classical deterrence cannot account. 
The history of Japan’s interest in and discourse regarding nuclear weapons 
explains its current nuclear hedging strategy, while the rise of China specifically1 
as the “Other” in Japan’s national psyche explains its shift to a more pro-active 
military posture.  
The theoretical shortcomings of structural realism, power transition theory, 
and classical nuclear deterrence theory were uncovered with the goal of 
identifying a theoretical space wherein a thin constructivist theoretical approach 
could be instantiated, specifically the relationship between the agent-structure 
problem, structuration theory, and nuclear deterrence theory. The paradoxes and 
antinomies of realism and nuclear deterrence theory were problematized, thus 
																																																								
1 William Choong, The Ties That Divide: History, Honour and Territory in Sino-
Japanese Relations (London: Routledge, 2017); June Teufel Dreyer, Middle Kingdom & 
Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations, Past and Present (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016); James C. Hsiung, ed., China and Japan at Odds: 
Deciphering the Perpetual Conflict (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). 
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showing the analytical chasm that exists in the two approaches that are typically 
used in tandem or as a congealed whole in an epistemologically flawed fashion. 
The ongoing process of Japan trying to strengthen its executive branch in 
its efforts to deal with a rising China was explained using Japan’s own legal 
cases and constitutional interpretations by both the Supreme Court and Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau. The legal thought of Kant, Locke, Aristotle, and Schmitt were 
articulated as Weberian ideal types to give both context and a framework within 
which Japan may justifiably strengthen its executive powers, especially in 
emergency situations, without a descent into prewar authoritarianism. Japan’s 
efforts at strengthening its ability to engage in collective self-defense through 
constitutional reinterpretation received significant rationalization, thus bolstering 
this dissertation’s thesis that ideational elements play a disproportionate role in 
states’ nuclear strategies—a role often ignored in most nuclear deterrence 
literature. Lastly, this dissertation has shown that the Japanese constitution has 
put constraints on the U.S.-Japan alliance that are often in contradiction to 
Japan’s explicit foreign policy goals relating to securing the credibility of the 
United States’ “nuclear umbrella.” 
China’s nuclear deterrence posture and nuclear strategy were justified on 
ideational grounds in contradistinction to mainstream structural explanations that 
account for rising powers’ strategic behaviors. Analyses based wholly or primarily 
on distribution of states’ material capabilities fail to account for both Japan’s and 
China’s strategic behavior in the nuclear and conventional realms.  
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Part of this dissertation’s purpose is to cause both scholars and 
policymakers to look beyond the nuclear deterrence theories we have inherited 
from the Cold War and instead focus on specific ideational characteristics of a 
particular country when analyzing its nuclear strategy where ideational factors 
are viewed not as mere epiphenomena, but as variables that are taken seriously 
in the study of international relations.  
This approach goes beyond “tailored deterrence” by not merely asking 
what deterrence tools are necessary to deter a specific adversary under specific 
circumstances, but to seek to understand holistically how each state internalizes, 
understands, and operationalizes nuclear deterrence theory in their respect 
nuclear strategies and resultant nuclear force structures. Further, underpinning 
my argument is that the governing parties of the United States, Japan, China, 
and Taiwan should bear in mind that there is a possibility that, however 
unpleasant, nuclear deterrence could fail.2 Lastly, this dissertation has sought to 
challenge the assumption found in much of the nuclear deterrence literature that 
extended deterrence processes and outcomes are primarily the result of the 
																																																								
2 Colin S. Gray perceptively notes,  
Although history tells us that the conditions for nuclear peace have persisted 
since the late 1940s, it is less helpful as a guide to what deters. The nuclear 
deterrence system may be said to have worked for more than three decades, but 
the system may not truly have been tested. One cannot demonstrate that war 
would have occurred but for the presence of nuclear weapons, or that war would 
have occurred but for a particular state of the strategic balance. Colin S. Gray, 
Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning, Philadelphia Policy Papers 
(Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), p. xvii, italics in 
original. 
 238 
 
defender’s and challenger’s actions and that protégés can have a substantial 
impact on the extended nuclear deterrence equation.3 
As such, the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and China all face serious 
security challenges in the current strategic environment in East Asia. Many of 
these security challenges have a substantial nuclear component. Maintaining 
both central deterrence and extended deterrence are complicated by a variety of 
factors. These include the number of nuclear weapons states in Asia, the 
historical animosities between nuclear and non-nuclear states between which 
exists significant territorial disputes, the ability of the United States and China to 
achieve a bilateral measure of nuclear stability while not alienating allies of the 
United States in the process, and the inclusion of new forms of warfare that can 
make nuclear deterrence operations more complicated, such as the maturation of 
artificial intelligence and hypersonic weapons technologies. The naval-centric 
aspect of security contingencies and its relationship to managing gray-zone 
escalation dynamics further complicate the East Asian security calculus.  
A question may arise to this study’s generalizability given the unique 
nature of Japan’s constitution and the particular history between Japan, China, 
and the United States. However, there are two primary ways in which the 
approach of this study might be applied to other cases. First, in general, many 
studies of both central and extended deterrence could benefit by the thin 
constructivist approach taken in this dissertation, particularly how a thin 																																																								
3 Andrew O’Neil, Asia, The US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas 
in the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 119. 
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constructivist framework with respect to how the agent-structure problem and 
structuration theory can be applied to studies of nuclear deterrence. Second, this 
study could be applicable to other extended deterrence protégés that have 
substantial constraints on executive power. It is often taken for granted that chief 
executives will have the same type of robust command authority possessed by 
the President of the United States, the President of France, the President of 
Russia, or the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in the event 
that war takes place. Yet, this has been shown not to be the case, especially in 
Japan. A study of other constitutional arrangements between the executive and 
the use of force might show similarities in legal or constitutional executive 
proscription. In these cases, the deeper study of the causes or roots of 
constitutional- or legal-based proscriptions on the executive could benefit from 
the method used in this dissertation and conduct more intensive case-specific 
research as needed.  
 To conclude, this dissertation has shown that the United States must 
recognize that states’ nuclear strategy and their resultant nuclear force structure 
is contingent upon ideational imperatives derived from, inter alia, history, culture, 
political and philosophical values, nationalism, and states’ self-perception of its 
desired role in a strategic system. The “black box” level of analysis in formulating 
nuclear deterrence strategies is an inadequate analytical tool. Deterrence 
“lessons” derived from the United States’ and the former Soviet Union’s unique 
experiences are likely to provide little guidance when dealing with a rising nuclear 
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power in the “second nuclear age.” Both scholars and policymakers should take 
seriously the ideational factors informing the nuclear strategy of states that bear 
directly on the national security states.  
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